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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1Background 
Climate change is a serious threat to the welfare of the current and future generations. 
Although efforts from international communities have been made to decelerate the process of 
climate change, global average atmospheric temperature has increased and will continue to 
increase for decades even under stringent climate policies. According to the latest Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5) by IPCC, many of the observed changes in the climate system are 
unprecedented. The globally averaged surface temperature has shown an increase from 0.65℃ 
to 1.06℃ over the period 1880 to 2012 (IPCC 2014). As a direct result of global warming, 
glaciers and ice sheets have been disappearing at increasing rates over the period 1992 to 
2011 (IPCC 2014). As a consequence, the global mean sea level has already risen by 0.19 m 
over the period 1901 to 2010 (IPCC 2014). Moreover, if fossil fuel stocks will get depleted, 
the ultimate impacts on sea levels could be catastrophic for many countries (Winkelmann et al. 
2015). There is now also overwhelming evidence that global warming is the result of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC 2014). Emissions of CO2 from fossil 
fuel combustion and industrial processes contributed about 78% to the total GHG emissions 
increase from 1970 to 2010 (IPCC 2014). Hence, mitigating anthropogenic CO2 emissions is 
crucial to address the problem of global warming. Particularly, due to the irreversibility of 
climate change (Carraro et al. 2006), strategies of CO2 emissions mitigation are needed to 
reduce the negative impacts of climate change. 
GHG emissions generate negative externalities that are not confined to the borders of an 
emitting country. It should be described as a transboundary pollution problem and should be 
addressed through cooperation at an international level. The optimal GHG abatement policy 
internalises negative externalities on other countries. The other side of the same coin is that 
benefits from emissions mitigation of one country are positive externalities for other countries 
as they can be shared by others. Due to the public good properties of GHG mitigation (i.e. 
non-excludability and non-rivalry), each country has incentives to free-ride on others’ 
mitigation. These free-riding incentives are an obstacle for the cooperative action on GHG 
emissions mitigation (Barrett 1994). 
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Barrett (1990) points out that one way out of the public goods dilemma on emissions 
mitigation is to form agreements between sovereign countries. Such agreements involve 
mutual consent to a global climate policy and its implementation. However, countries are 
characterised by heterogeneous mitigation costs and benefits. These asymmetries imply that 
benefits of cooperation differ between countries and there is no straightforward way to 
allocate the costs in an equitable way. Moreover, cooperating countries who are “doing the 
job” could be worse off compared to a non-cooperating country. Due to the lack of a 
supranational authority to enforce participating countries to fulfil their mitigation 
commitments, agreements have to be implemented voluntarily by countries. To facilitate the 
formation of international climate agreements, effective economic and institutional 
instruments need to be designed and implemented. The core of this thesis is the study of 
design features of an international climate agreement that improve its effectiveness and 
acceptance by sovereign countries. 
1.2 International climate agreements  
International climate agreements (ICAs) are formed between sovereign countries and 
designed with the aim of reducing GHG emissions. The first international climate agreement 
is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which was 
signed in 1992. Until now 194 countries have been involved in this treaty. UNFCCC (1992) 
sets its objective as to “stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that will prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system”. However, 
mitigation targets for member countries in UNFCCC are non-binding, which means that 
UNFCCC cannot enforce the reduction of GHG emissions. Nevertheless, as the starting point 
for ICAs, the UNFCCC shows the potential to tackle the problem of climate change in a 
cooperative way. Following the objective of the UNFCCC to reduce GHG concentrations, the 
Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997. As one step further in the UNFCCC process, the Kyoto 
Protocol sets legally binding mitigation targets for selected members in a stepwise method. 
Furthermore, an enforcement mechanism has been included to make signatories fulfil their 
commitments. To increase the cost-effectiveness of emission reductions, market-based 
mechanisms are designed in the protocol. However, the Kyoto Protocol failed to include 
binding targets for developing countries. Clearly, the Kyoto Protocol has a limited ability to 
induce significant reductions of worldwide GHG emissions. Facing threats from climate 
change, a stable post-Kyoto ICA with high mitigation efficiency in reducing global GHG 
emissions is urgently needed. The Paris Agreement, which was adopted in December 2015 
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and went into effect on 4 November 2016, is considered as a historic agreement for climate 
change mitigation. To limit the global average temperature increase below 2 ℃, the Paris 
agreement seeks participation of all parties to the UNFCCC. So far, the two largest GHG 
emitters, China  and the United States, have ratified this agreement.   
The public good nature of GHG emissions mitigation implies that individual mitigation 
incurs national costs but generates commonly shared benefits. Thus, each individual country 
has potential incentives to free ride on other’s mitigation efforts. Given this, there are two 
general aspects that should be considered in the design of an effective ICA.  
Firstly, due to the lack of a supranational authority to enforce cooperative behaviours, 
ICAs have to be self-enforcing. This implies that countries must have sufficient incentives to 
voluntarily participate in an ICA. The economic literature on ICA formation based on non-
cooperative game theory (Barrett 1992, 1994; Hoel 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993) shows 
that self-enforcing ICAs are characterised by a small size. ICAs with a larger size can only be 
reached when the gains from cooperation are small. To improve countries’ incentives to 
participate, some studies focus on reducing free-riding incentives by using various transfer 
schemes (e.g. Barrett 2001; Eyckmans and Finus 2006; Weikard et al. 2006), and applying 
different membership rules (Finus et al. 2005; Finus 2008) or social norms (Lange and Vogt 
2003; van der Pol et al. 2012). To reduce free-riding incentives that result in countries’ 
noncompliance with their commitments, the role of enforcement mechanism comprising 
monitoring and punishment in enhancing countries’ compliance levels is discussed and 
studied in some literature (Hovi and Areklett 2004; Barrett 2008; McEvoy 2013). 
The second aspect we need to consider for ICAs design is the efficiency of ICAs, which 
includes the cost effectiveness and the mitigation effectiveness. From an economic 
perspective, cost effectiveness is achieved by implementing the mitigation targets of an ICA 
at minimum costs. It is commonly acknowledged that mitigation costs can be minimised 
through market-based instruments, for example through carbon trade (Montgomery 1972; 
Tietenberg 1985; Barrett 1992; Helm 2003). Mitigation effectiveness concerns the “depth” of 
ICAs. The most frequently employed approach to addressing mitigation effectiveness of ICAs 
has been setting the mitigation standards and regulating countries’ emissions levels, the so-
called command-and-control instrument, whereby a high mitigation level can be achieved by 
setting mitigation targets (Sinclair 1997; Endres and Finus 2002).  
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1.2.1 Carbon trade 
The approach of marketable emission permits or carbon trade has proven its cost-
effectiveness advantage in reducing GHG emissions (Montgomery 1972; Tietenberg 1985; 
Barrett 1992; Rose and Stevens 1993; Leiby and Rubin 2001). Due to the heterogeneity in 
marginal abatement costs and benefits between countries, trade in emission permits enables 
carbon buying countries to reduce abatement costs and generates revenues for carbon selling 
countries. In addition to the cost-efficiency improvement, carbon trade can also alleviate the 
impact of free-riding incentives by serving as a transfer scheme to redistribute coalitional 
gains.  
While carbon trade implements abatement targets at minimal costs, it has proven to be 
difficult to establish consensus on binding targets. Moreover, for the design of a carbon trade 
mechanism, it is also essential to elaborate on how to allocate initial emission permits among 
countries that participate in carbon trade. The initial permits allocation determines the cost-
savings or revenues of carbon traders and thus their incentives to trade. Free allocation of 
initial emission permits was a standard feature of most existing carbon trade schemes, for 
example the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Generally, there are two 
allocation schemes. One scheme allocates the initial emission permits according to some 
given criteria. For example, taking into account the acceptability, some pragmatic rules based 
on sovereignty features like GDP, population, or historical emissions are proposed (Larsen 
and Shah 1994; Bohm and Larsen 1994; Edmonds et al. 1995). Considering the equity 
concept of burden-sharing in GHG emissions reduction, some equity rules based on the 
normative criteria are introduced as an improvement to pragmatic rules (Rose and Stevens 
1993; see Weikard 2004 for a more fundamental discussion). Both pragmatic and equity rules 
can be characterised as exogenous permit allocation rules. Alternatively, initial permits can be 
allocated endogenously. Helm (2003) suggested an endogenous allocation rule based on a 
strategic choice mechanism. According to this rule, initial permits and the after-trade emission 
levels are chosen non-cooperatively based on individual welfare maximisation. The 
endogenous permit allocation rule improves the cost efficiency in emission permits allocation 
across carbon traders.  
As to the effect of the emission permit allocation rule on countries’ participation 
incentives in ICAs, Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) examined the impact of permit 
trading on the stability of international climate agreements in a game theoretical model by 
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applying exogenous permit allocation rules. Their simulation results show that permit trading 
based on pragmatic allocation rules is more successful in improving the stability and 
abatement efficiency of ICAs, as compared to the one based on equitable allocation rules. To 
study the effect of the endogenous permits allocation scheme on participation incentives, 
Carbone et al. (2009) formulated a two-stage coalition formation model that analyses the 
formation and abatement efficiency of an international emission trade agreement based on 
Helm’s endogenous permits choice model. They have shown that an international climate 
agreement with international carbon trade (and, hence, cost efficient abatement) can be 
formed between developed and developing countries under endogenous permits choice. In 
their model countries with lower marginal abatement costs are incentivised to join carbon 
trade by seeking trade revenues. Their participation improves the coalitional abatement level 
and the cost-efficiency of abatement. In both analyses of Carbone et al. (2009) and Helm 
(2003), emission permits allocated to all carbon traders are not constrained. Without 
constraints on the total or individual permit choices, as studied by Helm (2003), the 
motivation to raise revenues from carbon trading could result in inefficiencies due to 
excessive permit choices, so-called ‘hot-air’. Another problem that could arise in such an 
unconstrained carbon market concerns the stability. Standard climate agreements are 
characterised by open membership, which implies free entry and exit. For an unconstrained 
carbon market with open membership, large revenues generated from carbon trading could 
induce excessive participation of countries with lower marginal abatement costs. The result 
could be that emission permits are oversupplied, which could undermine the stability of a 
carbon market through participation incentives that originate from selling carbon permits. 
Therefore, imposing a constraint on permit choices might not only mitigate the hot-air effect, 
but may also help to stabilise a carbon market by avoiding excessive participation. Hence, it is 
worth studying how exogenous constraints on allowance choices change the incentives to 
participate in an international carbon market and its environmental effectiveness.  
In the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is designed to reduce 
members’ free-riding incentives and improve the abatement effectiveness of the protocol by 
lowering signatories’ abatement costs. Under the CDM, two different kinds of carbon traders 
are involved. One is the signatory of the Kyoto protocol (Annex B countries), the others are 
non-signatories. Signatories are allowed to earn tradeable emission reduction credits by 
implementing mitigation projects in the outsider developing countries. This carbon trade 
option raises questions about its impact on the incentives to join and the effectiveness of an 
Chapter 1 
6 
 
ICA for mitigation. There are two coalitions that can be formed: a climate coalition for GHG 
emissions mitigation and a coalition for carbon trade. When these two coalitions are 
considered in parallel, the mitigation coalition and the non-signatories are considered as 
potential carbon traders and allowed to join the carbon market. As compared to a simple 
mitigation coalition, incentives with an open carbon market will be different in the sense that 
countries are not only incentivised to join an ICA for obtaining cooperation gains, but are also 
motivated to join the carbon market for trade benefits. Furthermore, an open carbon market 
not only increases the welfare of signatories of the ICA, but also of non-signatories. If the 
latter effect from trade benefits is sufficiently strong, then leaving the coalition will become 
more attractive and the carbon market has a negative effect on participation incentives and the 
success of the ICA. This can be translated into the research problem of how players’ 
incentives to participate in an ICA change if an independent carbon market is established 
outside of an ICA. It might offer an alternative or complementary policy instrument to 
facilitate mitigation. Furthermore, facing the advantage of low abatement costs and trade 
revenues, the question is whether or not the mitigation coalition is willing to join the carbon 
market. This concerns the problem of the interplay of a mitigation agreement and a carbon 
market. In this thesis, the impact of a carbon market as an independent party on the stability 
and effectiveness of an ICA for GHG emissions mitigation is investigated.    
1.2.2 Nash bargaining solution 
The Samuelson rule defines how cooperation is most efficient for public good provision. With 
respect to the climate mitigation problem, international cooperation on GHG emissions 
mitigation  generates positive net gains compared to the non-cooperative Nash behaviour. The 
potential positive gains from cooperation show the need for negotiation between countries 
with free-riding incentives. For example, some international climate agreements (e.g. the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol) are established through multilateral negotiations. Negotiation 
between players for collaborative benefits can be regarded and solved as a bargaining problem 
(Nash 1950). Hence, bargaining is a tool to distribute collaborative gains and to facilitate 
cooperation by providing well-designed sharing schemes for collective gains. Nash (1950) 
provided an axiomatic approach to distributing collective gains in the context of cooperative 
bargaining theory. Under this approach there is a unique solution to a bargaining problem, 
which is known as the Nash bargaining solution satisfying a set of axioms, such as individual 
rationality and Pareto efficiency (see Nash 1950). The Nash bargaining solution can obtained 
Introduction 
7 
 
by solving a maximisation problem and has been widely applied to distributional problems 
(see Grout 1984; Jackson and Moulin 1992; Han et al. 2005; Carraro et al. 2006).  
However, so far only few studies have applied the Nash bargaining solution to the 
problem of international climate cooperation. To examine the impacts of different sharing 
schemes in coalitional payoffs sharing, Carraro et al. (2006) applied the Nash bargaining 
solution to coalitional surplus sharing in a climate coalition. In their model, coalition members 
are assumed to be symmetric with equal bargaining power. However, in real climate 
negotiations negotiating countries are asymmetric. This asymmetry impacts countries’ 
bargaining power, which reflects each negotiator’s ability to obtain the share of cooperative 
gains. Thus, the bargaining outcome on the distribution of collective gains is subject to 
bargaining power. Then the key issue of bargaining over gains from international climate 
cooperation is to identify what constitutes the bargaining power of each negotiator. Therefore, 
it is interesting to explore potential sources that could induce differences of negotiators’ 
bargaining power and identify the determinants of bargaining power in international climate 
negotiations. Furthermore, a bargaining solution is not just affected by bargaining power, but 
also by players’ outside options (Wagner, 1988; Muthoo, 1999; Powell, 2002). The outside 
option payoffs impose a lower bound on the bargaining solution since no one needs to accept 
an agreement where he is worse off compared to what he can obtain otherwise. Therefore, it is 
also interesting to study the impact of the Nash bargaining solution applied to gains from 
climate cooperation and considering outside options on the incentives to join an international 
climate agreement in the first place.  
1.2.3 Enforcement 
Free-riding incentives exist in both the participation and implementation stage of ICAs. The 
free-riding incentives in the former case can be overcome by some institutional designs 
considering membership rules (Finus et al. 2005) or side payments (e.g. Eyckmans and 
Tulkens 2003; Carraro et al. 2006; Eyckmans and Finus 2006; Weikard et al. 2006). To 
improve the success of an ICA, an enforcement mechanism is needed to incentivise 
signatories to comply with their commitments. The idea that contracts need enforcement is 
not new (e.g. Buchanan 1975). For the case of ICAs, Barrett (2008) analyses the features of 
the Kyoto protocol and points out that enforcement mechanisms are essential and imperative 
to ensure the effectiveness of ICAs. Moreover, Finus (2008) reviews the enforcement 
mechanism adopted by the Kyoto protocol and confirms positive effects of the enforcement, 
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but also proposes measures to improve the enforcement mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. 
As a further step, Hovi et al. (2012) formulate a pragmatic and credible compliance 
enforcement system for post-Kyoto climate agreements. With respect to the impact of the 
enforcement on the participation in and compliance with self-enforcing ICAs, McEvoy and 
Stranlund (2009) study a coalition formation game that includes an enforcement system with 
costly monitoring. Their theoretical results show that under costly enforcement the set of 
stable ICAs is smaller, but stable coalitions can reach higher levels of participation and 
abatement compared to costless enforcement where compliance is taken for granted. Based on 
the same game structure, McEvoy and Stranlund (2010) study the effect of costly enforcement 
on the efficiency of voluntary environmental agreements. They find that a voluntary 
environmental agreement can be more efficient in reaching emissions targets than an 
emissions tax under the condition that the agreement is enforced by a third party that is 
financially supported by the members of the agreement. Their results also imply that free-
riding incentives can be reduced if signatories bear enforcement costs. The analyses of 
McEvoy and Stranlund (2009, 2010) provide insights into the design of enforcement 
mechanisms in ICAs, where an effective enforcement should be undertaken by an 
independent third party and funded by all signatories. 
However, McEvoy and Stranlund (2009, 2010) only consider the case of full compliance 
by all members, which results in abatement decisions are restricted to whether or not to 
control emissions. Therefore, their assumption does not consider partial enforcement that may 
result from signatories’ choice of enforcement expenditures. Signatories of ICAs are 
motivated by cooperative gains to support the enforcement, however they will not contribute 
an amount that is beyond their compliance benefits. If their contribution to enforcement is not 
sufficient for full compliance, certain amounts of noncompliance may occur. The social 
optimum is reached by full compliance of signatories in an ICA. When enforcement is costly, 
however, the optimal enforcement could induce the partial compliance (Arguedas 2005, 2008; 
Stranlund 2007).  
By allowing for partial compliance on the formation of ICAs, one chapter of this thesis 
investigates the optimal enforcement policy in an ICA. This enforcement policy involves the 
setting of the optimal abatement target and monitoring expenditure. Furthermore, the impact 
of an optimally designed enforcement mechanism on incentives to participation and 
compliance in a self-enforcing climate coalition is also studied in that chapter. 
Introduction 
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1.3 Objective and research questions  
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the formation of climate coalitions and to gain insight into 
the implementation mechanisms of ICAs in an game theoretic framework. Introducing 
institutional design elements of ICAs, this thesis aims to identify optimal outcomes where 
everyone gains in an incentive compatible environment. In order to achieve this objective, the 
following research questions are addressed: 
 What is the impact of a carbon market on regional incentives to join an ICA for GHG 
emissions mitigation when the carbon market is established independently of this 
agreement?   
 How does an individual allowance choice constraint impact the stability and 
effectiveness of a carbon trade agreement? 
 What is the impact of using the Nash bargaining solution for distributing coalitional 
gains under different sets of bargaining weights on the stability and effectiveness of 
international climate agreements? 
 How can an optimal enforcement mechanism for an ICA be designed, and what is the 
impact of  an optimally designed enforcement mechanism on participation and 
compliance? 
1.4 Methodology 
To address the research questions, game theoretical models are solved analytically and by 
numerical analysis. Negotiations on international climate cooperation are essentially strategic 
interactions between countries with different interests. Therefore, game theory is an 
appropriate theoretical instrument to analyse negotiating countries’ behaviours and incentives. 
The problem of international climate cooperation is characterised by the lack of property 
rights, externalities and the absence of a supranational authority to enforce climate policies 
(Folmer and van Mouche 2000; Schmidt 2000). These characteristics explain why non-
cooperative game theory is often used as a theoretical foundation to analyse the international 
cooperation on climate mitigation. By applying a game theoretical approach, the formation of 
ICAs is modelled as a coalition formation game, whereby the participation incentive is 
analysed. In such a context, a stable climate coalition is a Partial Agreement Nash equilibrium 
(PANE) (see Chander & Tulkens 1995). In a PANE, a coalition chooses actions based on joint 
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payoffs maximisation while the outsiders to the coalition choose actions that maximize their 
individual payoffs. In this thesis, I use this game theoretic concept. By applying backward 
induction, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is obtained as the solution concept of such a 
game. Under subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the individual rationality of signatories at 
each stage is ensured.  
For the numerical analysis in this thesis, I employ a calibrated numerical model – an 
adjusted version of the STAbility of COalitions model (STACO version 3.0) as documented 
by Dellink et al. (2015). STACO is an integrated assessment model. It links a (simple) climate 
change module with a game theoretic module for economic and policy analysis. STACO 
formulates a two-stage cartel (ICA) formation game for twelve heterogeneous regions in the 
world. STACO model provides a basis for addressing the research questions in this thesis with 
respect to the stability and performances of ICAs in the context of heterogeneous players. In 
the two-stage game of STACO, regions decide at the first stage whether or not to join a 
coalition. There are two strategies to be chosen, either to join or not to join. At the second 
stage, abatement strategies are chosen simultaneously by coalition members and outsiders. 
For coalition members, their abatement is chosen cooperatively considering the abatement 
levels of outsiders as given, whereas the outsiders choose their abatement non-cooperatively 
considering all others’ abatement as given. This two stage-game in STACO implies that the 
membership choice is once and for all and cannot be changed in the later periods of the time 
horizon defined in STACO. 
In order to capture the long-term effect of climate change, STACO adopts a time horizon 
of 100 years. The climate module of STACO relates GHG emission paths to GHG 
concentrations and atmospheric temperature change for the whole time horizon. In STACO, 
the GHG emissions specifically focus on the CO2 emissions. It is worth noting that numerical 
results in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis are based on the specific modelling approach and 
the calibration in the STACO model. Therefore, the results for coalition stability and 
performances would be different from the ones derived from other integrated assessment 
models, for example the RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang 1996), the ClimNeg World 
Simulation (CWS) model (Bréchet et al. 2011; Eyckmans and Tulkens 2003; Eyckmans and 
Finus 2006), the Model of International Climate Agreements (MICA) (Lessmann et al. 2009; 
Lessmann and Edenhofer 2011) and the WITCH model (Bosetti et al. 2006). In particular, in 
the STACO model the functional forms of abatement benefits and costs are specified as cubic 
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and linear forms, respectively. For a full specification of the latest version of the STACO 
model (STACO 3) the reader is referred to Dellink et al. (2015). 
More complex game theoretical models are studied in this thesis, and the STACO model 
is adapted for the numerical analysis of these models. For the first research question, I extend 
the two-stage game to four stages by including the formation of a carbon market. To solve the 
second research question, I modify the original model to the formation of a carbon market 
with constrained endogenous allowance choices, where allowances, abatement levels and 
carbon prices are generated endogenously in an international carbon market system. To 
answer the third research question, I introduce the Nash bargaining solution with different sets 
of unequal bargaining weights into a climate coalition to redistribute the cooperative gains 
across coalition members. The fourth question is addressed with an analytical model.      
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The remaining of the thesis consists of four main chapters which answer the research 
questions described in  section 1.3.  
Chapter 2 analyses the impact of an independent carbon market with endogenous 
allowance choice on the incentive structure of an international climate coalition for GHG 
emissions mitigation. I formulate a four-stage game theoretical model, in which the climate 
coalition and the carbon market are formed sequentially. To show the differences in 
participation incentives and performances from the two-stage cartel formation game, two 
scenarios are examined by a simulation analysis.  
Chapter 3 investigates the formation and mitigation efficiency of an international carbon 
market where the individual choice of emission allowances is constrained by imposing an 
exogenous constraint. To show the impact of the constraint on the choices of allowance and 
abatement level, I analyse the strategy of carbon traders theoretically and numerically through 
increasing the strictness of constraints. 
Chapter 4 explores the application of the Nash bargaining solution with different sets of 
asymmetric bargaining weights to the distribution of cooperative gains in a climate coalition. I 
identify the possible determinants of bargaining powers for the negotiators in a climate 
negotiation, and provide different sets of bargaining weights used for the distribution of 
coalitional gains. 
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Chapter 5 studies the design of an optimal enforcement mechanism in an ICA and the 
impact of this enforcement mechanism on the participation and compliance level of an ICA.  
The Chapter 6 summarises the answers to the research questions, and contains the 
synthesis and conclusions.      
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Chapter 2 
International climate agreements and the scope for carbon 
trade with endogenous permits 
 
In this paper, we develop an international climate policy game with a mitigation agreement 
and a carbon market that is open for all. The carbon market is modelled following Helm’s (J 
Public Economics, 2003) suggestion that participants may freely choose their initial permit 
endowments and then trade. In a game theoretic model we explore incentives for market 
participation, incentives to join a mitigation agreement and the interlinkages between the two. 
We employ a numerical analysis of a 7-region version of the STAbility of COalitions 
(STACO) model. We find that number and size of stable mitigation coalitions are smaller 
with than without a carbon market. The mitigation coalition has no incentive to join a carbon 
market with non-signatories, since the benefits from free riding surpass the net gains from 
carbon trade. However, some non-signatories would join a carbon market which helps to 
reduce global emissions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 This chapter is based on a submitted manuscript and a working paper presented in a thematic session of the 5th World 
Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists (WCERE) in Istanbul, June 28-July 02, 2014: Yu, S., Weikard, H.-P., 
Zhu, X., van Ierland, E.C. (2016). International climate agreements and the scope for carbon trade with endogenous permits. 
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2.1 Introduction 
As it remains difficult to reach an effective global climate agreement, it has been suggested to 
rely on unilateral actions or move forward with a partial coalition that would facilitate the 
formation of an International Climate Agreement (ICA) (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Brandt, 
2004). A prominent tool to meet mitigation targets, whether unilateral or global, are carbon 
emission trading schemes. The European Union (EU), for example, has introduced the 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which is a major tool within the EU to 
reach the mitigation targets of the second commitment period of the Kyoto protocol. As the 
EU is developing climate policies for the time beyond 2020, the scope for extending the 
European carbon market towards a global market has received increasing attention (e.g. Behr 
et al., 2009). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) defined in the Kyoto protocol 
allows Annex B countries that have accepted a cap on emissions to earn certified emission 
reductions by implementing mitigation projects in developing countries. Because these 
certified emission reductions may be traded in an emission trading scheme, the CDM can also 
be interpreted as a step in the direction of a global carbon market.  
In this paper we examine the stability of ICAs for mitigation when at the same time, but 
independently, a carbon market offers an alternative or complementary policy instrument to 
facilitate mitigation. Our analysis extends the frequently-used two-stage game for the analysis 
of international environmental agreements (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco 1993). We amend the 
game with a carbon market that is open to all. Following a suggestion by Helm (2003) we 
model a carbon market with endogenous emissions permit choice. Upon entering the market 
each country makes an  announcement of its emissions cap, i.e. its initial endowment with 
permits. Our game theoretic analysis sheds light on the interplay of a mitigation agreement 
and a carbon market. More specifically, we examine the sequential formation of two 
agreements, one on mitigation and one on carbon trade. Our game has four stages. At stage 1, 
players make their decisions on whether or not to join the mitigation agreement. We refer to 
those who join as the coalition members, and the remaining players are referred to as 
singletons. From stage 2 onward coalition members coordinate their climate policies and act 
as a single player. At stage 2, the coalition and the remaining singletons decide whether or not 
to join the carbon market. At stage 3, market participants announce their initial permit 
endowments. At stage 4, market participants can sell or buy permits and all players choose 
their mitigation levels. We solve the game backwards employing Sub-game Perfect Nash 
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Equilibrium. The equilibrium determines membership in the mitigation agreement, carbon 
market participation, carbon sales and mitigation levels.  
 While carbon trade implements any abatement target at the lowest cost, it has proven to 
be difficult to establish consensus on binding targets. Helm’s (2003) permit trade game with 
endogenous permit choice responds to this difficulty. While one is tempted to think that 
endogenous permits choice makes it attractive for all players to join the market, Helm (2003) 
shows that this is not true. In a global market with endogenous permit choice high damage 
countries may suffer a welfare loss compared to a Nash equilibrium in the emissions game 
without trading. This suggests that a partial market can be established by a subgroup of 
countries.  Carbone et al. (2009) analyse incentives to join an international carbon market 
with the application of Helm’s idea of endogenous allowance choices to a calibrated general 
equilibrium model. Their numerical results show that sub-global carbon markets exist and 
these equilibrium markets are successful to induce the participation of developing countries. 
In Carbone et al. (2009), the results of stable coalitions are obtained only by considering 
internal stability of the carbon market. In this paper, we apply the solution concept of the 
cartel stability where the carbon market is stable when both of internal and external stability is 
satisfied. Our results show that only a partial carbon market emerges and a mitigation 
coalition would usually not join the market. The intuition is that the mitigation coalition 
countries would usually have high (aggregate) marginal abatement benefits, they would be 
permit buyers thereby the negative transfers of buying emission permits and the benefits from 
free-riding surpass the gain from trading.  
Since the aim of the study is to go beyond qualitative results and to obtain insights in the 
relative strength of the different interacting effects of a mitigation agreement and carbon trade 
with partial agreements and partial markets we employ an adjusted version of the STAbility 
of COalitions model (STACO 3.0). Our version of STACO specifies the abatement benefit 
and cost functions for seven regions to evaluate the effects of endogenous permits choice on 
the stability of international coalitions and abatement efficiency. The original STACO 3.0 has 
been developed by Nagashima et al. (2011) and Dellink et al. (2015) and comprises 12 
regions.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we introduce our four-stage 
game. In Section 2.3, we present the analytical results. In section 2.4, we provide a brief 
description of STACO 3.0 and explain our re-calibration. In Section 2.5, we present numerical 
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results on the formation and efficiency of a mitigation agreement and a carbon market with 
endogenous permits choice. Section 2.6 concludes.  
2.2 The model 
We consider a game with a set of countries or regions ܰ = {1, … , ݊} that aim at maximising 
individual payoffs in a climate policy game. Our game has four stages: (i) formation of a 
mitigation agreement, (ii) formation of a carbon market, (iii) choice of emission permits, and 
(iv) carbon trade and abatement. A detailed description of the four stages follows. 
Stage 1: Formation of a Mitigation Agreement  
At the first stage, each player ݆ ∈ ܰ = {1, … , ݊}  announces whether or not to join a 
mitigation agreement. Formally each player has a binary strategy space {join, not join}. We 
refer to the subset of players who join as the signatories or the mitigation coalition  ܯ ⊆ ܰ; 
we refer to the non-signatories as singletons. ܯ is called “grand coalition” if ܯ = ܰ. If ܯ =
{݆} or ܯ = {}, we have the All-singletons structure. ܯ is a non-trivial partial coalition if it has 
at least two members. The remaining singletons are represented as the set ܰ − ܯ.  
We assume that signatories coordinate their climate policies to maximise joint payoffs. 
Hence, at subsequent stages, the coalition ܯ  acts as a single player. Our game has three 
subsequent stages and we employ the concept of Partial Agreement (Subgame Perfect) Nash 
Equilibrium (Chander & Tulkens 1995 and 1997) to solve our game. We will say that a 
mitigation coalition is stable if no signatory has an incentive to leave and no non-signatory 
has an incentive to join.  
Stage 2: Formation of a Carbon Market  
At this stage, the coalition ܯ acts jointly and the remaining singletons act individually, to 
decide to join or not to join the market for the trade in carbon emission permits. Formally 
each player has, again, a binary strategy space {join, not join}. We refer to the subset of 
players who join the market as traders  ܶ ⊆ ܰ;  Clearly, in order to be effective, ܶ must have 
at least two members. The carbon market, if it is formed, is assumed to be competitive and to 
satisfy Walras’ law. We will say that market participation is stable if no trader has an 
incentive to leave and no non-trader has an incentive to join the market.   
Stage 3: Choice of Initial Permits Endowment  
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At this stage, only market participants denoted by ݇ ∈ ܶ make a choice. They choose an 
amount of initial emission permits ߱௞. We refer to these as market participant ݇’s endowment. 
Coalition members jointly announce their aggregate endowment. The aggregate of all 
announcements ߱ = ∑ ߱௞∈் ௞ determines the size of the market and the aggregate abatement 
level of all trade participants. At this stage, the carbon price denoted by ݌  (=݌(߱) ) is 
determined by the total number of permits and equals to marginal abatement costs in 
equilibrium. Hence, with the assumption of market clearing individual trader’s abatement 
level decided at stage 4 can be indirectly affected by the total permit choice ݍ௞ = ݍ௞(݌(߱)). 
The choice of each market participant depends on three factors: benefits from global 
abatement denoted by ܤ௞, costs from own abatement denoted by ܥ௞ and revenues from trade. 
In the model of this paper, players’ abatement benefits ܤ௝ , which depends on the global 
abatement level ݍ = ∑ ݍ௝௝∈ே , are defined as linear form (ܤ௝ᇱ(ݍ) > 0, ܤ௝ᇱᇱ(ݍ) = 0). This linear 
form assures the dominant strategy of all non-participants’ abatement choice. Players’ 
mitigation costs ܥ௝ depend on a country’s own mitigation effort ݍ௝ and are convex (ܥ௝ᇱ൫ݍ௝൯ >
0, ܥ௝
ᇱᇱ൫ݍ௝൯ > 0).  
Stage 4: Permits Trade and Abatement 
At the final stage all players choose their mitigation levels. It is assumed in the model that 
each player’s abatement level does not exceed uncontrolled emissions denoted by ݁̅௝. At this 
stage we have four possible types of players: singleton non-traders, singleton traders, 
members of a non-trading coalition, and members of a trading coalition. 
The general structure of the four-stage game is summarized in Figure 2.1:   
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Stage 1: Formation of mitigation
coalition
Stage 2: Formation of carbon
market
Stage 3: Initial permits choice by
carbon traders
Stage 4: Choice of mitigation level
by all players
Players at stage 1: j ∈ N
The coalition: M Remaining singletons: j ∈ N-M
Carbon market Market outsiders
Join Not join
Players at stage 2: {M,{j | j ∈ N-M}}
Join Not join
T
Traders: k ∈ T
All players choose .jq ( )j N
 
Figure 2.1. Schematic representation of the game proceeding with four stages  
2.3 Analysis       
In this section, we present the theoretical analysis and results for each stage. We apply 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium and solve the game by backward induction.  
Stage 4: Mitigation   
At this stage, each player has decided whether or not to be a signatory to the mitigation 
agreement and whether or not to participate in the carbon market. Market participants have 
announced their endowment such that  ߱ ≡ ∑ ߱௞∈் ௞ and (implicit) permit price is given at 
this stage. Best response abatements will depend on the choices made at previous stages. Thus 
we identify conditions for the best responses for each of the four types of players.  
a. For singleton non-traders  ݆ ∉ ܶ, ݆ ∉ ܯ, they choose their optimal mitigation level by 
solving the following problem:  
               max
                    ௤ೕ
  [ߨ௝ = ܤ௝(ݍ) − ܥ௝൫ݍ௝൯].                                                                                              (2.1)                         
The first order condition is obtained as  
               ܤ௝
ᇱ(ݍ∗) = ܥ௝
ᇱ൫ݍ௝
∗൯.                                                                                                                  (2.2)                            
Singleton non-traders just equate their marginal benefits with their marginal costs of 
mitigation.        
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b. A singleton trader  ݇ ∈ ܶ, ݇ ∉ ܯ must set its mitigation level ݍ௞   according to the 
number of permits it holds after buying or selling permits. The optimization problem 
is: 
              max
௤ೖ
  [ߨ௞  = ܤ௞(ݍ) − ܥ௞(ݍ௞) + ݌[߱௞ − (݁̅௞ − ݍ௞)].                                                    (2.3) 
The third term of right side of Eq. (2.3) shows trade revenues, and the quantity traded 
is the difference between permits ߱௞  and after-trade emissions ݁௞(= ݁̅௞ − ݍ௞). The 
best response by singleton traders  is derived by taking the derivative of Eq. (2.3) with 
respect to ݍ௞:  
              ݌∗ = ܥ௞
ᇱ (ݍ௞
∗ ) .                                                                                                                          (2.4)  
             For traders it is optimal to equate marginal mitigation costs with the permit price.  
c. If the coalition participates in the carbon market, then the coalition member that also 
belongs to the carbon market ݇ ∈ ܯ ∩ ܶ jointly solves                 
max
௤ೖ
   [෍ ߨ௜
௜∈ெ
= ෍ (ܤ௜(ݍ) − ܥ௜(ݍ௜) + ݌[߱௜ − (݁̅௜ − ݍ௜)])
௜∈ெ
].                            (2.5) 
The best response of a coalition member when the coalition is participating in carbon 
trade must also  satisfy  condition (2.4). This follows from the first order condition 
obtained from problem (2.5). Recall that at this stage members of a mitigation 
agreement coordinate their climate policies and the coalition acts as a single player, 
i.e. all or none of the coalition members enter the carbon market. In a competitive 
market, trade equalises the marginal abatement costs among traders through a uniform 
permits price ݌∗ . For a convex cost function (2.4) implicitly gives individual 
abatement as a function of price. Since the carbon market must clear, we also have 
߱ = ∑ (݁̅௞ − ݍ௞)௞∈்  and we can determine the equilibrium price.     
d. If the coalition does not participate in the market, then members ݆ ∈ ܯ, ݆ ∉ ܶ solve 
the following problem:  
               max
௤ೕ
   [෍ ߨ௜ = ෍ ൫ܤ௜(ݍ) − ܥ௜(ݍ௜)൯
௜∈ெ
]
௜∈ெ
.                                                               (2.6) 
The first order condition is:                        
               ܥ௝
ᇱ൫ݍ௝
∗൯ = ෍ ܤ௜
ᇱ(ݍ∗)
௜∈ெ
.                                                                                                           (2.7) 
      Joint payoff maximisation requires that coalition members equate individual marginal 
cost with the sum of all members’ marginal benefits (Samuelson’s rule).  
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      With these results we can move to the analysis of stage 3 of the game. 
Stage 3: Choice of  Initial Permit Endowments                 
      At this stage only traders make a choice. A singleton trader’s best response initial permits 
choice ߱௞∗  is the solution to the following problem: 
max
ఠೖ
   [ߨ௞ = ܤ௞൫ݍ(߱)൯ − ܥ௞ ቀݍ௞
∗ ൫݌∗(߱)൯ቁ + ݌∗(߱) ቀ߱௞ − ݁̅௞ + ݍ௞
∗ ൫݌∗(߱)൯ቁ],   ݇ ∈ ܶ, ݇
∉ ܯ.                                                                                                                             (2.8) 
For convenience we will sometimes refer to emissions instead of abatement: 
݁௞
∗൫݌∗(߱)൯ ≡ ݁̅௞ − ݍ௞
∗ ൫݌∗(߱)൯. 
Differentiating the objective function Eq. (2.8) with respect to ߱௞  yields the equilibrium 
outcome: 
߱௞
∗ = ݁௞
∗ +
ܤ௞
ᇱ ቀݍ∗൫݌∗(߱∗)൯ቁ −ܥ௞
ᇱ ቀݍ௞
∗ ൫݌∗(߱∗)൯ቁ
݌∗ᇲ(߱∗)
 .                                                                      (2.9) 
If the coalition participates in the carbon market the best response choice of initial permits 
߱௞
∗  solves the following problem of joint payoff maximisation: 
max
ఠೖ
   [෍ ߨ௜(߱௜)
௜∈ெ
= ෍ ቂܤ௜ ቀݍ
∗൫݌∗(߱)൯ቁ − ܥ௜ ቀݍ௜
∗൫݌∗(߱)൯ቁቃ
௜∈ெ
+ ݌∗(߱) ෍ ቀ߱௜ − ݁௜
∗൫݌∗(߱)൯ቁ
௜∈ெ
], ݇
∈ ܯ ∩ ܶ.                                                                                                                   (2.10) 
Taking derivatives of Eq. (2.10) with respect to ߱௞, we obtain from the first order condition 
෍ ߱௜
∗
௜∈ெ
= ෍ ݁௜
௜∈ெ
+
∑ ܤ௜
ᇱ൫ݍ∗(߱∗)൯௜∈ெ − ܥ௝
ᇱ ቀݍ௝
∗൫݌∗(߱∗)൯ቁ
݌∗ᇲ(߱∗)
.                                                       (2.11) 
The final step in the analysis of the stage-3 game is to sum up the equilibrium 
announcements of all market participants ݇ ∈ ܶ using Eq. (2.9) and Eq. (2.11). Using the 
market clearance condition and individually optimal abatement ݌∗ =  ܥ௞ᇱ (ݍ௞∗ ) (see Eq. (2.4)) 
we obtain the equilibrium price of permits: 
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݌∗൫ݍ∗(߱∗)൯ =
1
⋕ ܶ
෍ ܤ௞
ᇱ ൫ݍ∗(߱∗)൯
௞∈்
.                                                                                             (2.12) 
where ⋕ ܶ represents the number of market participants and is specified as follows: 
⋕ ܶ ≡ ൜
|(ܰ − ܯ) ∩ ܶ|,        ݂݅ ܯ ݀݋݁ݏ ݊݋ݐ ݆݋݅݊ ݐℎ݁ ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ
|(ܰ − ܯ) ∩ ܶ| + 1, ݂݅ ܯ ݆݋݅݊ݏ ݐℎ݁ ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ.         
  
Notice that the mitigation coalition acts as a single player. From Eq. (2.12), we can see that 
the equilibrium price depends on the number of the market participants and the marginal 
abatement benefits of all traders. 
Furthermore, in line with Helm (2003), we obtain the following conclusion from Eqs. (2.9) 
and (2.11). A singleton is a permit buyer (seller) if its marginal benefits of abatement are 
larger (smaller) than its marginal costs of abatement. Formally it follows from (2.9) that  
 ൜
݌݁ݎ݉݅ݐݏ ܾݑݕ݁ݎ: ݁௞
∗ − ߱௞
∗ > 0 ⟺ ܥ௞
ᇱ (ݍ௞
∗ ) < ܤ௞
ᇱ (ݍ∗) 
݌݁ݎ݉݅ݐݏ ݏ݈݈݁݁ݎ: ݁௞
∗ − ߱௞
∗ < 0 ⟺ ܥ௞
ᇱ (ݍ௞
∗ ) > ܤ௞
ᇱ (ݍ∗)
, ݇ ∈ (ܰ − ܯ) ∩ ܶ.                        (2.13)            
A coalition member is a permit buyer (seller) if the sum of the coalition’s marginal benefits of 
abatement are larger (smaller) than that member’s marginal costs of abatement. Formally it 
follows from Eq. (2.11) that 
 ൜
݌݁ݎ݉݅ݐݏ ܾݑݕ݁ݎ: ∑ ݁௜
∗
௜∈ெ − ∑ ߱௜
∗
௜∈ெ > 0 ⟺ ܥ௞
ᇱ (ݍ௞
∗ ) < ∑ ܤ௜
ᇱ(ݍ∗)௜∈ெ  
݌݁ݎ݉݅ݐݏ ݏ݈݈݁݁ݎ: ∑ ݁௜
∗
௜∈ெ − ∑ ߱௜
∗
௜∈ெ < 0 ⟺ ܥ௞
ᇱ (ݍ௞
∗ ) > ∑ ܤ௜
ᇱ(ݍ∗)௜∈ெ
, ݇ ∈ ܯ ∩ ܶ.       (2.14)            
This result means that we can identify buyers and sellers by looking at the relationship 
between marginal costs and marginal benefits of abatement. Helm (2003) therefore 
distinguishes low-damage (ܤ௞ᇱ (ݍ∗) < ܥ௞ᇱ (ݍ௞∗ )) and high-damage (ܤ௞ᇱ (ݍ∗) > ܥ௞ᇱ (ݍ௞∗ )) countries, 
where in our case the damages are the avoided benefits from abatement. It is clear from 
equations (2.13) and (2.14) that a coalition member is more likely to be a permit buyer as the 
sum of marginal benefits for the coalition is more likely to exceed individual marginal costs.  
Stage 2: Market Participation Choice  
Now we move back to stage 2. The sub-game played at this stage determines trade 
participation. During this stage, players, i.e. the coalition ܯ  and the singletons, 
simultaneously choose to join or not to join ܶ. The choice of market participation depends on 
the payoffs from being a carbon trader or an outsider. The analysis of stages 3 and 4 of the 
game implicitly defines payoffs for each coalition and the remaining singletons for every 
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possible partition of the players into a set of traders and outsiders. In other words: payoffs can 
be written as a function of the coalition structure and market participation. We denote the 
resulting partition function by ௝ܸ(ܯ, ܶ). At stage 2, given ܯ, player ݆ would participate in the 
market ܶ if and only if  
௝ܸ(ܯ, ܶ) ≥ ௝ܸ(ܯ, ܶ\{݆}).                                                                                                                 (2.15) 
In the equilibrium, condition (2.15) must hold for traders. In addition, outsiders must prefer 
not to participate in trade: 
௝ܸ(ܯ, ܶ) ≥ ௝ܸ(ܯ, ܶ ∪ {݆}).                                                                                                              (2.16) 
Conditions (2.15) and (2.16) are the internal and external stability conditions for market 
participation. 
Stage 1: Formation of a mitigation coalition 
Moving back to the first stage, i.e. the formation of mitigation coalition ܯ, each player 
݆ ∈ ܰ makes choice of joining or not joining coalition ܯ. The choice of membership of ܯ 
depends on the payoffs from being a coalition member or a singleton.  The internal and 
external stability conditions of the mitigation coalition is: 
௝ܸ(ܯ) ≥ ௝ܸ(ܯ\{݆}), ݆ ∈ ܯ,                                                                                                             (2.17)                         
௝ܸ(ܯ) ≥ ௝ܸ(ܯ ∪ {݆}), ݆ ∉ ܯ.                                                                                                          (2.18)  
Within ܯ, each signatory is confronted with the incentive to be a free-rider. To alleviate 
this effect, we apply a transfer rule from the class of optimal transfers (Carraro et al. 2006, 
Weikard 2009) that allocates the coalition payoff proportional to outside option payoffs:  
௝ࣰ(ܯ, ܶ) =
௝ܸ(ܯ\{݆})
∑ ௜ܸ(ܯ\{݅})௜∈ெ
ெܸ(ܯ), ݆ ∈ ܯ.                                                                                (2.19) 
where we denote aggregated payoffs of coalition ܯ  by ெܸ(ܯ) . ௝ܸ(ܯ\{݆})  is the outside 
payoff of coalition member ݆ ∈ ܯ. We use ௝ࣰ(ܯ)  to denote payoffs after transfers.  
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2.4 Numerical analysis based on STACO model 
2.4.1 Background of STACO 3.0 
To gain a more explicit and practical insight in our game we apply an integrated assessment 
model STACO 3.0 (Nagashima et al., 2011; Dellink et al., 2015) for a numerical analysis. 
STACO is an integrated model which links a (simple) climate change module with game 
theory for economic and policy analysis. The climate module of STACO relates GHG 
emission paths to GHG concentrations and atmospheric temperature change. The model has 
been calibrated in line with the EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2005) and the DICE model 
(Nordhaus, 1994; Nordhaus, 2008). The economic part of STACO specifies regional payoff 
functions for emissions mitigation, which is composed of abatement costs and benefits. 
Regional abatement benefits, which are calculated as the reduced damages, are given as a 
share of global abatement benefits (Fankhauser, 1995; Tol, 1997; Tol, 2009). STACO 
formulates a two-stage game of ICA formation among 12 heterogeneous regions: United 
States (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union-27 & EFTA (EUR), Other High Income 
countries (OHI), Rest of Europe (ROE), Russia (RUS), High Income Asia countries (HIA), 
China (CHN), India (IND) and the Middle East countries (MES), Brazil (BRA) and Rest of 
the World (ROW).  
The main equations of STACO 3.0 are presented in Box 2.1. STACO adopts a time 
horizon of 100 years, ranging from 2011 (ݐ = 1) to 2110 (ݐ = 100). Eqs. (2.20) to (2.22) 
show the objective functions for coalition members ݆ ∈ ܯ , market participants ݇ ∈ ܶ  and 
singletons ݆ ∉ ܯ , ݆ ∉ ܶ, which are based on the net present value of payoffs accruing to 
regions over a period of 100 years. Eq. (2.23) shows a linear functional form of abatement 
benefits, where ݏ௝  represents the regional share of global benefits with ∑ ݏ௝௝∈ே = 1 , and 
ߛ஽ gives the aggregated climate change damages in terms of a percentage of gross world 
product (GWP). Parameter  ߜ௝,ఛ reflects two impacts of mitigation adopted in current period ݐ: 
one is the impact on future climate due to the inertia in the climate system; the other is the 
impact on GDP growth. The calibration of ߜ௝,ఛ is based on the EPPA-5 (Paltsev et al., 2005) 
model by using a climate module from the DICE (Nordhaus, 1994) model. The regional 
abatement cost function (Eq. (2.24)) is a cubic function of regional abatement efforts ݍ௝,௧, 
where parameters ߙ௝ and ߚ௝ are parameters estimated based on the data from EPPA (Morris et 
al., 2008), which is shown in Table 2.A1. For discount rates ݎ௝,௧, STACO 3.0 uses the Ramsey 
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rule, which implies a changing discount rate over time based on the pure rate of time 
preference and regional growth rates of GDP. STACO 3.0 uses data from EPPA-5 model to 
calibrate the regional business as usual (BAU) emission paths (see Table 2.A1 for the BAU 
emissions in period one).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Modified STACO 3.0: aggregation of regions 
The software package MATLAB (R2012a) is used for the numerical analysis. The partition 
function for the12-region STACO 3.0 model for mitigation coalitions is defined on the power 
set of the set of players ܰ. In our case, since we examine coalition membership and trade 
participation at the same time, the partition function is defined on the power set of ܰ × ܰ. For 
a numerical model with 12 regions the partition function cannot be calculated within 
reasonable time. We therefore aggregate the 12 regions into 7 regions: United States (USA), 
Box 2.1.       Main model equations of STACO 3.0 
Payoff  functions (Objective functions) 
max
௤ೕ,೟
ߨ௝,௧(ݍ௧) = ∑ ∑ {൫1 + ݎ௜,௧൯
ି௧
∙ (ܤ௜,௧(ݍ௧) − ܥ௜,௧൫ݍ௜,௧൯)}
௧ୀଵ଴଴
௧ୀଵ௜∈ெ ,                                  ∀݆ ∈ ܯ              (2.20)    
max
௤ೖ,೟
ߨ௞,௧(ݍ௧) = ∑ {൫1 + ݎ௞,௧൯
ି௧
∙ (ܤ௞,௧(ݍ௧) − ܥ௞,௧൫ݍ௞,௧൯ + ݌௧[߱௞,௧ − (݁̅௞,௧ − ݍ௞,௧)])}
௧ୀଵ଴଴
௧ୀଵ , ∀݇ ∈
  ܶ                                                                                                                                                                                  (2.21) 
 max
௤ೕ,೟
ߨ௝,௧(ݍ௧) = ∑ {൫1 + ݎ௝,௧൯
ି௧
∙ (ܤ௝,௧(ݍ௧) − ܥ௝,௧൫ݍ௝,௧൯)}
௧ୀଵ଴଴
௧ୀଵ ,                                   ∀݆ ∉ ܯ, ݆ ∉ ܶ          (2.22) 
with global abatement: ݍ௧=∑ ݍ௝,௧௝∈ே . 
Abatement benefits 
ܤ௝,௧(ݍ௧) = ෍ ቄ൫1 + ݎ௝,ఛ൯
௧ିఛ
∙ ൫ݏ௝ ∙ ߛ஽ ∙ ߜ௝,ఛ ∙ ݍ௧൯ቅ
ஶ
ఛୀ௧
,                                                                     ∀݆ ∈ ܰ    (2.23) 
which captures the long term effect of current abatement ݍ௝,௧ on climate change by including future time 
periods ߬ ⊆ [ݐ, ∞). 
Abatement costs 
ܥ௝,௧൫ݍ௝,௧൯ = ቀ
ଵ
ଷ
∙ ߙ௝ ∙ ݍ௝,௧
ଷ +
ଵ
ଶ
∙ ߚ௝ ∙ ݍ௝,௧
ଶ ቁ ∙ ߯௝,௧,                                                                          ∀݆ ∈ ܰ      (2.24) 
where 0 < ߯௝,௧ < 1 is declining over time to reflect cost savings due to technological  progress. 
Ramsey rule for the discount rate 
ݎ௝,௧ = ߩ + ߟ ∙ (
ܩܦ ௝ܲ,௧
ܩܦ ௝ܲ,௧ିଵ
− 1),    ߩ = 0.015, ߟ = 1.                                                              ∀݆ ∈ ܰ        (2.25) 
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European Union-27 & EFTA (EUR), China (CHN), India (IND), the region of High 
Abatement costs and High Income (HAHI), 1 the region of Low Abatement costs and Energy 
Exporting (LAEX) 2 and Rest of the World (ROW). This reduces the calculation time by three 
orders of magnitude and allows for the numerical calculation of all possible coalitions and 
their payoffs in our model. We have recalibrated the STACO parameters for the abatement 
cost functions of the seven regions, and the undiscounted marginal cost curves in base year 
2011 are shown in Figure 2.2:     
 
Figure 2.2. Marginal abatement cost curves in 2011 for STACO model with 7 regions  
All other parameters for STACO 3.0 with 7 regions are shown in Table 2.A1 in 2.7 Appendix 
II. 
2.4.3 Implications from the specified functions 
Based on the functions specified in Box 1, the relationship between equilibrium permit price 
݌௧
∗ and the total number of optimal initial permits ߱௧∗ is (the derivation is provided in 2.7 
Appendix II):           
߱௧
∗ = ݁̅௧ − ∑
ିఉೖ∙ఞೖ,೟ାට(ఉೖ∙ఞೖ,೟)మାସఈೖ∙ఞೖ,೟∙௣೟
∗
ଶఈೖ∙ఞೖ,೟
௞∈் .                                                                           (2.26)                         
                                                             
1 The integration of four regions in original STACO model: JPN, OHI, BRA and HIA.  
2 The integration of three regions in original STACO model: ROE, RUS and MES. 
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Eq. (2.26) cannot be solved analytically in an explicit form of ݌௧∗(߱௧∗), therefore we resort to a 
numerical analysis. If we assume, for example, the number of traders is 7 in period ݐ = 1, 
then the numerical value of ݌௧∗ can be obtained for any value ߱௧∗. Figure 2.3 shows a plot of 
the relationship between ݌௧∗ and ߱௧∗ in the carbon market. As expected, the price of permits 
falls when the supply of permits increases, and the price decreases to zero when the total 
initial permits are chosen as the BAU emissions level.  
  
Figure 2.3. Relationship between equilibrium price and total number of initial permits in carbon market 
By taking the derivative of both sides of Eq. (2.26) with respect to ߱௧∗ , we get a 
differential equation of permit price ݌௧∗: 
݌௧
∗ᇱ(߱௧
∗) = −
1
∑ ቀ൫ߚ௞߯௞,௧൯
ଶ
+ 4ߙ௞߯௞,௧݌௧
∗ቁ
ି
ଵ
ଶ
௞∈்
 .                                                                       (2.27) 
Note that the coalition enters the carbon market as a single agent and is included in ܶ. From 
Eq. (2.27), we can see that under higher permit prices, the marginal price due to one more unit 
change in permits supplying (the absolute value ห݌௧∗
ᇱ(߱௧
∗)ห) is higher than the one under lower 
prices. This also can be observed from Figure 2.3.  
2.5 Results 
In this section we show the results in three parts. Firstly, in subsection 2.5.1, we analyse the 
benchmark scenario with a single mitigation agreement ܯ  not considering carbon trade, 
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which includes two cases: All-Singletons ܯ = {݆} or ܯ = {}, and the Grand Coalition ܯ = ܰ; 
then, in subsection 2.5.2, we analyse stability and efficiency of partial mitigation agreement 
ܯ without a carbon market; in subsection 2.5.3, we introduce carbon trade with endogenous 
permits choice in this setting. 
2.5.1 Two cases for the benchmark scenario:  All-Singletons and Grand Coalition 
without carbon trade 
We provide two cases as benchmark scenarios: All-Singletons (AS) and Grand Coalition 
(GC). In All-Singletons, each region chooses its own mitigation as a best response to others’ 
mitigation efforts ( ܥ௝ᇱ൫ݍ௝൯ = ܤ௝ᇱ(ݍ) , ݆ ∈ N , see Table 2.1, columns 6 and 7), which 
corresponds to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of the abatement game. The Grand 
Coalition is the best-performing coalition in terms of global abatement and net benefits and 
implements full cooperation. Under the GC, the marginal abatement costs of all regions are 
equalized with the sum of marginal benefits, i.e. ܥ௝ᇱ൫ݍ௝൯ = ∑ ܤ௝ᇱ(ݍ)௝∈୒ .  
Comparing the two cases, we find that: firstly, the abatement level (see columns 2 and 3 
in Table 2.1) by each GC member increases as compared to the level in AS, which is reflected 
by the increased marginal abatement costs (see columns 8 and 9 in Table 2.1). The three 
regions with the largest increase in abatement levels are CHN, IND and ROW. This is due to 
their relatively low marginal abatement costs (see Figure 2.2) which causes them to take 
larger shares of the global abatement. The same happens to the payoffs presented in columns 
4 and 5 of Table 2.1, where USA, EUR and HAHI take the largest shares of the total benefits 
because they have the highest marginal benefits (see column 6 in Table 2.1) and lower 
mitigation burdens (see column 3 in Table 2.1). Secondly, the optimal transfer scheme applied 
in our model is used to alleviate the imbalance between mitigation burdens and net benefits, 
which implies a flow of transfers from regions with higher marginal benefits, e.g. USA, EUR, 
HAHI and LAEX, to regions with large mitigation burdens, e.g. CHN, IND and ROW (see 
column 11 in Table 2.1). Note that Ramsey’s rule (Eq. (2.25)) is used for discounting, so that 
different discount rates are applied for different regions. With respect to the internal stability, 
we find that each GC member prefers to leave the coalition (internal instability), because the 
gains from cooperation are not sufficient to compensate for all players’ free-riding incentives. 
The first best mitigation policy of the GC offers a large increase in global mitigation and 
offers the largest possible welfare gains. However, every region has a strong incentive to free-
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ride, especially the regions with high marginal abatement benefits and costs (e.g. USA, EUR 
and HAHI).  
Table 2.1. All Singletons (AS) and Grand Coalition (GC) in a setting without a carbon market 
* Since regional discount rates are used, transfers do not add up to zero. 
2.5.2 Mitigation coalition ࡹ without a carbon market 
In this section, we investigate the formation of stable coalitions and their mitigation efficiency 
without considering the carbon market. This game is a standard two-stage coalition formation 
game. We check the stability of all 127 (i.e. 2଻ − 1)  mitigation coalitions under the optimal 
sharing rule, and find that 28 non-trivial coalitions are stable. The results are shown in Table 
2.A2 in 2.7 Appendix II, where all stable coalitions are ranked by an “indicator of success”  3 
(last column in Table 2.A2), which reflects the relative welfare improvement by stable 
coalitions. The two best performing coalitions (in terms of welfare gains from cooperation) 
comprise the largest number of signatories as compared to the other coalitions (see column 1 
in Table 2.A2). These results reflect the following. Firstly, a stable coalition is more easily 
formed by a small set of signatories, since larger coalitions are associated with stronger free-
riding incentives, which causes deviation from cooperation. Secondly, the minimum number 
of signatories in all stable coalitions is no less than 3, which means that all two-member 
coalitions are internally stable. This finding reflects the conclusion of Weikard et al. (2006) 
that all two-player coalitions are internally stable under a linear abatement benefit function 
and non-negative claims with proportional surplus sharing. Thirdly, the results show the 
superiority of the larger coalitions in terms of mitigation efficiency, that is, coalitions with 
                                                             
3 Indicator of success (%) is defined as [(NPV of global payoff in a coalition-NPV of global payoff in All Singletons)/( NPV 
of global payoff in Grand coalition-NPV of global payoff in All Singletons)]*100. 
  
  Mitigation  in 
2011 in % of 
BAU emissions 
NPV of payoffs over 
100 years 
( billion $) 
Marginal 
abatement 
benefits 
($/ton  CO2) 
Marginal 
abatement 
Costs ($/ton 
CO2) 
Incentive 
to leave 
GC 
(billion $) 
NPV of 
Transfers 
within GC 
(billion 
$)* 
 
    
  AS          GC AS          GC AS      GC AS        GC GC GC  
USA 8.5 33.0 6347.9   11192.4 14.1    14.1 14.1       62.3 3799.5 -2416.9  
EUR 16.0 39.4 8928.4   14944.8 19.3    19.3 19.3       62.3 5430.6 -7065.0  
CHN 7.7 45.4 519.0   2935.2   1.2       1.2      1.2       62.3 284.5 3470.5  
IND 15.5 66.1 329.4   2554.9 0.7       0.7 0.7       62.3 208.7 927.0  
HAHI 3.8 9.3 8304.1   13210.6 17.6    17.6 17.6       62.3 5051.9 -8074.2  
LAEX 12.6 39.1 2842.5     8931.9  6.1   6.1 6.1       62.3 1842.7 -119.3  
ROW 5.1 49.1    1482.0   6860.7 3.2       3.2 3.2       62.3 923.3 2785.8  
World 8.8 38.0 28753.3   60630.4 −           − −           − − −  
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more members have a higher indicator of success. Furthermore, from the coalitional structure, 
we can observe that all stable coalitions are combinations of regions with higher marginal 
abatement costs and benefits on the one hand and regions with lower marginal abatement 
costs and benefits on the other, e.g. USA-CHN (or USA-IND), EUR-CHN (or EUR-IND) and 
HAHI-CHN (or HAHI-IND). This structure counterbalances the free-riding incentives for 
signatories with relatively high abatement costs through higher mitigation levels by 
signatories with low abatement costs. The compensation is transferred from high benefit 
gaining signatories to losing signatories. Comparing coalitions with higher and lower 
indicators of success, generally coalitions with lower indicators comprise more signatories 
with expensive abatement than signatories with cheap abatement options. Example are the 
differences between the first two coalitions ({CHN, IND, HAHI, ROW} and {EUR, CHN, 
IND, ROW}) and the last two coalitions ({USA, HAHI, LAEX} and {EUR, HAHI, LAEX}) 
(see Table 2.A2). This shows that the presence of regions with low marginal costs improves 
the efficiency of a coalition in terms of the net abatement benefits.  
Inspection of the structure of high ranking stable coalitions shows that participation by 
CHN reduces global abatement costs and improves global welfare. China’s participation 
seems to be crucial. All stable coalitions where China participates show a larger indicator of 
success than any of the stable coalition (see Table 2.A2). This finding shows that it is 
essential to engage China in GHG emissions mitigation policies, which is consistent with the 
result of Paltsev et al. (2012) who analysed the role of China in mitigating greenhouse gas 
emissions. Any one of the top 3 regions in terms of the highest marginal abatement costs (see 
Figure 2.2), HAHI, LAEX or EUR, can form a stable coalition with any other region with low 
abatement costs such as CHN, IND and ROW.  
Table 2.2 shows details for the stable coalition with the highest global welfare {CHN, 
IND, HAHI, ROW}. Within this coalition, members equalize their marginal abatement costs, 
which results in large gains of 11685.7 billion $ for HAHI, but HAHI compensates CHN, 
IND and ROW by 4386.4 billion $. Under this structure, all outsiders can benefit from the 
positive externality of increased global abatement, which causes the negative incentives to 
change membership for all regions.  
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Table 2.2. The best-performing ܯ:{CHN, IND, HAHI, ROW} 
  
  
Mitigation in 2011 in 
% of BAU emissions 
NPV of payoffs over 
100 years 
( billion US $) 
Marginal 
abatement 
Costs ($/ton CO2) 
Incentive to 
change 
membership 
(billion $) 
NPV of 
transfers 
within M 
(billion $)* 
USA 8.5 12835.3 14.1 -1300.2 − 
EUR 16.0 17935.0 19.3 -1793.5 − 
CHN 28.0 753.1 22.7 -12.3 853.1 
IND 42.9 564.8 22.7 -9.0 256.7 
HAHI 4.7 11685.7 22.7 -183.7 -4386.4 
LAEX 12.6 5622.8 6.1 -443.6 − 
ROW 24.9 2495.1 22.7 -44.1 683.2 
World 18.7 51891.8 − − − 
* Since regional discount rates are used, transfers do not add up to zero. 
2.5.3 Mitigation coalition ࡹ under a carbon market with endogenous permits choice  
In this section, our analysis focuses on the impact of carbon trade on the stability and 
efficiency of the mitigation coalition ܯ. For brevity of notation, we use the set structure {ܯ, ܶ} 
to represent each coalition ܯ under a particular market structure ܶ. Firstly, we calculated the 
abatement level and payoffs for each region under different {ܯ, ܶ} structures, and then we 
analysed the internal and external stability of each structure. Table 2.3 shows the results: there 
are 3 stable {ܯ, ܶ} structures among the total of 3990 structures, ranked by their indicators of 
success. The second column of Table 2.3 lists the stable coalition ܯ, and the subsequently 
formed ܶ are presented in the third column. The three stable coalitions all contain the same 
two regions IND and ROW which cooperate respectively with USA, HAHI and EUR on 
mitigation. In equilibrium the choice of coalition membership is combined with the choice of 
market participation by CHN and LAEX in each of the three structures {ܯ, ܶ}. Here CHN 
takes the role of a permit seller in the carbon market because it has the cheapest abatement 
options. One interesting point we find is that for all three stable structures {ܯ, ܶ} , the 
abatement coalition ܯ has no incentive to join the carbon market ܶ which is composed of 
non-signatories only. Our numerical results also show that if ܯ would join the carbon market, 
then ܯ  would always be a buyer, implying negative transfers for ܯ . Furthermore, ܯ  can 
benefit from the positive externality of increased mitigation efforts resulting from a carbon 
market formed by singletons. The best-performing structure is {ܯ={USA, IND, ROW}, 
ܶ={CHN, LAEX}}, which corresponds to the highest value of success indicator and also 
reaches the highest abatement level, but shows a significantly lower global payoffs than the 
best-performing coalition in the absence of a carbon market, shown in Table 2.2.  
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Figure 2.4 shows global abatement levels over time under the three {ܯ, ܶ} structures for 
the time horizon of 100 years. Overall, the abatement commitments of three coalition 
structures increase over time. Due to the identical markets across the three stable structures 
with the same mitigation level of traders, differences in mitigation over structures are 
exclusively driven by the mitigation efforts of the respective coalitions. More specifically, the 
level of abatement is a function 4 of coalitional marginal benefits ∑ ܤ′௜,௧௜∈ெ  which vary across 
coalitions ܯ. As can be seen from Figure 2.4, the global abatement of structure 3 takes the 
lead initially due to the ranking of ܤᇱா௎ோ > ܤᇱு஺ுூ > ܤᇱ௎ௌ஺. While this ranking changes after 
35 years, the global abatement level of structure 1 surpasses that of structure 3 and the 
disparity increases after that. This can be explained by i) the decreased gaps of marginal 
benefits between EUR and USA, which reduce the difference between the total abatement 
levels of ܯ3 and ܯ1, and by ii) the value of parameters ߙா௎ோ and ߙ௎ௌ஺ in the abatement cost 
function. The same holds for coalition structure 2 and structure 3 from the 85th year onwards, 
the global abatement levels of structure 2 exceed those of structure 3, which is due to the 
marginal abatement costs of HAHI, which are larger than those of EUR from the 85th year 
onwards.  
Table 2.3. The stable structures {ܯ, ܶ} 
 M T NPV of global 
payoffs over 100 
years 
(billion $) 
Global Mitigation 
in full-period 
in % of BAU 
emissions 
Indicator 
of success 
M1 USA, IND, ROW T1  CHN, LAEX 40160.3 23.7 35.8 
M2 IND, HAHI, ROW T2  CHN, LAEX 39533.5 23.4 33.8 
M3 EUR, IND, ROW T3  CHN, LAEX 39506.3 23.5 33.7 
 
 
                                                             
4 Based on the Eq.(2.11) in Section 2.3 and the specified model equations (shown in Box 2.1) in STACO 3.0, the abatement 
level of coalition member ݇ ∈ ܯ  at steady state is ݍ௞,௧∗ =
ିఉೖ∙ఞೖ,೟ାට(ఉೖ∙ఞೖ,೟)మାସఈೖ∙ఞೖ,೟∙∑ ஻′೔,೟೔∈ಾ
ଶఈೖ∙ఞೖ,೟
, where ∑ ܤ′௜,௧௜∈ெ  is the 
coalitional marginal benefits. 
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As our particular interest is in the impacts of the carbon market on the stability and 
efficiency of mitigation coalitions, the comparison between a stable mitigation coalition 
without the carbon market and the coalition with carbon market {ܯ, ܶ}  is displayed in Tables 
2.4, 2.5a and 2.5b.   
First, the coalition ܯ={USA, IND, ROW}, which is stable without a carbon market, is 
also stable under a carbon market with the structure of {ܯ={USA, IND, ROW}, ܶ={CHN, 
LAEX}}. From Table 2.4, it can be observed that global mitigation levels and global welfare 
are both improved under ܶ. The indicator of success for coalition ܯ={USA, IND, ROW} (see 
the last column in Table 2.3) also increases as compared to the indicator under a single 
coalition ܯ (see the last column in Table 2.A2). Furthermore, in coalition ܯ, the abatement 
level of each coalition member remains the same. The payoffs, however, increase when CHN 
and LAEX create a carbon market. This improvement is driven by the positive externality of 
the increase in the global mitigation level arising from the carbon market. The global 
mitigation level increases from 5790.6 Mton CO2 to 6177.3 Mton CO2 with the presence of 
the carbon market. The payoffs of both market participants CHN and LAEX increase due to 
the relatively lower carbon price and the large positive surplus of payoffs through trading. 
Due to lower mitigation costs, CHN prefers to export emission permits, while LAEX, which 
Figure 2.4 Global abatement path under three stable structures 
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has relatively higher abatement costs, prefers to buy permits in the market. As a result, CHN 
achieves a higher abatement level and gains revenues from selling, while LAEX abates less as 
a permits buyer than as a market outsider. Outsiders of both ܯ and ܶ, EUR and HIHA, have 
the same mitigation commitments in these two scenarios, however, their payoffs are improved 
due to the increased global abatement with a carbon market. In this case, with a given stable 
coalition ܯ, the presence of a carbon market can help to improve abatement and payoffs. 
Table 2.4. Results for structure {ܯ={USA, IND, ROW}, ܶ={CHN, LAEX} } 
  M without a carbon market  
 
 
M with a carbon market 
 
 
  Mitigation in 
2011 
(Mton CO2) 
NPV of global 
payoffs over 100 
years 
(billion $) 
 
 
 
Mitigation in 
2011 
(Mton CO2) 
NPV of global 
payoffs over 100 
years 
(billion $) 
M USA 761.5 7327.4 761.5 7515.2 
(The  IND 1276.6 413.1 1276.6 463.2 
 coalition) ROW 1187.6 1822.5 1187.6 1903.5 
 Sum of M 3225.8 9562.9 3225.8 9881.9 
      
The  
singletons 
CHN 
(trader) 
894.8 750.5 1410.5 796.7 
 LAEX 
(trader) 
596.6 4037.7 467.6 4058.9 
 EUR 783.6 12800.1 783.6 13242.0 
 HAHI 289.8 11783.8 289.8 12180.8 
 World 5790.6 38935.1 6177.3 40160.3 
 
Second, with a carbon market ܶ , some internally stable coalitions ܯ  , which are 
externally instable without a carbon market, are improved to be both internally and externally 
(i.e. fully) stable coalitions. These coalition structures are {EUR, IND, ROW} and {IND, 
HAHI, ROW}. In the presence of a carbon market, singletons face additional strategic options: 
to be carbon traders or outsiders of both ܯ and ܶ. We find that China prefers to be a trader 
over membership in a mitigation coalition. Tables 2.5a and 2.5b report the results of internally 
stable and fully stable ܯ, which shows that due to the participation of CHN and LAEX in ܶ, 
the CO2 abatement of CHN increases from 894.8 Mton to 1410.5 Mton, because of the 
reduced emission levels by permits selling; In contrast, the abatement of LAEX decreases 
from 596.6 Mton CO2 to 467.6 Mton CO2 , because it imports permits instead of reducing 
CO2 emissions. As a result, the absolute increase in abatement of CHN is larger than the 
absolute decrease in abatement of LAEX, the global level of abatement and payoffs of all 
global regions are improved. Without participation in ܶ, the abatement levels of coalition 
ܯ = {IND, HAHI, ROW}  (or ܯ = {EUR, IND, ROW} ) and singletons USA and EUR (or 
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singletons USA and HAHI) remains the same as under the scenario without the carbon market, 
but their payoffs increase because of the positive externalities from the increased global 
abatement level.   
Table 2.5a. Results for structure {ܯ={IND, HAHI, ROW}, ܶ={CHN, LAEX} } 
    Internal stability of a single M 
 
 
 
 
Full stability of M  with a carbon 
market 
 
    Mitigation 
in 2011 
(Mton CO2) 
NPV of global 
payoffs over 100 
years 
( billion $) 
 
 
 
Mitigation 
in 2011 
(Mton CO2) 
NPV of global 
payoffs over 100 
years 
( billion $ ) 
M IND 1416.9 416.6 1416.9 468.0 
(The  HAHI 289.8 11765.7 289.8 12162.7 
 coalition) ROW 1430.3 1841.6 1430.3 1924.7 
  Sum of M 3137.0 14023.91 3137.0 14555.4 
        
The  
singletons 
CHN (trader) 894.8 748.4 1410.5 794.5 
  LAEX (trader) 596.6 4031.4 467.6 4052.7 
  USA 601.5 9119.1 601.5 9436.2 
  EUR 912.5 10396.4 912.5 10667.6 
  Global 6348.5 38319.2 6529.1 39506.3 
 
Table 2.5b. Results for structure {ܯ: {EUR, IND, ROW}, ܶ={CHN, LAEX}}  
    Internal stability of a single M 
 
 
 
 
Full stability of M  with a carbon 
market 
 
    Mitigation in 
2011 
(Mton CO2) 
NPV of global 
payoffs over 100 
years 
(billion $) 
 
 
 
Mitigation in 
2011 
(Mton CO2) 
NPV of global 
payoffs over 100 
years 
(billion $) 
M EUR 783.6 12647.1 783.6 13089.1 
(The  IND 1372.3 414.3 1372.3 465.5 
 coalition) ROW 1352.6 1838.9 1352.6 1921.8 
  Sum of M 3508.5 14900.4 3508.5 
 
15476.3 
        
The 
singletons 
CHN (trader) 894.8 740.9 1410.5 787.0 
  LAEX (trader) 596.6 3990.4 467.6 4011.6 
  USA 601.5 9024.5 601.5 9341.7 
  HAHI 337.0 9666.7 337.0 9917.0 
  Global 5938.5 38322.8 6325.1 39533.5 
 
Third, a carbon market has also negative impacts on stability. Without trade, the number 
of stable ܯ is 28 totally, however, only 3 stable ܯ are formed with trade. Lessmann et al. 
(2013) studied the carbon market mechanism in which the emission permits are traded 
International climate agreements and carbon trade 
35 
 
between signatories and non-signatories of a climate agreement, showing that the extended 
market with non-signatories does not improve the incentive to join in the climate agreement 
compared with the case of permit trade only among signatories. Our findings about the 
negative effects of the carbon market are similar to Lessmann et al. (2013). One reason is that, 
with the existence of T, there are more potential strategy choices for each player ݅ ∈ ܰ, such 
as (ܯ௜ = 1, ௜ܶ = 1), (ܯ௜ = 1, ௜ܶ = 0), (ܯ௜ = 0, ௜ܶ = 1) or (ܯ௜ = 0, ௜ܶ = 0), which provides 
alternative options for each player to exploit the mitigation benefits but it also destabilises 
coalitions. Hence, some regions who chose to be members in a mitigation coalition in a 
setting without a carbon market will prefer to be singleton traders instead in a setting with a 
carbon market. China, as mentioned before, is a prominent example. Another drawback is 
reflected by the decrease of the indicator of success (the payoffs). Due to the establishment of 
an additional carbon market, the best-performing coalition under a single agreement system is 
destabilized, and the highest indicator of success can be reached by the stable coalition with a 
carbon market is only half of the best one obtained without a carbon market (see Table 2.A2). 
Although for a given coalition, the addition of carbon market has a positive influence on the 
indicator of success (see Tables 2.4, 2.5a and 2.5b).  
In conclusion, for a given mitigation coalition, the presence of a carbon market could 
engage more regions with emissions mitigation, and thus the efficiency of global mitigation is 
enhanced with higher abatement and payoffs. However, at the same time, alternative strategic 
options offered by carbon trade destabilise the most efficient mitigation coalitions which are 
stable in the system with single mitigation agreement and without an open carbon market. It is 
also worthy to notice that the carbon market is not attractive for the mitigation coalition, 
which prefers to be a market outsider due to the free-riding incentives from the increased 
mitigation level.             
2.6 Conclusion 
We examined a four-stage game with sequential formation of a mitigation agreement and a 
carbon market with endogenous carbon endowments. The mitigation coalition ܯ formed at 
stage 1 internalises the benefits of coalition members through the mitigation cooperation. The 
subsequently formed carbon market at stage 2 provides an opportunity of permits trading for 
all players if they join the market. In the next stage, the carbon market participants choose 
their permit endowments based on the endogenous permits trading model introduced by Helm 
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(2003). Permits trading among carbon traders and abatement levels are determined at the final 
stage.      
We analysed this game using backward induction, and study the stability of the mitigation 
agreement under carbon trade and its efficiency by employing a refined version of the 
numerical model of STACO 3.0. Through comparison of different scenarios, we analysed the 
effects of a carbon market on the formation and efficiency of a mitigation agreement and find 
the following results. 
First, in the presence of a carbon market with endogenous carbon permit endowments, 
players are faced with more strategic choices, which is beneficial to the singletons by 
choosing to join the market, but has an adverse influence on the formation of a mitigation 
coalition, since the members of some coalitions have an incentive to deviate from a mitigation 
coalition and become a carbon trader instead. This may destabilise the mitigation coalition. It 
implies that for the formation of ICAs, the alternative of joining a carbon market with 
endogenous carbon permit endowments can have a negative impact on coalition stability. 
Furthermore, from the results of stable coalition structures with a carbon market, this 
augmented strategy set destabilises the mitigation coalitions with higher indicator of success 
(see Table 2.A2) than the one obtained by including carbon trade, thus the efficiency and 
effectiveness of mitigation is reduced. Meanwhile, even with this dual-agreement system, the 
structure of coalition formation is still a partial participation with free-riding outsiders.    
However, even though the negative influence of a carbon market’s presence is obvious, it 
still could be beneficial to some mitigation coalitions by expanding the single coalition 
structure to improve the efficiency of some given suboptimal ICAs. For some specific 
coalitions which are stable with or without a carbon market, if a carbon market with 
endogenous carbon permit endowments is added, additional countries can be induced to 
increase mitigation efforts, which induces the Pareto improvement on abatement level and 
profitability of the given mitigation coalition (see Table 2.4). In Section 2.5, the comparison 
of the same stable mitigation coalitions with and without a carbon market shows that the total 
number of players involved in ܯ and ܶ is larger than the number of cooperative players in the 
absence of a carbon market, and the payoffs are also improved.  
        Third, our results also suggest some key regions in ICAs stabilization. Developing 
countries like India and China with low-cost mitigation options participate in both best-
performing coalitions with or without carbon trade, which reinforces the importance of 
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developing countries in an international agreement on emission reduction. Especially in the 
carbon market with endogenous carbon permit endowments, China bears a large quantity of 
abatement which contributes largely to global mitigation efficiency. This result reflects the 
need to engage developing countries with lower mitigation costs to cooperate with developed 
countries with higher abatement costs.  
         Finally, the analysis shows that a single mitigation coalition which prefers to be outsider 
of a carbon market, in contrast, cannot gain from opening its carbon market to outsiders, at 
least not under the condition of endogenous permit choice, because the negative transfers of 
buying emission permits and the benefits from free-riding surpass the gain from trading.  
        An important notice is that these conclusions are restricted to the investigation of 
strategic incentives into stability of  ICAs without specific constraints on the choice of initial 
emissions permit. The formation and stability of ICAs could, however, be influenced by 
imposing constraints on permit endowments’ choices. Therefore the relationship between 
stability of ICAs and putting specific caps on the issuing of emission permits is an interesting 
topic for future research. 
2.7 Appendix 
Appendix I 
This Appendix shows the relationship between equilibrium price and the total number of 
initial permits choice at steady state. In a specific period ݐ, the abatement costs for market 
participant ݇ ∈ ܶ can be represented as Eq. (2.24) in Section 2.4, then by taking the derivative 
of Eq. (2.24) with respect to ݍ௞,௧ , we obtain marginal abatement costs as 
ܥ௞,௧
ᇱ = ൫ߙ௞ ∙ ݍ௞,௧
ଶ + ߚ௞ ∙ ݍ௞,௧൯ ∙ ߯௞,௧, ݇ ∈ ܶ,                                                                          (2. ܣ1) 
From Eq. (2.4), we can get the specification of equilibrium price ݌௧∗ as 
݌௧
∗ = ܥ௞,௧
ᇱ = ൫ߙ௞ ∙ ݍ௞,௧
ଶ + ߚ௞ ∙ ݍ௞,௧൯ ∙ ߯௞,௧ ,   ݇ ∈ ܶ,                                                                     (2. ܣ2) 
from which, we can get the function of after-trade abatement ݍ௞,௧∗  as 
ݍ௞,௧
∗ =
−ߚ௞ ∙ ߯௞,௧ + ඥ(ߚ௞ ∙ ߯௞,௧)ଶ + 4ߙ௞ ∙ ߯௞,௧ ∙ ݌௧
∗
2ߙ௞ ∙ ߯௞,௧
,   ݇ ∈ ܶ.                                                   (2. ܣ3) 
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Since the total number of initial permits at steady state is ߱௧∗ = ∑ ߱௞,௧∗௞∈் = ∑ ݁̅௞,௧௞∈் −
∑ ݍ௞,௧
∗
௞∈் = ݁̅௧ − ∑ ݍ௞,௧
∗
௞∈்  , then we can get: 
߱௧
∗ = ݁̅௧ − ෍
−ߚ௞ ∙ ߯௞,௧ + ඥ(ߚ௞ ∙ ߯௞,௧)ଶ + 4ߙ௞ ∙ ߯௞,௧ ∙ ݌௧
∗
2ߙ௞ ∙ ߯௞,௧௞∈்
.                                             (2. ܣ4) 
This gives Eq. (2.26) in the main text. 
Appendix II 
Table 2.A1. Parameters in the 7-region STACO 3.0 model 
 Share of  
global 
benefits 
 Parameter in  
abatement cost 
function 
 Parameter in  
abatement cost 
function 
 Uncontrolled  
Emissions 
(BAU) in 2011    
  
Regions ݏ௝            ߙ௝   ߚ௝         Gton 
USA 0.2263     0.00000189    0.02237106  7.0850 
EUR 0.236     0.00000676    0.01950044  4.8917 
CHN 0.062     0.00000243  -0.00076194         11.6240 
IND 0.050     0.00001685  -0.00708971  3.2762 
HAHI 0.2523     0.000071155    0.0411  7.5375 
LAEX 0.1054     0.000018718  -0.00080322  4.7457 
ROW 0.068     0.00000457   0.00984083  5.6603 
World (∑ ݏ௝ = 1)       
 
  
International climate agreements and carbon trade 
39 
 
Table 2.A2. Stable coalitions ܯ without a carbon market 
Structure of stable M NPV of global payoffs over 
100 years 
(billion $) 
Global mitigation in 
2011in 
Indicator of 
success 
% of BAU emissions 
CHN, IND, HAHI, ROW 51892 18.7 72.6 
EUR, CHN, IND, ROW 51501 19.5 71.4 
USA, EUR, CHN 46874 18.5 56.8 
USA, CHN, HAHI 46705 17.5 56.3 
USA, CHN, ROW 45802 15.9 53.5 
USA, CHN, LAEX 44841 15.7 50.5 
USA, CHN, IND 44754 14.8 50.2 
CHN, HAHI, LAEX 43937 15.9 47.6 
EUR, CHN, LAEX 43859 16.6 47.4 
CHN, LAEX, ROW 41314 13.4 39.4 
CHN, IND, LAEX 40371 12.5 36.4 
USA, EUR, ROW 39306 15.7 33.1 
USA, IND, ROW 38935 12.9 31.9 
USA, HAHI, ROW 38802 14.6 31.5 
USA, EUR, IND 38618 14.2 30.9 
USA, LAEX, ROW 38173 13.5 29.6 
USA, IND, HAHI 38153 13.3 29.5 
USA, IND, LAEX 37523 12.4 27.5 
EUR, HAHI, ROW 37247 14.7 26.6 
EUR, LAEX, ROW 37226 14.0 26.6 
HAHI, LAEX, ROW 36919 13.4 25.6 
USA, EUR, LAEX 36795 14.3 25.2 
EUR, IND, HAHI 36686 13.3 24.9 
EUR, IND, LAEX 36664 12.9 24.8 
IND, HAHI, LAEX 36419 12.4 24.0 
IND, LAEX, ROW 36139 11.4 23.2 
USA, HAHI, LAEX 36116 13.2 23.1 
EUR, HAHI, LAEX 34440 13.1 17.8 
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Chapter 3 
International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: 
Results from the STACO model 
 
International carbon markets are advocated in order to involve more countries in an agreement 
for the mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to reduce the costs of mitigation. 
In this paper we develop a model where allowances are endogenously determined by each 
member of a carbon trade agreement, but with an exogenous constraint on the number of 
allowances per member. We use a global model to explore the incentives for regions to 
participate in such a carbon market and we examine its performance. To gain practical policy 
insights, we employ the STACO model, a numerically calibrated model with twelve world 
regions. Our results show that the stability and effectiveness of an international carbon market 
can be improved by imposing constraints on individual allowance choices compared to a 
carbon market without such constraints. Constraints on allowance choices reduce ‘hot air’ and 
increase global welfare and mitigation. When tightening the constraint ‘broad but shallow’ 
agreements are replaced by ‘narrow but deep’ ones. If the constraint is too tight, however, no 
stable carbon market exists.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Carbon emissions can be cost-efficiently reduced by means of carbon trade. The European 
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is an attempt to do this. Compared to a partial or 
regional carbon market, a global approach to carbon trade would engage all countries in 
emission mitigation. Moreover, inclusion of the major and low-cost emitters into the market 
could help to meet more ambitious mitigation targets and reduce abatement costs (Stern 2008; 
Behr et al. 2009; Flachsland et al. 2009). Yet, no global market for carbon has emerged so far. 
This can be explained by free-riding incentives to abstain from a global climate agreement 
(Barrett 1994). From the perspective of political efforts there are two approaches to a global 
emission trading system: the top-down approach based on government-to-government trading 
of emission allowances; and the bottom-up approach based on the linkage between regional 
emission trading systems (Stavins and Jaffe 2008; Behr et al. 2009; Flachsland et al. 2009). 
According to Flachsland et al. (2009), the top-down approach would generally cover a larger 
share of global emissions and is associated with larger mitigation efforts as compared to the 
bottom-up approach.  
The possibility to meet an emission reduction target by means of a government-to-
government emission trading system was firstly established and specified by the Marrakesh 
Accords in 2001 based on the Kyoto Protocol. However, this trading system only includes the 
developed countries (listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol). Given that growing shares of 
global emissions stem from emerging (non-Annex I) economies, like China and India, the 
effectiveness of a partial international trading system supported by the Marrakesh Accords 
and the Kyoto Protocol can be enhanced. As a project-based trading system, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) allows the Annex I countries to get tradable emission 
reduction credits when investing in emission-reduction projects in developing countries 
(UNFCCC 1998). A limitation of the CDM is that only the Annex I countries are committed 
to the Kyoto mitigation targets, whereas developing countries are not committed to any 
mitigation.  
In a market for carbon emission allowances countries with relatively high abatement costs 
would be buyers and have incentives to join a carbon market as the market offers cheaper 
abatement options. Countries with relatively low abatement costs would be sellers and could 
gain from earning revenues. In a carbon market with unconstrained endogenous allowance 
choices, as studied by Helm (2003), the motivation to raise revenues from carbon trading 
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results in excessive allowance choices, so-called ‘hot-air’. Such a carbon market is then 
characterised by modest emission reductions. Moreover, the stability of a carbon market with 
open membership could be undermined by incentives for participation that stem from selling 
carbon emission allowances. Therefore, imposing a constraint on allowance choices might not 
only mitigate the hot-air effect but can also help to stabilise a carbon market by avoiding 
excessive participation of potential sellers. However, a constraint on allowance choices can 
also generate free-riding incentives because the improved global abatement resulting from 
limiting carbon emission allowances will increase the payoffs of non-signatories. It is 
therefore important to study how exogenous constraints on allowance choices change the 
incentives to participate in an international carbon market and its environmental effectiveness. 
We address this problem by modelling a top-down approach to an international carbon market 
where emission allowances are traded between governments.  
Stevens and Rose (2002) studied a restricted carbon market with a constraint on the 
volume of carbon transactions, i.e. purchases and sales of emission allowances, and showed 
that abatement costs would be increased due to the carbon trade restrictions. Rehdanz and Tol 
(2005) analysed the impacts of regulation imposed on a bilateral carbon market. They assume 
that the carbon buying country will suffer higher damages from GHG emissions. Therefore, 
the carbon buying country can strategically and unilaterally set stricter abatement targets for 
its own emissions aiming to reduce its carbon allowance imports and limiting emission 
permits issued by the selling country. Their research shows that the regulation of the quantity 
of emission permits makes both countries worse off if the regulation adopted by the buying 
country is strict, as this reduces cost-savings from trade. Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) 
consider uniform emission reductions to define tradable quota. They study the impact of 
restricted carbon trade on the formation and efficiency of climate coalitions, but they do not 
consider allowance choices. Carbone et al. (2009) apply Helm’s idea of a carbon market with 
endogenous allowance choices in a calibrated general equilibrium model. They analyse 
participation incentives and environmental effectiveness of international carbon trade 
agreements. In order to mitigate the hot-air effect Carbone et al. (2009) consider a setting 
where incumbent members of the carbon market may block entry of additional potential 
market participants, i.e. they only consider internal stability of the carbon market. In this 
paper we explore another option. While we maintain the idea of a carbon market with 
endogenous allowance choice, we use an open-membership model, in line with most currently 
existing international environmental agreements. In our model the hot-air effect is mitigated 
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by constraining the allowance choice. The constraint is exogenous to our model. Hence, we 
consider it to be part of the agreement that is “on the table” ready to be signed. 
We explore the incentives to join a carbon market in a two-stage non-cooperative game. 
In the first stage, regions decide simultaneously on their market participation. In the second 
stage signatories can choose their allowances and then trade. However the carbon trade 
agreement obliges all signatories to accept a constraint on their allowance choice that we 
model as a fraction of the business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. This setting is in line with the 
‘cap-and-trade’ system of the EU ETS where caps were set relative to historical emission 
levels. BAU emission levels reflect historical emission levels, i.e. carbon emissions before 
any (unilateral) climate policies were adopted. Historical emission levels have also played a 
role as reference points in climate negotiations. Another reason for using BAU emissions 
levels as our base line is that, unlike Nash equilibrium levels, the BAU levels are exogenous 
to our model. Since it is still interesting to explore the setting when allowance constraints are 
tied to Nash-emissions levels, we provide results for this case in a sensitivity analysis. 
Generally we assume that non-signatories (or singletons) cannot participate in international 
carbon trade and, thus, they adopt their own carbon abatement policies. We examine cartel 
stability, i.e. we assume a single international carbon market which is stable if no signatory 
has an incentive to leave the market and no singleton has an incentive to join.   
Intuitively, a carbon market with a constraint on allowance choices can be more effective 
in terms of emission reductions compared to an unconstrained market. We show this by 
employing the STACO model. STACO specifies business-as-usual emission paths and 
emission abatement costs and benefits functions for twelve heterogeneous world regions 
(Nagashima et al. 2011; Dellink et al. 2015). We use the model to identify stable carbon trade 
agreements. In particular we show that by tightening the constraint on allowance choices, the 
global mitigation level in a stable carbon market can be improved. Regarding the welfare 
effects, there are two main consequences. Firstly, by imposing a constraint on allowance 
choices, the benefits from global abatement can be increased, especially for the countries with 
relatively high marginal benefits from global abatement. Secondly, obviously, constraints on 
allowance choices reduce the supply of emission allowances in the carbon market. This will 
reduce hot air, drive up the carbon price and thereby reduce the benefits for carbon buyers. 
The revenues of carbon sellers could also be reduced as only a limited number of emission 
allowances can be sold. Furthermore, in our setting with asymmetric regions, individual 
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welfare effects will differ per region due to the differences in marginal abatement costs and 
benefits.  
The main idea of our paper is to investigate the impact of allowance choice constraints on 
participation incentives in a carbon market. The impact of the constraint is analysed by 
varying the level of the constraint parameter in our simulation analysis. We do not make a 
claim about which level of the constraint parameter would be chosen in the pre-negotiations 
to a trade agreement, i.e. we are not endogenising the constraint. In our approach the optimal 
level (in terms of global welfare) of the constraint is identified from numerical results from 
the STACO model.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes our two-stage game of the 
formation of an international carbon market. In Section 3.3, we introduce the model with and 
without allowance choice constraints and we analyse the two-stage game by backward 
induction. The numerical analysis is implemented, and the results are presented and discussed 
in Section 3.4. The final section summarizes the main findings and discusses policy 
implications. 
3.2 Formation of an international emission trade agreement  
A standard two-stage coalition formation game is applied to study an international carbon 
market with heterogeneous regions. Each region is characterised by its abatement cost and 
benefit functions. The set of all regions is denoted by ܰ. An individual region is indexed by ݆ 
with ݆ = 1, … , ݊.  
At stage 1, a membership game is played. All regions ݆ ∈ ܰ simultaneously and non-
cooperatively choose whether or not to join a proposed carbon market. The choice set is 
defined as ߪ௝ = {0,1}. If ߪ௝ = 1, then ݆ joins the market. If ߪ௝ = 0, then ݆ does not join and 
remains a singleton. Countries decide upon their membership by anticipating the welfare 
impacts of the allowance choices and the ultimate abatement level. We refer to the set of 
regions who join the market as traders ܶ. 
At stage 2, with a given set of traders ܶ, every trader ݆ ∈ ܶ chooses initial allowances, 
denoted by ௝߱, subject to a constraint and chooses abatement, denoted by  ݍ௝, depending on 
carbon trade. The constraint specifies the maximum level of allowances that each market 
participant can choose, denoted by ௝߱௠௔௫. Specifically, the individual maximum allowances 
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௝߱
௠௔௫ are a fraction of the BAU emissions ݁̅௝ (݆ ∈ ܶ) such that ௝߱௠௔௫ = α݁̅௝ . In our model the 
parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is the same for all carbon traders, but the maximum allowance choices 
௝߱
௠௔௫  ( ݆ ∈ ܶ ) are different across traders since their BAU emissions ݁̅௝  differ. As the 
mitigation target becomes stricter, the value of α decreases. The strictest possible constraint, 
ߙ = 0, refers to a carbon-free economy. However, in our numerical simulations we do not 
consider constraints on allowance choices that are stricter than what the social optimum 
requires. In fact, our results from the STACO model in Section 3.4 show that no stable carbon 
market can be found when the constraint parameter is lower than 0.74 (see Table 3.3 in 
Section 3.4.2).  
Following Helm’s (2003) endogenous allowance choice model, each trade participant 
determines its best response allowance choice and after-trade abatement by solving the 
following problem:   
max
ఠೕ, ௤ೕ 
    ߨ௝ = ܤ௝ ቌ෍ ݁̅௝ − ߱
௝∈்
+ ෍ ݍ௝
௝∈ேି்
ቍ − ܥ௝൫ݍ௝൯ + ݌(߱) ∙ ቀ ௝߱ − ൫݁̅௝ − ݍ௝൯ቁ ,   ݆ ∈ ܶ,    (3.1) 
subject to 
 0 ≤  ߱௝ ≤ α݁̅௝, ݓ݅ݐℎ α ∈ [0, 1], ݍ௝ ≥ 0. 
The global abatement level is ݍ = ∑ ݁̅௝ − ߱௝∈் + ∑ ݍ௝௝∈ேି் . In the objective function (Eq. 
(3.1)), the total allowances are ߱ ≡ ∑ ௝߱௝∈் , which also represents the total emissions in the 
carbon market ܶ . The carbon price is a function of emission allowances ߱  in the carbon 
market, denoted by ݌(߱)  with ݌ᇱ(߱) ≤ 0 . Carbon price ݌(߱)  is uniform for all trade 
participants. In line with the functional forms in the STACO model, we assume abatement 
benefits ܤ௝(ݍ)  that are linear in the total abatement with ܤ௝ᇱ(ݍ) > 0  and ܤ௝ᇱᇱ(ݍ) = 0 . 
Abatement costs ܥ௝(ݍ௝)  are strictly convex in individual abatement with ܥ௝ᇱ൫ݍ௝൯ > 0  and 
ܥ௝
ᇱᇱ൫ݍ௝൯ > 0. Emissions are denoted by ௝݁ = ݁̅௝ − ݍ௝ corresponding to the abatement level ݍ௝. 
Note that the functional forms of ܤ௝(ݍ) and ܥ௝(ݍ௝) result in a concave net benefit function 
ܤ௝(ݍ) − ܥ௝(ݍ௝) , which assures that the optimal solution to the problem (1) is uniquely 
determined.  
 At this second stage, the non-traders  ݆ ∉ ܶ choose their optimal mitigation level by 
solving  
Carbon trade with constrained allowance choices 
47 
 
max
௤ೕ
     ߨ௝൫ݍ௝൯ = ܤ௝(ݍ) − ܥ௝൫ݍ௝൯,   ݆ ∉ ܶ.                                                                                      (3.2) 
Because of the linear form of the abatement benefits function, singletons have a dominant 
strategy implying that the abatement level of any singleton is not influenced by the carbon 
market.  
3.3 Model and the theoretical analysis 
In this section we describe the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the game using 
backward induction.  
Stage 2: Equilibrium choices of allowances and abatement   
At the second stage, given the set of trade participants ܶ and a constraint  ௝߱ ≤ ߙ݁̅௝ on 
individual allowance choices, the initial emission allowances and the after-trade abatement 
levels are chosen. The maximisation problem (3.1) gives the following Lagrangian function: 
ܮ൫ ௝߱; ݍ௝; ߛ௝൯ = ߨ௝ + ߛ௝൫ߙ݁̅௝ − ௝߱൯, ݆ ∈ ܶ.                                                                                      (3.3) 
In (3.3) ߛ௝ is the Lagrangian multiplier for individual emission allowance choices. By taking 
the derivatives of Eq. (3.3), the first order conditions for ௝߱, ݍ௝ and ߛ௝ are derived as follows: 
 
߲ܮ
߲ ௝߱
=
߲ߨ௝
߲ ௝߱
− ߛ௝ = ݌
ᇱ(߱∗)൫ ௝߱
∗ − ௝݁
∗൯ + ݌ − ܤ௝
ᇱ − ߛ௝ = 0,                                                         (3.4) 
߲ܮ
߲ݍ௝
= −ܥ௝
ᇱ + ݌ = 0,                                                                                                                            (3.5) 
߲ܮ
߲ߛ௝
= α݁̅௝ − ௝߱ ≥ 0,                                                                                                                           (3.6) 
ߛ௝൫α݁̅௝ − ௝߱൯ = 0, ߛ௝ ≥ 0.                                                                                                                  (3.7) 
From Eq. (3.5) we conclude that the equilibrium carbon price equals to the marginal 
abatement cost ݌(߱∗) = ܥ௝ᇱ(ݍ௝∗) . Rewriting Eq. (3.4) leads to the following equilibrium 
condition: 
ܤ௝
ᇱ − ܥ௝
ᇱ = ݌ᇱ(߱∗) ቀ ௝߱
∗ − ൫݁̅௝ − ݍ௝
∗൯ቁ − ߛ௝.                                                                                    (3.8) 
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When the allowance choice constraint ߙ݁̅௝ is not binding, then the equilibrium conditions 
will be identical to the equilibrium condition for unconstrained carbon markets where the 
shadow value ߛ௝ = 0 in Eq. (3.8). This shows that with unconstrained allowance choices, the 
marginal revenues (either negative or positive) from carbon trade ݌ᇱ(߱∗)൫ ௝߱∗ − (݁̅௝ − ݍ௝∗)൯ are 
equal to the net marginal abatement benefits ܤ௝ᇱ(ݍ∗) − ܥ௝ᇱ൫ݍ௝∗൯. Compared to the unconstrained 
carbon markets, Eq. (3.8) shows that with constraints, each carbon trader’s marginal 
abatement net benefits do not only depend on the marginal trade revenues ݌ᇱ(߱∗)൫ ௝߱∗ − (݁̅௝ −
ݍ௝
∗)൯, but are also affected by the shadow value of the allowance choices if the constraint is 
binding. With a constraint on allowance choices, the shadow value ߛ௝  represents the 
unavailable marginal gains due to the constraint on ݆’s allowances. Substituting ܥ௝ᇱ(ݍ௝∗) with 
݌(߱∗) in Eq. (3.8) we obtain the carbon price 
݌(߱∗) = ܤ௝
ᇱ − ݌ᇱ(߱∗) ቀ ௝߱
∗ − ൫݁̅௝ − ݍ௝
∗൯ቁ + ߛ௝.                                                                              (3.9)                     
Eq. (3.9) implies that the carbon price will be impacted by the constraint. The more stringent 
the constraint is, the higher is the shadow price of allowances and the more valuable are 
emission allowances. 
Now consider that the value of the constraint parameter α  decreases such that the 
constraint is binding for all carbon traders and, hence, the optimal choice of initial allowances 
is ௝߱∗ = α݁̅௝ . Then the size of the market is ߱∗ = α ∑ ݁̅௝௝∈் . Any further decrease of α further 
reduces the optimal allowance choices ௝߱∗ and, hence, ߱∗. Reduced allowance choices require 
increased after-trade abatements ݍ௝∗ = ݍ௝∗(݌(߱∗)), higher marginal abatement cost and, since 
݌(߱∗) = ܥ௝
ᇱ(ݍ௝
∗), also the carbon price ݌(߱∗) is higher.  
It is interesting to consider the implications of the Kuhn-Tucker condition  
డగೕ
డఠೕ
− ߛ௝ = 0; 
see Eq. (3.4), rewritten in (3.8). When the shadow value of allowances ߛ௝ = 0, the constraint 
is not binding and carbon traders ݆ (݆ ∈ ܶ) will choose their optimal allowances as ௝߱∗ < ߙ݁̅௝. 
Then the equilibrium condition will be identical to the equilibrium in an unconstrained carbon 
market. This can happen when the constraint is lax, especially to the carbon buyer regions 
with high marginal abatement benefits and costs. The numerical results shown in Table 3.3 
confirm that carbon buyer regions like USA and Japan choose non-binding levels of 
allowances with a lenient  constraint. However, when the constraint is strict enough, it will be 
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binding such that the shadow value ߛ௝ > 0 in Eq. (3.8). If the allowance choice constraint is 
binding, traders ݆ (݆ ∈ ܶ) choose their optimal allowances as ௝߱∗ = ߙ݁̅௝. Since  
డగೕ
డఠೕ
= ߛ௝ > 0 it 
can be concluded that the gains of all carbon traders decrease with the tightening of the 
constraint on allowance choices. Consequently, the participation incentives decrease and thus 
there is no carbon market when the constraint is too strict. In this case the internal stability 
condition, specified below, is violated.  
       Finally, to conclude the analysis of stage 2, we still need to consider the behaviour of the 
singletons. As they cannot participate in the market, they decide their mitigation levels by 
maximising the payoffs specified in Eq. (3.2). Their best response is characterised by 
ܥ௝
ᇱ(ݍ௝
∗) = ܤ௝
ᇱ(ݍ∗).  
 Stage 1: Membership choice  
         At stage 1, all players make their membership decisions considering how the stage-2 
game will be played. The Nash equilibria of the membership game correspond to cartel 
stability ( d'Aspremont et al., 1983; Barrett 1994). Hence, in an equilibrium carbon market 
satisfying internal and external stability, no trade participant has an incentive to leave and no 
singleton has an incentive to participate; see conditions (3.10) and (3.11) below. For a carbon 
market ܶ with constraint parameter α, we introduce a partition function ௝ܸ(ܶ;  α) to represent 
the payoffs of trade participants ݆ ( ݆ ∈ ܶ) and singletons ݆ (݆ ∉ ܶ) as a function of the set of 
traders. An equilibrium carbon market is formed if the following internal and external 
stability conditions hold:  
Internal stability: ௝ܸ(ܶ;  ߙ) ≥ ௝ܸ(ܶ\{݆};  ߙ), ݆ ∈ ܶ,                                                                     (3.10) 
External stability: ௝ܸ(ܶ;  ߙ) ≥ ௝ܸ(ܶ ∪ {݆};  ߙ), ݆ ∉ ܶ.                                                                (3.11) 
3.4 Simulation analysis and results 
To illustrate the consequences of imposing constraints on individual allowance choices for the 
stability and the performance of an international carbon market, we conduct a simulation 
analysis based on our two-stage game employing the STACO model. A detailed description 
of the numerical approach is presented in section 3.4.1. To compare and analyse the 
differences in terms of stability and performance of international carbon markets with and 
without allowance choice constraints, we firstly examine the base scenario of an 
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unconstrained carbon market. Results are provided in section 3.4.2. The results for 
constrained carbon markets are presented and discussed in section 3.4.3. In section 3.4.4., as a 
sensitivity analysis, we provide results for a scenario where the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium emissions are used as a baseline for the allowances constraint.   
3.4.1 Simulations employing the STACO model  
Our simulation is performed by employing the STACO model, which is an integrated 
assessment model connecting GHG emissions with abatement costs and economic evaluations 
of climate damages for twelve different world regions: United States (USA), Japan (JPN), 
European Union-27 & EFTA (EUR), Other High Income countries (OHI), Rest of Europe 
(ROE), Russia (RUS), High Income Asian countries (HIA), China (CHN), India (IND), the 
Middle East countries (MES), Brazil (BRA) and Rest of the World (ROW). In STACO, the 
economic evaluation with respect to the payoff assessment is specified by the comparison 
between abatement costs and benefits. Focusing on the establishment of an international 
carbon market, we modify carbon traders’ payoff functions by including the carbon trade 
effects into the original payoff function in STACO under different constraints on allowance 
choices, as shown in Eq. (3.1). Considering inertia and the long term effects in the climate 
system, the STACO model evaluates GHG emission mitigation with projected baseline 
emissions ݁̅௝ for a horizon of 100 years. Given the participation choice in the initial period, 
each region determines optimal abatement levels ݍ௝∗ strategically in every time period. For a 
full specification of the latest version of the STACO model (STACO 3.0) the reader is 
referred to Nagashima et al. (2011) and Dellink et al. (2015). 
We use the numerical computing software MATLAB to do the calculations and to derive 
the numerical solutions. The approach to solving the numerical model is implemented in steps: 
Firstly, we assign a number to all possible non-trivial carbon markets (|ܶ| ≥2). With 12 
regions, the total number of non-trivial carbon markets is 2ଵଶ −12. In the second step, we 
calculate the equilibrium allowance choices, after-trade abatement and payoffs of each trader 
and for every possible market. We also calculate abatement levels of the singletons. Then we 
repeat this step for a tighter constraint on allowance choices, i.e. we lower the value of α 
stepwise (with step size ∆α = 0.02) from 1 to the percentage of the social optimum emissions. 
From these results, we can observe the changes in abatement and payoffs of all players 
associated with different constraints. Based on the results from the second step, the 
equilibrium carbon markets can be identified and internal and external stability can be 
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checked. Finally, from the performances and stability of the equilibrium carbon markets, we 
can identify an optimal exogenous constraint.      
3.4.2 Results for carbon markets with unconstrained allowance choices 
In an unconstrained carbon market the initial emission allowances can be chosen arbitrarily by 
trade participants. We first look at the stability of all possible non-trivial carbon markets. Our 
result shows that no equilibrium carbon market is simultaneously satisfying internal and 
external stability conditions under unconstrained allowance choices. However, if we only 
consider internal stability, then there are 36 internally stable carbon markets. The internally 
stable carbon markets are listed in Table 3.1, which reports the 12 best-performing carbon 
markets in terms of the global NPV (net present value) over 100 years. From the last column 
of Table 3.1, we can see that with arbitrary allowance choices, carbon market participation is 
attractive to all potential carbon sellers which are characterized by low marginal abatement 
benefits and low marginal abatement costs. Full stability is undermined by the incentives for 
singletons to join, i.e. external stability is violated. Specifically, regions with low marginal 
benefits (i.e. see Table 3.A1 in Appendix) from global abatement are highly motivated to join, 
for example OHI, ROE, RUS, HIA, IND, MES, BRA and ROW. The underlying reason is 
that regions with lower marginal benefits from global abatement have less incentive to reduce 
their emissions, hence their main motivation to join a carbon market is seeking revenues from 
carbon sales. This finding indicates that it will be difficult to establish an unconstrained 
carbon market under open membership. A constraint on the allowance choices could limit the 
participation incentives that are arising from revenue seeking behaviour which, in turn, results 
in hot air. A constraint on allowance choices may improve external stability.    
Table 3.1 shows that global mitigation and welfare of the internally stable carbon markets 
are higher compared to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, but are much lower than the 
levels in the social optimum (see the first and second row of Table 3.1). This can be attributed 
to non-cooperative strategies of abatement choice and limited participation. As we can see 
from the second to the last row of Table 3.1 the global payoffs and abatement levels achieved 
under carbon trade are significantly higher than the no-trade Nash equilibrium. The welfare 
enhancement through carbon trade is mainly due to the cost-savings from cheaper abatement 
options. Exploiting cheaper abatement options increases global mitigation. Regions with high 
marginal abatement costs (MAC) (see Figure 3.A1 in Appendix) like JPN and EUR are 
motivated to abate more than their Nash equilibrium levels because of their higher shares of 
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global abatement benefits. At the same time, a region like CHN which sells carbon without 
producing hot-air also contributes to the global abatement compared to the no-trade outcome. 
Hence, with carbon trade, the global emission reductions are larger and cheaper than in the 
no-trade Nash equilibrium. Both traders and non-traders can benefit from the positive 
externality of the increased global mitigation.         
The best-performing market is formed by two countries with different properties: EUR, 
which is characterized by high MAC, and CHN, which has the lowest MAC of all regions. In 
the best performing market, the MACs of the two traders are equalised at a carbon price  of 
4.74 $/tonCO2. This price is much lower than the MAC of EUR in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium and thus EUR benefits a lot from emission trading. In Carbone et al. (2009), the 
best market is also composed of EUR and CHN, which is comparable to our result. It is worth 
noticing the different carbon prices resulting in these different market structures as shown in 
column 4. Prices in the three best performing markets are higher than in other carbon markets. 
This is due to the number of participants with low MAC in the markets with a better 
performance. It is obvious that the carbon markets with lower carbon prices like {JPN, CHN, 
IND} and {EUR, CHN, IND} are formed by more regions with low MAC compared to the 
carbon markets like {EUR, CHN} and {JPN, CHN}.         
As shown by Helm (2003) and Carbone et al. (2009), the arbitrary choice of emission 
allowances can cause hot air in unconstrained carbon markets. Our results also confirm the 
existence of the hot-air effect. Table 3.2 reports the hot air effects that we find in eight of the 
twelve best-performing carbon markets listed in Table 3.1. Only the four best performing 
carbon markets do not show hot air effects. As explained in Carbone et al. (2009), hot air is 
not an issue for China as it prefers to maintain a relatively higher carbon price by reducing 
allowances. Hence the markets where China is the only carbon seller do not show hot air 
effects. For the carbon market {JPN, CHN, IND} the allowances supply by the world’s two 
biggest carbon sellers China and India can easily satisfy the small demand of Japan, without 
supplying an amount beyond their BAU emissions. So, also in this case hot air is avoided. 
Comparing hot-air and global abatements, see columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.2, we find that the 
abatement is inversely associated with the magnitude of hot-air. This observation carries over 
to global payoffs which are also inversely related to the magnitude of hot-air. These results 
underline the negative impact of hot-air on abatement and welfare. According to Helm (2003), 
it is possible that the total allowances chosen by all carbon traders exceed their non-
cooperative emissions level under certain conditions. However, in our simulations total 
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allowances of all carbon traders are lower than their non-cooperative emissions. This can be 
seen by comparing the no-trade Nash emissions level and the allowance choices in a carbon 
market in Table 3.2. The reason is that although some traders choose allowances above the 
BAU level, other traders (i.e. EUR and JPN) who have large marginal benefits of global 
abatement will choose lower allowances than their no-trade Nash emissions level to offset the 
negative influence of others’ excessive allowance choices.       
Table 3.2 shows that the hot air effects is largest in the carbon market {EUR, CHN, 
BRA}, caused by excessive allowance choice of BRA. The driving force is Brazil’s high 
marginal abatement costs, so it has an incentive to drive down the carbon price by increasing 
the amount of emission allowances; at the same time, Brazil’s marginal benefits are quite low 
(see Table 3.A1 in Appendix) and, hence, its incentives to reduce emissions are limited. As 
shown in the third row in Table 3.2, our results confirm that ROE, consisting of mainly the 
former Soviet Union countries, is one of the largest sources of hot air. In addition to its low 
benefits share from global abatement, the slow economic growth also reduces ROE’s demand 
for GHG emission allowances. The reason why MES produces hot air can be understood 
because it is the largest exporter of fossil fuels. MES seeks to decrease the carbon price and 
thus to increase the carbon demand which has a positive influence on fossil fuel exports. The 
hot air effects generated in other three carbon markets shown in Table 3.2 are caused by 
regions like HIA, OHI and IND respectively. The common reason for hot air created in these 
three markets is their relatively low benefits from global abatement (see Table 3.A1 in 
Appendix) and high revenues from carbon sales.  
In summary, our numerical analysis confirms the advantage of carbon markets in terms of 
global welfare and mitigation as compared to the no-trade Nash equilibrium. However, 
without a constraint on allowance choices it is difficult for a carbon market with open 
membership to satisfy external stability, because it is easily destabilized by market entrants 
who seek to raise revenues from carbon sale. The lower a region’s marginal damages of GHG 
emissions, the more allowances will be chosen. Excessive allowance choices result in an 
inefficient carbon market.  
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Table 3.1. Results for the top twelve best-performing internally stable carbon markets with unconstrained allowance choices  
Market structures 
with internal 
stability 
NPV of Global 
payoffs over 
100 years 
(billion $) 
Global 
mitigation  
in 2011 
in % of 
BAU 
emissions 
Price of 
emission 
allowance in 
2011 ($/ton 
CO2) 
 
Singleton regions with incentives to join the 
carbon markets 
 
 
 
 
 
No-trade  
Nash equilibrium 
(All singletons) 
  8446.39    5.38 ------ All 
The social optimum 
equilibrium 
29559.56 
 
28.75 30.52a ------ 
{EUR, CHN} 9682.73 7.00 4.74 OHI, ROE, RUS, HIA, IND, MES, BRA, ROW 
{JPN, CHN} 9556.75 7.07 3.95 OHI, ROE, RUS, HIA, IND, MES, BRA, ROW 
{USA, CHN} 9551.28 6.69 3.53 OHI, ROE, RUS, HIA, IND, MES, BRA, ROW 
{JPN, CHN, IND} 9416.88 7.03 2.75 OHI, ROE, RUS, HIA, MES, BRA, ROW 
{EUR, CHN, IND} 9399.96 6.86 3.28 OHI, ROE, RUS, HIA, MES, BRA, ROW 
{JPN, HIA, CHN} 9143.16 6.74 2.91 OHI, ROE, RUS, IND, MES, BRA, ROW 
{JPN, OHI, CHN} 9122.71 6.73 2.90 ROE, RUS, HIA, IND, MES, BRA, ROW 
{JPN, ROE, CHN} 9113.74 6.84 2.74 OHI, RUS, HIA, IND, MES, BRA, ROW 
{JPN, CHN, MES} 9087.21 6.70 2.84 OHI, ROE, RUS, HIA, IND, BRA, ROW 
{EUR, ROE, 
CHN} 
9060.98 6.63 3.26 OHI, RUS, HIA, IND, MES, BRA, ROW 
{JPN, CHN, BRA} 9052.53 6.68 2.78 OHI, ROE, RUS, HIA, IND, BRA, ROW 
{EUR, CHN, 
BRA} 
8999.96 6.45 3.30 OHI, ROE, RUS, HIA, IND, BRA, ROW 
 
a: Equalised marginal abatement costs in the social optimal equilibrium. 
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3.4.3 Results for carbon markets with constraints on allowance choices 
In this part, we focus on the numerical analysis of a carbon market with a constraint on the 
allowance choices. As described in Section 3.3, allowance choices are limited to a fraction α 
of each trade participant’s BAU emissions. Table 3.3 reports the stable carbon markets that 
we find for different levels of α. Compared to the unconstrained scenario, stability of and 
participation in the constrained carbon market are improved; with constraints we find 16 
stable carbon markets and the maximum number of trade participants is increased to five (see 
last column of Table 3.3). As shown in Table 3.1, under unconstrained allowance choices, the 
potential carbon sellers have incentives to join (i.e. ROE, RUS, IND, BRA and ROW). With 
constraints on allowance choices, these singleton regions are discouraged to join the carbon 
trade and the degree of discouragement increases with the strictness of the constraints. From 
columns 1 and 4 of Table 3.3 we can see that when α falls from 0.98 to 0.88, regions like 
ROE, RUS and IND are still willing to join; but when the value of α is decreased further, only 
RUS is motivated to join. Because ROE and IND are the main source of hot-air (as shown in 
Table 3.2), their marginal benefits from global abatement are much lower compared to 
Russia’s (see marginal benefits in Table 3.A1). When the constraint on allowance choices is 
too strict to make profits from selling carbon, ROE and IND prefer not to join the market. 
Table 3.3 shows that with decreasing of α from 0.84 to 0.74, only the carbon market {JPN, 
RUS} still remains to be stable. This is because both JPN and RUS have incentives to reduce 
emissions through carbon trade due to relatively higher marginal abatement benefits, 
especially JPN. At the same time, even under a stricter constraint, JPN can still find cheaper 
abatement options from carbon trade, while RUS also can earn revenues from selling carbon. 
However, no stable carbon market can be found when α is lower than 0.74. Note that the 
social optimum requires that global emission would fall to 71% of BAU emissions; see Table 
3.1.  
Table 3.3 displays that a stable carbon market will be the largest (in terms of the number 
of traders) when the constraint is modest, e.g. α = 0.9  and 0.88. Moreover, multiple 
equilibrium carbon markets can emerge under modest constraints, e.g. α = 0.94 , 0.92 and 
0.88. However, when the constraint becomes stricter, e.g. α < 0.88, the number of stable 
markets and their size decrease. The list of the equilibrium carbon markets under different 
constraints, shown in the last column of Table 3.3, also shows that when α < 0.88 , the 
stability of the equilibrium carbon market {JPN, RUS} is robust to varying the allowance 
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constraint. This robustness implies that for regions like JPN and RUS, the ranges of cost 
savings in abatement and earnings from carbon sale are so large that they can still benefit 
from carbon trade under more stringent constraints. It is interesting to observe the relationship 
between the actual allowance choices and the constraint. As shown in column 2 of Table 3.3, 
under less strict constraints, e.g. from α = 0.98  to 0.88, the actual allowance choices of 
carbon buyers (i.e. USA and JPN) with higher marginal abatement benefits, are generally 
non-binding. Carbon sellers (i.e. IND, ROE and RUS) who have lower marginal benefits from 
global abatement but can raise revenues from carbon sale, prefer to choose allowances at the 
binding levels (shown by bold numbers in Table 3.3). However, when the constraint is 
becoming stricter, e.g. α < 0.88, it becomes binding for all traders.  
Table 3.3 also shows that, a global market involving all world regions is difficult to 
realise. However, at least some larger GHG emitters like USA, IND and RUS can be included 
in a carbon trade agreement. The non-existence of a stable global carbon market indicates that 
the constraints imposed on the allowance choices can stabilise the carbon market to a certain 
degree but cannot completely overcome free-riding incentives. It is worth noting that CHN 
does not join any carbon market satisfying internal-external stability under different 
constraints, in contrast to the observation that CHN is part of the internally stable 
unconstrained markets discussed in the previous subsection. To see why this is the case notice 
that the markets listed in Table 3.1 are externally unstable because others would like to join, 
create hot air, and thus destabilise the (enlarged) market. Although hot air is ruled out in the 
constraint market, a similar mechanism is at work. Consider a lax constraint, e.g. α = 0.98. 
Here CHN would not join {ROE, HIA, MES} because ROE would then increase allowances. 
For stricter constraints the reason for the absence of China is that market entry requires a 
tough restriction of allowances such that potential revenues from sales of allowances are 
overcompensated by higher abatement costs.             
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Table 3.3. Stable carbon markets under different constraints 
Constraint 
parameter
α 
Allowance choices in 2011 in % of BAU emissions b Carbon markets with full 
stability 
 USA JPN ROE RUS HIA IND MES ROW  
0.98 ----- ----- 0.97 ----- 0.98 ----- 0.98 ----- {ROE, HIA, MES} 
0.94 ----- 0.93 0.94 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- {JPN, ROE} 
0.94 0.92 0.91 0.94 ----- ----- 0.94 ----- ----- {USA, JPN, ROE, IND} 
0.94 ----- 0.92 0.94 ----- ----- 0.93 ----- 0.94 {JPN, ROE, IND, ROW} 
0.92 ----- 0.91 0.92 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- {JPN, ROE} 
0.92 0.91 0.86 0.92 ----- ----- 0.91 ----- ----- {USA, JPN, ROE,  IND} 
0.9 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.90 ----- 0.90 ----- ----- {USA, JPN, ROE, RUS, 
IND} 
0.88 ----- 0.81 ----- ----- ----- 0.88 ----- ----- {JPN, IND} 
0.88 0.88 ----- ----- 0.88 ----- 0.88 ----- ----- {USA, RUS, IND} 
0.88 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.88 ----- 0.88 ----- ----- {USA, JPN, ROE, RUS, 
IND} 
0.84 ----- 0.84 ----- 0.84 ----- ----- ----- ----- {JPN, RUS} 
0.82 ----- 0.82 ----- 0.82 ----- ----- ----- ----- {JPN, RUS} 
0.8 ----- 0.80 ----- 0.80 ----- ----- ----- ----- {JPN, RUS} 
0.78 ----- 0.78 ----- 0.78 ----- ----- ----- ----- {JPN, RUS} 
0.76 ----- 0.76 ----- 0.76 ----- ----- ----- ----- {JPN, RUS} 
0.74 ----- 0.74 ----- 0.74 ----- ----- ----- ----- {JPN, RUS} 
0.72 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----  None 
b: The ratio is calculated as ௝߱∗/݁̅௝ . Bold face numbers indicate that the constraint is binding. 
Table 3.4 reports performances of the equilibrium carbon markets in terms of global 
welfare and mitigation levels. From columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.4, we find that global welfare 
(NPV over 100 years) and mitigation of the carbon market are depending on the constraint. 
Figure 3.1a provides a scatter plot of the global NPV over 100 years achieved by the 
equilibrium carbon markets for different levels of the constraint. Note that at α = 0.88, 0.92 
and 0.94 we find multiple equilibrium carbon markets. The trend line in Figure 3.1a shows 
that the global NPV of the equilibrium carbon markets generally increases when the constraint 
becomes stricter. Similarly mitigation levels increase as the constraint becomes stricter. 
Turning to coalition structures we observe that when tightening the constraint ‘broad but 
shallow’ agreements are replaced by ‘narrow but deep’ ones. As the constraint becomes 
stricter it becomes binding for more traders and the shadow value of allowances increases. 
This indicates increasing forgone payoffs for individual coalition members. At the same time 
tougher abatement targets of the coalition increase the free-rider incentives and only a small 
coalition {JPN, RUS} remains to be stable when the constraint tightens. Enhanced welfare 
effects resulting from more stringent policies can be explained as follows. Carbon sellers, due 
to the constraints on total emission allowances, have improved payoffs through an increased 
Carbon trade with constrained allowance choices 
59 
 
carbon price and abatement benefits which outweigh larger abatement costs. Carbon buyers 
who usually obtain higher marginal benefits of global abatement, can gain from the increased 
mitigation level. Lastly, singletons have higher payoffs from increased global mitigation. 
Figure 3.1b shows the carbon price in equilibrium carbon markets under different constraints. 
We can see that the carbon price is generally higher when the constraint becomes tighter. 
Multiple prices that can be observed at α = 0.88, 0.92  and 0.94 relate to the multiple 
equilibrium carbon markets (e.g. {USA, JPN, ROE, RUS, IND}, {USA, RUS, IND} and 
{JPN, IND} at α = 0.88). 
The first row of Table 3.4 shows the best-performing stable carbon market is formed by 
{USA, JPN, ROE, RUS, IND} under ߙ=0.88. This market has the largest membership and 
the highest mitigation level. A further tightening of the constraint would further increase 
mitigation and welfare for the given coalition, however, it will destabilise the coalition since 
free-rider incentives are stronger under a stricter constraint.  
Table 3.4  Performances of equilibrium carbon markets with constrained allowance choices 
Value of 
constraint 
parameter
ߙ 
Carbon markets with full 
stability 
Price of 
emission 
allowance in 
2011 ($/ton 
CO2) 
NPV of Global payoffs 
over 100 years (billion $) 
Global mitigation  in 
2011 in % of BAU 
emissions 
0.88 {USA, JPN, ROE, RUS, IND} 6.07 9038.73 6.98 
0.74 {JPN, RUS} 22.29 8987.14 6.76 
0.76 {JPN, RUS} 19.36 8922.64 6.60 
0.78 {JPN, RUS} 16.60 8851.23 6.44 
0.80 {JPN, RUS} 14.00 8773.37 6.28 
0.88 {USA, RUS, IND} 5.91 8760.03 6.49 
0.82 {JPN, RUS} 11.58 8689.66 6.11 
0.84 {JPN, RUS} 9.34 8600.66 5.95 
0.88 {JPN, IND} 1.23 8576.15 5.48 
0.92 {JPN, ROE} 3.24 8540.04 5.62 
0.94 {JPN, ROE} 1.92 8443.13 5.49 
0.90 {USA, JPN, ROE, RUS, IND} 4.17 8442.83 6.29 
0.98 {ROE, HIA, MES} 0.47 8353.10 5.39 
0.92 {USA, JPN, ROE,  IND} 3.15 8057.79 5.80 
0.94 {JPN, ROE, IND, ROW} 0.83 7928.85 5.34 
0.94 {USA, JPN, ROE, IND} 1.52 7503.21 5.22 
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In order to gain better insights into the performance of the equilibrium carbon markets 
under constraints, we report more details of the best-performing carbon market {USA, JPN, 
ROE, RUS, IND} under α = 0.88  in Table 3.5. Column 2 shows that all equilibrium 
allowance choices are bound by the constraint except for JPN. This is because JPN has the 
highest marginal benefits from global abatement such that JPN prefers to maintain a high 
global abatement. This result can also be explained by the shadow value of allowances shown 
in column 4 of Table 3.5, which indicate that JPN would not lose from a marginal tightening 
of the allowance constraint. These indicate for all traders except JPN that relaxing the 
constraint for an individual trader will benefit that trader. Concerning the after-trade 
abatement the carbon buyers USA and JPN, having the highest MAC, will abate less than 
their non-cooperative levels (shown in Appendix 3.A2) since they can buy cheap allowances. 
However the sellers (i.e. ROE, RUS and IND) having lower MAC almost double abatement 
compared with their non-cooperative abatement levels. The singletons choose the same 
abatement levels as in the no-trade Nash equilibrium, since they have dominant strategies in 
the abatement game. Due to increased abatement through carbon trade, the payoffs of all 
regions are improved as compared to the Nash payoffs (shown in the Appendix, Table 3.A2).  
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Figure 3.1a.  Global NPV of the equilibrium 
carbon markets under different constraints 
 
Figure 3.1b.  Carbon price in the equilibrium 
carbon markets under different constraints 
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Table 3.5  The best-performing equilibrium carbon market with constraint α=0.88: {USA, JPN, ROE, RUS, IND} 
Market 
participants 
Allowance 
choices in 2011 
in % of BAU 
emissions 
Price of emission 
allowance in 2011 
($/tonCO2) 
 
Shadow value of 
allowances in 
2011 ($/ton CO2) 
Abatement  in 
2011 (Mton 
CO2) 
NPV of regional 
payoffs over 100 
years 
(billion $) 
 
USA 0.88 6.07 3.41 266.89 1808.77 
JPN 0.86 6.07                        0 47.34 2267.01 
ROE 0.88 6.07 5.12 280.04 89.89 
RUS 0.88 6.07 2.70 412.07 766.21 
IND 0.88  6.07 2.73 852.35 110.75 
Singletons      
EUR ---- ---- ---- 403.16 2616.49 
OHI ---- ---- ---- 17.80 244.08 
HIA ---- ---- ---- 16.29 245.33 
CHN ---- ---- ---- 670.99 148.79 
MES ---- ---- ---- 9.28 178.61 
BRA ---- ---- ---- 8.48 129.26 
ROW ---- ---- ---- 142.86 432.66 
Overall, our numerical results confirm the cost effectiveness and environmental 
effectiveness of carbon trade, compared to the no-trade Nash equilibrium. However, in a 
carbon market with unconstrained allowance choices, the incentive of earning revenues from 
carbon sales and the arbitrary allowance choices result in a hot-air effect and the external 
instability of a carbon market with open membership. When imposing constraints on 
allowance choices, the hot-air effect can be eliminated. Most importantly, by curbing the 
incentives of obtaining revenues from carbon sale through limiting the allowance choices, the 
external instability can be reduced. We also find that under a carbon market with constrained 
allowance choices global mitigation and welfare can be improved most when the constraint is 
moderate.  
3.4.4 Results for carbon markets with Nash-emission levels as baseline for allowance 
choice constraints    
In this chapter we examine the impact of the setting of the baseline on the stability and 
effectiveness of constrained carbon markets. In the following we assume that allowance 
constrains are based on non-cooperative Nash emissions levels, i.e. emissions in the All 
singletons case. Numerical results for all stable carbon markets under the constraint α ∈ [0,1] 
are reported in Table 3.6. In general, compared to the BAU baseline for the constraint, results 
indicate the possibility of larger stable coalitions and more effective markets, i.e. higher 
global abatement levels in equilibrium. Several features of this result are worth to be 
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highlighted. Firstly, a global carbon market can be sustained when α = 1. In this grand carbon 
market where the upper bound of individual allowance choices is the Nash-emissions level, 
the global mitigation (5.38%) is equal to the All singletons structure (see Column 5 of Table 
3.6; compare to Column 3 of Table 3.1). This result stems from the fact that individual 
allowance choices of all carbon traders are binding. In this case cooperation does not increase 
abatement but global payoffs are improved through carbon trade. When the constraint is 
tighter, at α = 0.98 and 0.96, partial carbon markets are stable that comprise of 11 and 8 
regions, respectively. The highest global payoffs (10163.68 billion $) can be obtained when 
α = 0.98 and the highest global abatement level (7.27%) can be achieved when α = 0.96. 
These results improve upon global welfare and abatement that can be achieved under the 
BAU baseline.  
The enhanced stability and effectiveness of stable carbon markets with Nash baseline 
compared to the BAU baseline are related to the binding allowance choices of all carbon 
traders, which are found in all carbon markets from our numerical results. In particular, when 
α = 1, each region can only improve upon its Nash payoff by joining the carbon market. Thus 
a carbon market with full participation can be sustained. If the constraint is a little tighter, α =
0.98 , only ROW prefers to take a free rider position. As argued before, tightening the 
constraint will always decrease the incentive to sign the agreement. Further tightening of the 
constraints causes more regions to drop out. From Table 3.6, it can be observed the size of 
stable carbon markets becomes smaller because of the increased free-riding incentives when 
the constraint becomes stricter. This is a general finding and robust to changes of the baseline.  
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Table 3.6  Equilibrium carbon markets with Nash-emissions baseline for individual allowance choices constraints 
Value of 
constraint 
parameter
ߙ 
Carbon markets with full stability Price of emission 
allowance in 2011 
($/ton CO2) 
NPV of Global 
payoffs over 100 
years (billion $) 
Global mitigation  
in 2011 in % of 
BAU emissions 
1 All (Grand carbon market) 1.64 8599.58 5.38 
0.98 {USA, JPN, EUR, OHI, ROE, RUS, 
HIA, CHN, IND, MES, BRA} 
3.03 10163.68 7.03 
0.96 {USA, JPN, EUR, OHI, ROE, RUS,   
IND, MES} 
6.39 10020.94 7.27 
0.94 {JPN, ROE} 5.00 8730.03 5.75 
0.94 {EUR, ROE, MES}  9.18 9101.10 6.31 
0.92 {JPN, ROE}  6.82 8812.26 5.87 
0.92 {JPN, RUS}  9.57 8785.24 5.97 
0.90 {EUR, ROE}  14.97 9191.55 6.70 
0.90 {JPN, RUS}  11.62 8857.77 6.72 
0.88 {EUR, ROE} 17.41 9302.74 6.97 
 
3.5 Conclusions  
In this paper, we focus on the conditions for developing a stable international carbon market. 
Without constraints on individual allowance choices a carbon market can suffer from hot-air 
effects and market instability. To solve this problem, we consider the role of setting a 
constraint on allowance choices. Our main findings are the following.    
First, under a carbon market with unconstrained allowance choices we find that no stable 
market emerges. Unconstrained allowance choices can cause hot-air and thus undermine 
effectiveness and stability of a carbon market.  
Second, the stability and the membership of an international carbon market can be 
increased by imposing a constraint on allowance choices. The reason is that the constrained 
allowance choices discourage excessive participation of potential sellers. This reduces or 
avoids hot air. Due to a constraint on the allowance choices, a higher global abatement level 
can be obtained. Generally, compared to an unconstrained market, constraints can improve the 
stability and enlarge the scale of an international carbon market, but only to a limited degree. 
The largest part of the potential gains from cooperation remains unexploited. 
Third, when tightening the constraint ‘broad but shallow’ agreements are replaced by 
‘narrow but deep’ ones. In our setting with a constraint on BAU emissions the carbon market 
with the largest membership can be formed under a relatively lax constraint (12% below BAU 
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emissions in the STACO calibration). When the constraint is closer to the globally optimal 
abatement, we observe a narrower but deeper stable market with similar performance in terms 
of global abatement and welfare. We also find that under lax constraints, carbon buyers 
generally choose their allowances strictly lower than their constraint while sellers choose the 
binding level. Stricter constraints are binding for all traders. This result is not surprising since 
the strategic allowance choices by carbon buyers are motivated by the benefits from 
abatement, while carbon sellers are motivated mainly by revenues of carbon sales. These 
different motivations induce the strategic allowance choices to depend on the strictness of 
constraints.   
Fourth, our results also point at an alternative option for stabilising an international 
carbon market. As external instability is an issue, limiting access will increase abatement and 
global welfare. In fact limiting access can be more effective than allowance choice constraints 
based on BAU emissions; compare the best performing markets in Tables 3.1 and 3.4. This is 
in line with the conclusion by Finus (2008) that an open membership regime adopted in 
current international climate negotiations should be critically reviewed. However this 
conclusion does not carry over to the case of constraints based on Nash emissions. 
Finally, we demonstrate that by tying individual allowance choice constraints to the 
Nash-emissions levels, a carbon market with full participation can be sustained when the 
constraint is sufficiently lax (i.e. α close to 1). Different from BAU-related baselines, Nash-
related baselines are always binding. Our result indicates that a Nash-related baseline is more 
successful in terms of global welfare and abatement, as it responds better to individual 
incentives to participate. In the current policy debate BAU emissions are still dominant for 
defining and negotiating abatement targets or emission allowances. Our finding suggests that 
a revision of the baseline could ease negotiations. 
A limitation of our analysis is that the constraint on allowance choices is modelled as an 
exogenous parameter which is common for all carbon traders. A valuable extension of the 
model would be to include a pre-negotiation stage where the set of all regions first determines 
the constraint – possibly conditional on regional characteristics – and only after that the 
membership and allowance choices would follow.  
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3.6 Appendix 
Table 3.A1.  Benefits share, marginal benefits and BAU emissions in the STACO model 
 
Regions 
Benefits share of global   
abatement 
 Marginal benefits in 
2011 ($/ton CO2) 
 Uncontrolled 
Emissions (BAU) in 
2011 (Gton CO2) 
     
USA 0.2265  6.49  7084.96 
JPN 0.1725  7.34  1386.55 
EUR 0.2360  8.92  4891.74 
OHI 0.0345  0.80  1411.23 
ROE 0.0130  0.30  1503.11 
RUS 0.0675  2.43  2234.26 
HIA 0.0300  0.81  2591.49 
CHN 0.0620  0.57  11623.98 
IND 0.0500  0.34  3276.20 
MES 0.0249  0.60  991.67 
BRA 0.0153  0.43  2181.62 
ROW 0.0680  1.49  5660.27 
Sum 1.0000 
 
 ------  44837.08 
 
 
Table 3.A2.  Performances of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and the first-best social optimum scenario 
Regions 
 
  Nash equilibrium  Social optimum 
 
 
 Abatement in 
2011 (Mton 
CO2) 
 NPV of payoffs over 
100 years (billion $) 
 Abatement in 
2011(Mton 
CO2) 
 NPV of payoffs over 
100 years(billion $) 
USA  284.63  1742.81  1240.94  6558.90 
JPN  56.97  2125.91  222.85  9310.70 
EUR  403.16  2428.74  1130.12  10128.17 
OHI  17.80  228.31  390.08  707.83 
ROE  71.36  85.83  614.66  19.26 
RUS  266.34  686.37  904.47  2421.62 
HIA  16.29  228.75  531.82  345.23 
CHN  670.99  138.94  3740.05  -727.20 
IND  465.01  90.61  1586.02  0.88 
MES  9.28  166.47  470.65  92.81 
BRA  8.48  120.49  330.59  193.56 
ROW  142.86  403.16  1728.81  507.82 
Global  2413.17  8446.39  12891.06  29559.58 
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Figure 3.A1. Marginal abatement cost curves in 2011 in the STACO model  
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Chapter 4 
Nash bargaining solutions for international climate agreements 
under different sets of bargaining weights 
 
Bargaining is a tool to share collaborative gains and to facilitate reaching an agreement. To 
improve incentives to join an international climate agreement (ICA), the Nash bargaining 
solution can be used to distribute cooperative gains across signatories. In this paper, we 
examine how the formation of ICAs and their mitigation efficiency are impacted by the use of 
the Nash bargaining solution. In a Nash bargaining game with heterogeneous players, 
bargaining powers are unequal and may be driven by different characteristics of the players. 
We employ different sets of asymmetric bargaining weights in order to examine the 
effectiveness of climate coalitions that emerge as stable agreements. Using the Nash 
bargaining solution, we obtain results from the Stability of Coalition model (STACO). We 
find that the Nash bargaining solution can improve the participation incentives and 
performances of ICAs as compared to agreements that do not redistribute gains from 
cooperation, but its capacity to overcome free-riding incentives is limited. However, if Nash 
bargaining accounts for outside options of players, we find larger stable coalitions and higher 
global abatement levels. In fact, Nash bargaining with outside options can stabilise the largest 
coalitions that can possibly be stable in our game.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 Published in Journal of International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics:  
Yu S., van Ierland E.C., Weikard H.-P., Zhu X. (2017). Nash bargaining solutions for international climate agreements under 
different sets of bargaining weights, DOI: 10.1007/s10784-017-9351-3. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is costly. Due to the public-good property of 
GHG emissions mitigation each individual country has an incentive to free-ride on the 
abatement efforts of other countries. However, through multilateral negotiations an 
international climate agreement can be formed to alleviate the social dilemma (Carraro and 
Siniscalco 1993; Finus 2003). A climate agreement comprises a mitigation target for members, 
but also needs to distribute gains from cooperation.  
The distribution of coalitional gains across countries can be organised through transfer 
schemes which are effective instruments to offset free-riding incentives and improve the 
stability of International Climate Agreements (ICAs) (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 
1997; Botteon and Carraro 1997; Rose et al. 1998; Rose and Stevens 1998; Weikard et al. 
2006; Carraro et al. 2006; Weikard 2009; Nagashima et al. 2009). Sharing the gains of 
cooperation is solving a bargaining problem (Nash 1950; Powell 2002), hence the Nash 
bargaining solution (NBS) can be used to determine transfer schemes for ICAs. Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1993) analyse the role of welfare transfers for coalition stability among symmetric 
players when transfers are determined by applying the Nash bargaining solution. Their 
theoretical results show that the size of stable coalitions can be extended by ‘bribing’ 
singletons with transfers. Botteon and Carraro (1997) and Carraro et al. (2006) apply the Nash 
bargaining rule to surplus sharing within coalitions. They extend the analysis to asymmetric 
players and their results are derived resorting to numerical analysis. However, previous 
studies on the application of a Nash bargaining rule assume equal bargaining weights among 
countries and do not take the different bargaining powers of asymmetric countries into 
account. Bargaining powers determine the sharing of collective gains which, in turn, 
determines the incentives to join a climate agreement. In this paper, we assume that the 
distribution of gains is the outcome of a bargaining process with unequal bargaining power 
and, thus, transfers are determined by bargaining power. We employ the Nash bargaining 
solution to model the distribution of cooperative gains. The bargaining outcome is subject to 
bargaining power. The key issue is what constitutes the bargaining power of each negotiator. 
Costantini et al. (2015) provide a sketch of future potential bargaining positions of developing 
countries in climate negotiations according to key structural features like economic power, 
geographic, environmental and social characteristics, and the energy system. Considering the 
importance of bargaining power in climate negotiations, we discuss and review potential 
reasons that could induce differences of negotiators’ bargaining power in international climate 
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negotiations. Thus determinants of bargaining power can be identified and then used for the 
quantification of negotiators’ bargaining weights. Furthermore, we model the international 
climate negotiations as a Nash bargaining game in which cooperative gains are distributed 
based on the NBS with asymmetric bargaining power, and we study which climate coalitions 
could form, given the different bargaining powers of the negotiators.  
Although Nash bargaining has been used as a transfer scheme in the literature on ICAs, it 
has not been investigated in depth for the surplus sharing of coalitional gains among countries 
with unequal bargaining powers. The novelty of this paper is that we explore the impact of 
using the NBS for distributing coalitional gains under different sets of bargaining weights on 
the stability and effectiveness of international climate agreements. We consider different 
possible determinants of bargaining power which are exogenously determined in our model. 
Our analysis complements the set of coalitional surplus sharing rules. 
In this paper, we identify five different factors that can determine negotiators’ bargaining 
power. (i) In bargaining theory, time preference, i.e. the willingness to wait for the payoff is 
often proposed as a driving factor that can influence the distribution of gains. A player who is 
more patient has more bargaining power (Rubinstein 1982; Binmore et al. 1992; Powell 2002). 
Thus we use time preference represented by the discount factor to determine bargaining 
power of negotiating countries. (ii) In climate negotiations, it is commonly argued that the 
distribution of cooperative payoffs should be in accordance with abatement efforts. Larger 
efforts give a claim to a larger share of the gains. Hence, we use the proportion of individual 
abatement in a coalition to represent each negotiator’s bargaining weight. (iii) Another way to 
assess efforts is to use abatement costs. This is different from (ii) if countries differ in 
marginal costs of abatement. Larger costs could justify a larger claim. Thus we use countries’ 
total abatement costs, reflecting their monetary efforts as an indicator of bargaining power. (iv) 
Abatement benefits of a country reflect the avoided damages from reducing GHG emissions 
which are associated with a country’s vulnerability to climate change. A country that is more 
vulnerable to climate change will be more eager to get involved in the climate cooperation 
than a country that is less vulnerable. Hence, we use the inverse of abatement benefits as an 
indicator of bargaining power. (v) In international negotiations, economically powerful 
countries can be more successful in shaping the agreement. We therefore take the economic 
power measured by gross domestic product (GDP) as an indicator of bargaining power.    
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To compare and examine the impact of the NBS with different sets of unequal bargaining 
weights on incentives to cooperate, we formulate a two-stage cartel formation game. At the 
first stage, each country decides whether to participate in a climate coalition or not by 
evaluating payoffs received from being a signatory or a singleton. At the second stage, 
abatement targets are set cooperatively by coalition members, but their individual payoffs are 
determined by applying the NBS with a given set of bargaining weights.  
A bargaining solution is not just affected by bargaining power, but also by players’ 
outside options (Wagner 1988; Powell 2002). A decision to take up an outside option implies 
a withdrawal from the bargaining process. The outside option payoff imposes a lower bound 
on the bargaining solution since no one must accept an agreement that makes him worse off 
compared to what he can obtain otherwise (Binmore et al. 1992; Muthoo 1999). For the 
bargaining problem of international climate agreements, we assume that a country’s outside 
option is to abstain from an agreement and to remain a singleton player. This is in line with 
Muthoo (1999, p. 105) who explains that outside options do not affect the disagreement point. 
The Nash bargaining solution with outside options falls in the class of optimal sharing rules 
described by Carraro et al. (2006) and Weikard (2009). Hence, our paper provides an 
additional motivation for the use of optimal sharing rules.  
We adopt the concept of internal and external stability to analyse our game (cf. 
D’Aspremont et al. 1983). An agreement is internally stable if no member wants to leave. It is 
externally stable if no other player wants to join. This implies that we consider only single 
deviations which define the outside option payoffs. If a deviation would trigger others’ 
withdrawal from the coalition, a simple internal/external stability concept would not be 
adequate and more sophisticated solution concepts such as coalition proof equilibrium 
(Bernheim et al. 1987) or farsighted stability (Chwe 1994) could be employed. De Zeeuw 
(2008) shows that farsighted coalition stability can lead to larger stable coalitions with higher 
global welfare. Another assumption that we adopt is that we allow only for one coalition. A 
deviator from the coalition becomes a singleton and cannot make an agreement with other 
players. Allowing for multiple coalitions would lead to higher abatement levels and global 
welfare as has been shown by Asheim et al. (2006) and Sáiz et al. (2006). However, in this 
paper we do not consider the possibility of multiple coalition structures and we confine the 
analysis to internal and external stability. The implications of refined solution concepts is left 
to future research.  
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To see how different sets of bargaining weights and the relevance of outside options 
impact coalition stability, we compare results from the STACO (Stability of Coalitions) 
model. STACO is a global model with calibrated abatement costs and benefits functions for 
12 world regions. We use it to test stability of the 2ଵଶ − 12 possible coalitions that may form. 
Our results provide implications of sharing rules based on the NBS, and also its impact on the 
formation and stability of ICAs.   
In what follows, we present the game in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses potential 
determinants of bargaining power, i.e. we introduce different sets of bargaining weights used 
in the NBS for distributing cooperative gains. Section 4.4 describes the STACO model and 
our numerical results in more detail. The paper ends with discussions and conclusions in 
Section 4.5.  
4.2 The game theoretical model 
We consider a set of players ܰ = {1,2, … , ݊} representing countries or regions that negotiate 
an agreement on mitigating GHG emissions. We allow for asymmetric abatement benefits and 
costs. The formation of a climate agreement is modelled by the following a two-stage game.  
Stage 1: All players (݅ ∈ ܰ)  announce whether to sign an agreement or not. Their 
decisions are made non-cooperatively and simultaneously. Formally, an agreement is a subset 
of the set of players. The set of all possible agreements is:  
ߞ = {ܵ ⊆ ܰ|  ݏ ≥ 2 }, |ߞ| = 2௡ − (݊ + 1).                           
where ݏ = |ܵ|  represents the number of signatories. If negotiations fail, then there is no 
agreement and all players remain singletons.    
Stage 2: At the second stage signatories ܵ  and the remaining singletons play a 
transboundary pollution game. Abatement strategies are chosen simultaneously by signatories 
and singletons. Signatories (݅ ∈ ܵ) decide on their abatement by maximising their aggregated 
payoffs; non-signatories (݅ ∈ ܰ\ܵ) maximise their individual payoff. If no agreement has 
been reached at stage 1, payoffs are determined by the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome 
of a n-player transboundary pollution game. We denote this outcome by ܦ as it represents the 
disagreement point of the bargaining game.  
The set of abatement choices by all players can be defined as ݍ = (ݍଵ, … , ݍ௡) with the 
condition ݍ௜ ∈ [0, ݁̅௜] , where ݁̅௜  denotes the business-as-usual emissions level. Once 
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abatement is chosen, the individual signatory’s payoff denoted by ߨ௜(ݍ) can be determined, 
where ݍ  denotes the abatement vector. The coalitional gains of the agreement ܵ  are the 
difference between the aggregate payoff of signatories ∑ ߨ௜(ݍ)௜∈ௌ  and what they would get in 
case of disagreement. The final payoffs of signatories denoted by ߨ௜∗ are based on the NBS 
used to redistribute the coalitional gains. The set of weights reflecting bargaining power is 
denoted by {ߣ௜}௜∈ௌ. It is exogenously determined in our model.  
Note that in our game, we only consider the formation of one single agreement, such that 
a player deviating from ܵ becomes a non-signatory. Therefore, the outside option for each 
signatory ݅ ∈ ܵ in our Nash bargaining game is the payoff received as a singleton when other 
players maintain their membership status. In this setting, for an agreement S with only two 
signatories (i.e. ݏ = 2), the outside option is identical to the disagreement point or status quo, 
but in general this is not the case. Obviously, an agreement ܵ can be accepted by a signatory if 
and only if its coalitional payoff is larger than its outside option payoff. 
 We solve this two-stage game by backward induction in order to identify the sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibria. At stage 2, the signatories ݅ ∈ ܵ choose their optimal abatement levels 
ݍ௜  by maximising joint payoffs denoted by ∑ ߨ௜௜∈ௌ . We have the following maximization 
problem for signatories ݅ ∈ S: 
݉ܽݔ
௤೔
   ∑ ߨ௜(ݍ) = ∑ ൫ܤ௜(ݍ) − ܥ௜(ݍ௜)൯௜∈ௌ .௜∈ௌ                                                                                  (4.1)  
where ݍ = ∑ ݍ௜௜∈ே  denotes the global abatement level. The abatement cost function denoted 
by ܥ௜(ݍ௜)  is increasing and strictly convex, i.e. ܥ௜ᇱ(ݍ௜) > 0  and ܥ௜ᇱᇱ(ݍ௜) > 0 . Abatement 
benefits ܤ௜(ݍ), depend on the overall level of abatement ݍ and are assumed to be linearly 
increasing, i.e. ܤ௜ᇱ(ݍ) > 0 and ܤ௜ᇱᇱ(ݍ) = 0, implying a dominant strategy for each player. The 
equilibrium condition for signatories ݅ ∈ ܵ is derived from the first order condition of problem 
(4.1): 
ܥ௜
ᇱ(ݍ௜
∗) = ෍ ܤ௝
ᇱ
௝∈ௌ
(ݍ∗).                                                                                                                          (4.2) 
At this stage, each non-signatory maximises its own payoffs. The problem for non-signatories 
can be formulated as follows:  
݉ܽݔ
௤೔
   ߨ௜(ݍ) = ܤ௜(ݍ) − ܥ௜(ݍ௜).                                                                                                         (4.3) 
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The equilibrium condition for singletons ݅ ∈ ܰ\ܵ can be obtained by deriving the first order 
condition of the problem (4.3). This gives ܤ௜ᇱ(ݍ∗) = ܥ௜ᇱ(ݍ௜∗). 
Based on abatement choices of all players, the payoffs of signatories and singletons can 
be determined. Signatories redistribute the aggregated payoffs ∑ ߨ௜(ݍ) ௜∈ௌ based on the NBS. 
Their bargaining powers are unequal and given by a set of bargaining weights {ߣ௜}௜∈ௌ. The 
redistributed payoff under the NBS can be represented by a set denoted by {ߨ௜∗}௜∈ௌ, which 
solves the Nash bargaining problem described as follows:  
 ݉ܽݔ
{గ೔
∗}೔∈ೄ
ෑ(ߨ௜
∗ − ߨത௜)
ఒ೔
௜∈ௌ
,                                                                                                                       (4.4)  
s.t. 
ߨ௜
∗ ≥ ߨത௜, 
ߨଵ
∗ + ⋯ + ߨ௦
∗ = ෍ ߨ௜(ݍ)
௜∈ௌ
. 
in which ߨത௜  represents the non-cooperative payoffs of signatories ݅ ∈ ܵ , which is the 
disagreement point ( (ߨത௜)௜∈ௌ = ܦ ). We assume that gains from cooperation can be 
redistributed among signatories without incurring transactions costs. Therefore, the bargaining 
set is convex and compact which ensures the uniqueness of the solution of bargaining 
problem (4.4). Signatories’ bargaining weights satisfy the condition ∑ ߣ௜௜∈ௌ = 1. A higher 
value of ߣ௜ indicates a strategic advantage in the bargaining process.  
At stage 1, all players decide to sign an agreement or not. Here, we use the partition 
function ௜ܸ(ܵ) that can be derived from the solution of the stage-2 game to represent each 
player’s payoffs under the coalition ܵ based on the NBS. Note that a signatory receives its 
outside option payoffs when deviating from the coalition ܵ, denoted by ௜ܸ(ܵ\{݅}). The Nash 
equilibrium of the stage-1 game satisfies the following internal and external stability 
conditions (d'Aspremont et al. 1983). 
Internal stability:  
௜ܸ(ܵ) ≥ ௜ܸ(ܵ\{݅}), ݅ ∈ ܵ.                                                                                                                   (4.5)  
External stability:   
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௜ܸ(ܵ) ≥ ௜ܸ(ܵ ∪ {݅}), ݅ ∈ ܰ\ܵ.                                                                                                            (4.6) 
4.3 The representation and interpretation of different sets of bargaining 
weights 
In this section, we discuss factors that could lead to differences in countries’ bargaining power 
in international climate negotiations. Based on these factors, weights of bargaining power can 
be identified that will be used to determine the bargaining outcomes and, hence, the individual 
payoffs for all coalition members. We also explain the relevance of outside options in our 
game and discuss their role for stable climate agreements. 
4.3.1 Bargaining weights based on discount factor  
Gains from cooperation can only be obtained when agreement is reached. A delay of reaching 
an agreement is costly (Rubinstein 1982; Muthoo 1999). This is particularly relevant for 
climate agreements: the sooner cooperation is achieved, the smaller the climate damages will 
be (Courtois and Tazdaït 2014). Binmore et al. (1986) show that in a bargaining game players’ 
time preferences impact their strategic choices and thus the bargaining solution. The discount 
factor reflects a player’s willingness to wait and can be used as an indicator of the negotiators’ 
bargaining power.  
Over time the net present value (NPV) of the gains from cooperation falls quicker for a 
region with a higher discount rate than for a region with a lower discount rate. Therefore, the 
higher a region’s discount rate, the stronger its preference for an ICA that is formed and 
implemented earlier. Regions with a strong preference to reach an agreement are more willing 
to give in. They will have a larger cost of waiting and therefore less bargaining power. 
Let ݎ௜ be the discount rate prevailing in region ݅. We use the discount factor denoted by 
ߜ௜ ≡
ଵ
ଵା௥೔
 to represent the bargaining power of signatory ݅  in the negotiation. The 
corresponding bargaining weight can be represented as: 
ߣ௜ =
ߜ௜
∑ ߜ௝௝∈ௌ
, ݅ ∈ ܵ.                                                                                                                              (4.7) 
Under this set of bargaining weights, regions with relative lower discount rates are expected 
to have stronger participation incentives induced by higher bargaining weights and a larger 
share of coalitional gains. 
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4.3.2 Bargaining weights based on abatement efforts 
As compared to developed regions with high marginal abatement costs and benefits, 
developing regions with low marginal abatement costs and benefits have less incentives to 
join a climate coalition. The main reason is that developing regions contribute larger shares of 
global abatement but with lower private returns. Considering the importance of developing 
regions’ contribution to abatement, it can be argued that regions engaging in greater 
abatement efforts, if they join, can ask for a larger share of the gains. Hence, we use the 
proportion of individual abatement in a coalition to represent each negotiator’s bargaining 
weight. The larger the mitigation efforts of a coalition member, the larger its bargaining 
power in the negotiation over coalitional gains. The bargaining weight based on abatement 
efforts can be formulated as: 
ߣ௜ =
ݍ௜
∗
∑ ݍ௝
∗
௝∈ௌ
, ݅ ∈ ܵ.                                                                                                                             (4.8) 
in which, ݍ௜∗ is the equilibrium abatement level of each signatory ݅ of coalition ܵ. It can be 
expected that under this set of bargaining weights, regions contributing larger shares to the 
coalitional abatement will have more incentives to participate.     
4.3.3 Bargaining weights based on abatement costs 
Within a climate coalition, due to differences in the technological development and the 
resulting differences in marginal abatement costs between countries, a large abatement 
assignment of a member does not necessarily imply high total abatement costs if marginal 
abatement costs are low. Hence, abatement effort ݍ௜ does not accurately reflect the cost each 
member pays for cooperation. The controversy about collaborative gains allocation that is 
induced by countries’ uneven costs for mitigation cooperation has been a recurring issue put 
on the negotiation table (Barrett and Stavins 2003; Carraro et al. 2006). Generally, countries 
taking on larger abatement costs would claim compensation in the form of a larger share of 
the cooperative gains. If the total abatement is seen as a joint effort requiring investment, then 
the gains from cooperation should be distributed proportional to these investments. Hence, a 
country’s abatement cost can be identified as a source of asymmetry in bargaining power 
during negotiations on climate cooperation. We take the abatement cost of a country as a 
measure of its bargaining power. The bargaining weight can be formulated as follows:  
ߣ௜ =
ܥ௜(ݍ௜
∗)
∑ ܥ௝(ݍ௝
∗)௝∈ௌ
, ݅ ∈ ܵ.                                                                                                                      (4.9) 
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Under such a set of bargaining weights, the higher a country’s abatement cost, the higher will 
be its share of the gains from cooperation.    
4.3.4 Bargaining weights based on climate change damages 
Damages resulting from climate change differ across regions due to different impacts of 
climate change, different economic losses and different valuations of environmental quality. 
Regions facing high damages are eager to mitigate climate change. However the low-damage 
regions have less incentives to join the cooperation. This difference in preferences for climate 
cooperation implies that low-damage countries hold more bargaining power than high-
damage countries.  
In our model abatement benefits are avoided climate change damages. Hence, we use 
abatement benefits to represent climate change vulnerability. Bargaining power is then 
inversely related to climate change vulnerability. The bargaining weight based on damages 
can be represented as  
ߣ௜ =
1
ܤ௜(ݍ∗)
∑ 1ܤ௝(ݍ∗)௝∈ௌ
, ݅ ∈ ܵ.                                                                                                                  (4.10) 
From Eq. (4.10) it is straightforward to see that higher benefits from global abatement are 
associated with lower bargaining power and a lower bargaining weight ߣ௜.  
4.3.5 Bargaining weights based on economic power  
In international negotiations among asymmetric regions, the economic power reflected by the 
GDP of a region can affect its bargaining power. Generally, regions which are characterised 
by a larger GDP can exert more influence over the regions with a lower GDP, for example 
through issue linkage. Issue linkage connects environmental negotiations with other economic 
issues (e.g. trade or technological cooperation). Issue linkage can offset free-riding incentives 
in climate cooperation (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 1995). In climate negotiations, regions 
with an economic advantage can put pressure on poorer regions with ‘sticks and carrots’. For 
example, they can withhold or offer technological cooperation. Therefore, regions who have 
advantage in economic power have larger bargaining power in climate negotiations. Based on 
this argument, economically powerful regions can obtain a larger share of the joint payoff. 
This reasoning has also been put forward by Rose et al. (1998) where they discuss a transfer 
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rule based on income claims. Determining negotiators’ bargaining power by economic power, 
the bargaining weight can be represented as: 
ߣ௜ =
ܩܦ ௜ܲ
∑ ܩܦ ௝ܲ௝∈ௌ
, ݅ ∈ ܵ.                                                                                                                     (4.11) 
4.3.6 Outside options  
In the bargaining game outside options introduce a lower bound on each player’s payoff. The 
presence of outside options can thus affect the negotiation outcome by considering the impact 
of the minimum payoff a player can assure for himself when leaving the negotiation. Hence, 
in our game we assume that a region’s outside option is to abstain from an agreement and to 
remain a singleton player. As mentioned before, a player’s outside option payoff can be 
written as ௜ܸ(ܵ\{݅}). In the literature examining coalition stability in cartel games it has been 
pointed out that coalition ܵ can be internally stable whenever the coalition payoff does not fall 
short of the sum of members’ outside options, i.e. 
෍ ௜ܸ(ܵ)
௜∈ௌ
≥ ෍ ௜ܸ(ܵ\{݅})
௜∈ௌ
.                                                                                                               (4.12) 
Inequality (4.12) is a necessary condition for internal stability of coalition ܵ. If we consider a 
bargaining solution with outside options, then the outside option payoff is guaranteed for each 
signatory whenever (4.12) is satisfied. Carraro et al. (2006) and Weikard (2009) have called 
solutions satisfying internal stability when (4.12) holds “optimal transfers”, since payoffs are 
re-arranged to incentivise participation in the agreement. It is obvious then that bargaining 
with outside options belongs to the class of optimal transfer rules. It is important to note that 
the set of stable coalitions is not affected by the distribution of the surplus that remains after 
all signatories have received their outside option payoffs. This implies that in our game, under 
bargaining with outside options, the set of stable coalitions is independent of bargaining 
weights ߣ௜ . Hence, for the analysis of stability there is no need to apply different sets of 
bargaining weights. 
4.4 Simulations and Results  
In this section, we describe the implementation of the simulation analysis employing the 
STACO model in Section 4.4.1. Section 4.4.2 presents the simulation results and a discussion 
of our findings concerning stability and effectiveness of coalitions under the NBS. We 
examine the relevance of outside options in Section 4.4.3. All results and discussions in this 
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section are based on the STACO 3.0 model as documented by Nagashima et al. (2011) and 
Dellink et al. (2015).  
4.4.1 Simulations employing the STACO model  
To gain practical insights into the implications of the NBS with different sets of bargaining 
weights, we employ a numerical simulation model, the STACO model. The STACO model is 
a combined game-theoretic and integrated assessment model created to examine the formation 
and performances of international climate agreements among twelve world regions as 
specified in the Table 4.A1 in the Appendix (cf. also Nagashima et al. 2011; Dellink et al. 
2015). By specifying the abatement benefit and cost functions for these twelve heterogeneous 
regions, the STACO model enables us to analyse coalition stability, abatement levels, 
efficiency and welfare. Considering inertia of the climate system, the simulation analysis in 
STACO adopts a 100-year time horizon (from 2010 to 2110). The formation of an ICA in 
STACO is a standard two-stage cartel formation game, in which the membership decision is 
taken once and for all periods. The abatement choice of each player ݅ for the whole time 
horizon can be represented by an abatement path (ݍ௜,ଵ∗ ,..., ݍ௜,ଵ଴଴∗ ). Accordingly, the payoffs of 
each player over the planning horizon can be represented as a payoff path (ߨ௜,ଵ∗ , … , ߨ௜,ଵ଴଴∗ ). 
Finally, the stability of a climate coalition is checked based on the net present value of the 
payoff stream over 100 years according to the internal and external stability conditions (4.5) 
and (4.6). For a full specification of the latest version of the STACO model (STACO 3.0) the 
reader is referred to Nagashima et al. (2011) and Dellink et al. (2015).         
For our simulations we use the numerical computing software MATLAB. For each period, 
signatories and singletons decide their optimal abatement ݍ௜,௧∗  according to Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3). 
Accordingly, the payoffs of signatories can be derived in each period based on Nash 
bargaining solutions described in Eq. (4.4). The payoffs of singletons are the net gains from 
abatement. In particular, each signatory’s bargaining weight ߣ௜,௧ in each period is based on the 
value of different determining factors at each period, for example, the discount factor ߜ௜,௧, 
abatement ݍ௜,௧∗ , abatement costs ܥ௜,௧(ݍ௜,௧∗ ) , climate change damages 
ଵ
஻೔,೟(௤೟
∗)
 and economic 
power ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ . For each set of bargaining weights, we calculate the abatement and payoffs 
path of each region under every coalition that can be formed. Finally, based on the calculation 
of the NPV of each player’s payoff stream over 100 years we perform a stability check for 
each coalition according to Eqs. (4.5) and (4.6).   
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4.4.2 Results for the Nash bargaining solution without consideration of outside 
options  
In this section, we report and discuss results on coalition formation and performances under 
the NBS with different sets of bargaining weights. The role of outside options is discussed in 
Section 4.4.3.  
To compare our surplus sharing scheme based on the NBS with other conventional 
sharing schemes that are frequently discussed (for example egalitarian, historical 
responsibility or ability to pay) we calculate transfers generated in NBS under the five 
different sets of bargaining weights for the grand coalition. Table 4.1 illustrates the amount of 
transfers for each region under various sets of bargaining weights. Regions with negative 
transfers are payers, and regions with positive transfers are receivers. Due to high marginal 
abatement benefits USA, JPN and EUR can benefit more than other regions. Hence, USA, 
JPN and EUR are always transfer payers under all five sets of bargaining weights. This result 
is in line with the result under the egalitarian and ability-to-pay sharing scheme calculated by 
Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) using STACO. However, JPN becomes transfer 
receiver under a historical responsibility rule. This is due to the low Business-As-Usual 
emissions of JPN, implying that JPN contributes less to the current GHG concentration and 
thus JPN has a low mitigation target. In terms of the amount of transfers JPN and EUR are the 
two largest payers and their payments are much larger than under the egalitarian and ability-
to-pay rule in Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006). In contrast, USA pays the largest amount 
of transfers under the egalitarian and ability-to-pay rule in Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus 
(2006). This is due to USA’s relatively large population and high GDP per capita. From Table 
4.1, it can also be seen that CHN and BRA always receive the largest amounts of transfers 
under different bargaining weights. This also explains why CHN and BRA have strong 
participation incentives as shown in Table 4.2. When other conventional sharing rules are 
applied, IND and BRA are the largest transfer receivers (Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus 2006).  
Now we turn to the stability results when the NBS is used to redistribute coalitional gains.  
Firstly, our results show that all coalitions with two members are internally stable. As 
explained by Weikard et al. (2006) this result is related to the linear functional form of 
abatement benefits and non-negative weights, which ensure a positive coalitional surplus. 
Thus being a signatory of a two-members coalition gives a larger payoff than that of being a 
singleton. Table 4.2 shows the results for stable coalitions and the value of bargaining weights 
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for each signatory under different determinants of the bargaining power. The second column 
of Table 4.2 lists all stable coalitions for the five sets of asymmetric bargaining weights 
described in Section 4.3 and a reference scenario with equal weights. Under the scenario with 
equal bargaining weights, three coalitions (i.e. {RUS, CHN, BRA}, {HIA, CHN, BRA} and 
{CHN, IND, BRA}) are stable. In STACO, regions like RUS, CHN and IND are 
characterised by flat marginal abatement cost curves and by a moderate level of abatement 
benefits (see Table 4.A2 in Appendix 4.6 and Figure 3.A1 in Appendix 3.6). In a coalition of 
regions with similar marginal abatement costs and benefits, participation incentives can be 
promoted and maintained with equal sharing of collective gains. Regions BRA and HIA face 
steep marginal abatement cost curves and low marginal benefit shares. Hence when joining a 
coalition the required additional abatement remains limited. It is CHN that undertakes the 
largest abatement efforts but also not much more than under All Singletons.  
As shown in Table 4.2, generally, there are small stable coalitions under all sets of 
bargaining weights we examine. The reason is that for each set of asymmetric bargaining 
weights, only the regions with an advantage have sufficient incentives to join. For example, as 
our numerical results show, USA has strong incentives to join an ICA with members of HIA, 
CHN and BRA when the bargaining weight is based on GDP, whereas among six stable 
coalitions only China, India and the Rest of the World are motivated to join with large 
incentives when the bargaining weight is determined by abatement efforts. Our results also 
show that multiple equilibrium coalitions emerge under each set of bargaining weights. 
Generally, among all determinants, more coalitions can be stabilised when bargaining power 
is determined by signatories’ abatement efforts, damages and abatement costs. It should be 
noticed that same stable coalitions can emerge under different sets of bargaining power, for 
example, coalitions {OHI, CHN}, {ROE, CHN} and {RUS, CHN} can be stabilised with 
bargaining weights based on ‘abatement efforts’ and ‘abatement costs’. Even though some 
regions’ bargaining power can be interpreted as different values under different determinants, 
and the corresponding NBS in terms of the distribution of coalitional gains is also changed 
accordingly, the same equilibria with respect to the stable coalitions can still be reached. It is 
also interesting to see that, even though there are multiple equilibrium coalition structures for 
each distribution of bargaining weights, one coalition member is present in each equilibrium 
structure (CHN or BRA). This is due to their relatively larger bargaining weights under the 
respective set of weights (see Table 4.2).   
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When the bargaining weight is determined by regions’ discount factors, regions with high 
discount rates, for example CHN and IND, cannot strike an agreement with developed regions 
like USA, JPN and EUR which have low discount rates and induce large additional abatement 
efforts of CHN. Due to low discount rates (see Appendix A2), developed regions like USA, 
JPN and EUR are in a better bargaining position compared to regions that have high discount 
rates and CHN cannot recover the cost of abatement. However, as can be seen from Table 4.2, 
cooperation can be established between CHN and regions like ROE, BRA and RUS (e.g. 
{ ROE, CHN, BRA}, {RUS, CHN, BRA}). To see why such coalitions can be stable, notice 
that ROE, RUS and BRA have low marginal benefits, requiring little extra abatement 
compared to disagreement. To shed more light on stability consider Figure 4.1 which depicts 
the payoff space for RUS and CHN in a coalition with BRA. This coalition is stable under 
equal and discounting bargaining weights. In Figure 4.1, D = (836.58, 283.52)  is the 
disagreement point. BRA’s payoff in that point is 244.52 and not reported in the Figure. The 
downward sloping line depicts any payoff distribution between CHN and RUS when BRA 
receives its outside option payoff, a minimum requirement for internal stability. Hence to the 
right of that line where RUS and CHN receive more and BRA receives less the coalition 
cannot be stable. The dashed vertical and horizontal lines depict the outside option payoffs of 
RUS and CHN, respectively. Only bargaining solutions that produce payoff vectors in the 
shaded triangle will be internally stable. We highlight three points in Figure 4.1. Point B =
(884.80, 289.66) is the best payoffs that BRA can obtain (288.22) in a stable coalition with 
RUS and CHN. Both, RUS and CHN receive only their outside option payoff. Points E =
(884.92, 295.66) and F = (885.31, 294.38) are the bargaining solutions for equal bargaining 
weights and weights based on discounting. Both are stable as can be seen from Table 4.2 and 
very close to each other as can be seen from Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1. The bargaining set for the coalition {RUS, CHN, BRA}. The disagreement point is D. The bargaining set is the 
triangle to the north-east of D. Point B marks the outside option payoffs for RUS and CHN. The shaded triangle marks 
internally stable allocations.     
In scenarios where bargaining weights are based on abatement efforts and abatement 
costs, China is a member of all stable coalitions. This can be attributed to China’s advantage 
in terms of low marginal abatement costs, which makes China contribute large shares to the 
total coalitional abatement. The large contribution to coalitional abatement puts China in a 
strong bargaining position and it therefore receives a larger share of the gains. However, there 
are two exceptions of stable coalitions (i.e. {CHN, IND} and {CHN, ROW}), in which the 
bargaining weights of CHN are lower compared to IND and ROW (i.e. ߣ஼ுே = 0.47 and 0.39), 
see Table 4.2. This is due to the lower marginal abatement costs of IND and ROW as 
compared to CHN at the equilibrium abatement level. 
Under bargaining weights determined by climate change damages, BRA always has more 
bargaining power because of its lowest benefit share. Hence, as shown in the scenario for 
damage weights in Table 4.2, BRA has generally a higher bargaining weight than its 
respective coalition partner (except when it forms a coalition with India) and thus appears in 
all stable coalitions in this scenario. Under bargaining weights determined by the economic 
power, USA holds an advantageous bargaining position in the negotiation. As shown in the 
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last row of Table 4.2, USA has the largest bargaining weight in the coalition {USA, HIA, 
CHN, BRA}. However, USA would prefer one of the other five bargaining weight scenarios 
since in these scenarios it would benefit from being a free-rider. Our results also show that a 
stable cooperation between two regions with equal bargaining weights, like CHN and ROW, 
can also be reached.  
In order to compare the performance of stable coalitions that we find under different sets 
of bargaining weights, we report more detailed results in Table 4.3. The table shows results 
for the best-performing stable coalitions in terms of the net present value of global payoffs for 
each set of bargaining weights. Table 4.3 shows that in general the set of bargaining weights 
that favours large emitters can lead to higher abatement and welfare levels.  
Among the five sets of bargaining weights, the highest global abatement and welfare can 
be obtained under the coalition {USA, HIA, CHN, BRA} which is stable for bargaining 
weights determined by GDP. The reasons for this finding are, firstly, that the size of this 
coalition is the largest among all stable coalitions under different sets of bargaining weights; 
secondly, this is due to the participation of the world’s two biggest GHG emitting countries 
USA and CHN. Their GHG emissions account for a large part of the world emissions, hence 
the abatement level adopted by these two countries is also prominent for global abatement and 
welfare. This result also reflects the important impact of the participation by USA and CHN 
in the formation of ICAs. By contrast, the coalition {CHN, BRA}, that is stable when the 
bargaining weights are determined by damages, offers the lowest global abatement and 
welfare in our set of scenarios. It is even Pareto dominated by {USA, HIA, CHN, BRA}. This 
result is straightforward to understand: compared to other regions BRA is a region with higher 
marginal abatement costs. Therefore, the equilibrium abatement level by BRA is lower, which 
results in the lowest global abatement and welfare obtained by coalition {CHN, BRA}. In the 
reference scenario with equal bargaining weights, the global abatement of the stable coalition 
{CHN, IND, BRA} is lower than what is achieved under other sets of asymmetric bargaining 
weights, except for the weights derived from damages. Nevertheless, the welfare obtained is 
higher, unless weights are determined by economic power. It can be concluded that 
signatories with low marginal abatement costs forming a coalition with a region with high 
marginal benefits lead to higher the abatement of the coalition. As can be seen from Table 4.3 
the success of the coalition largely depends on the participation of both USA and CHN (cf. 
also Dellink 2011). 
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Table 4.1. Transfers determined by a NBS under different sets of bargaining weights: Grand coalition 
Regions Discount 
factor 
Abatement 
efforts 
Climate change 
damages 
Abatement costs Economic power 
USA -6364.37 -5687.02 -6209.24 -3275.24 -1312.63 
JPN -7784.00 -12176.82 -11725.37 -12608.12 -8925.65 
EUR -12470.40 -13604.72 -12568.08 -12251.56 -8135.26 
OHI 2609.60 -214.57 3603.85 1862.57 1625.68 
ROE 1289.63 492.82 2565.22 262.06 1194.35 
RUS 3735.38 1109.04 5010.89 2116.59 862.58 
HIA 2535.77 1278.78 4356.11 3903.70 1859.10 
CHN 2471.66 4876.11 3010.30 4991.20 4383.22 
IND 1164.29 1234.09 1584.42 1422.41 583.73 
MES 2162.61 2431.62 5254.77 2684.92 1173.04 
BRA 4842.53 810.31 7591.57 822.07 1732.48 
ROW 1506.56 2181.38 2247.70 3810.50 3079.45 
Total  0 0 0 0   0 
Note: All figures are expressed as NPV of transfers (bln$) over 100 years 
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Table 4.2.  Stable coalitions and values of bargaining weights under different determinants of bargaining power 
Scenario Stable 
coalitions 
The value of bargaining weights for each region  
  USA JPN EUR OHI ROE RUS HIA CHN IND MES BRA ROW 
Equal 
weight  
{RUS,CHN, 
BRA} 
     0.33  0.33   0.33  
 {HIA,CHN, 
BRA} 
      0.33 0.33   0.33  
 {CHN, IND, 
BRA} 
       0.33 0.33  0.33  
Discount 
factor  
{ROE, CHN, 
BRA} 
    0.34 
 
  0.32 
 
  0.34 
 
 
 {RUS, 
CHN,BRA } 
     0.34 
 
 0.32 
 
  0.34 
 
 
Abatement 
efforts 
{OHI, CHN}    0.36    0.64     
 {ROE, CHN}     0.40   0.60     
 {RUS, CHN}      0.43  0.57     
 {HIA, CHN}       0.47 0.53     
 {CHN, IND}        0.47 0.53    
 {CHN, ROW}        0.39    0.61 
Climate 
change 
damages  
{ROE, BRA}     0.40      0.60  
{HIA, BRA}       0.34    0.66  
 {CHN, BRA}        0.43   0.57  
 {IND, BRA}         0.56  0.44  
 {MES, BRA}          0.42 0.58  
Abatement 
costs  
{OHI, CHN}    0.13 
 
   0.87 
 
    
 {ROE, CHN}     0.14   0.86     
 {RUS, CHN}      0.20  0.80     
 {CHN, IND}        0.73 0.27    
 {CHN, MES}        0.80  0.20   
 {CHN, ROW}        0.61    0.39 
Economic 
power 
{USA, HIA, 
CHN, BRA} 
0.67      0.10 0.16   0.07  
 {CHN, ROW}        0.50    0.50 
C
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4.4.3 Results for the Nash bargaining solution with outside options  
We introduced outside options to the NBS in Section 4.3 and discussed their role. We have 
argued that the NBS falls into the class of optimal sharing rules when outside options are 
considered. In this section, we examine the effects of outside options by comparing results 
from the STACO model for bargaining with outside options with the Nash bargaining 
outcomes of the previous subsection.  
Under the NBS with outside options, signatories’ redistributed payoffs consist of their 
outside option payoff plus a share of the remainder (∑ ௜ܸ(ܵ)௜∈ௌ − ∑ ௜ܸ(ܵ\{݅})௜∈ௌ ). As noted 
earlier, the distribution of the remainder does not affect coalition stability. Thus stability is 
independent of the bargaining weights when outside options matter. Our numerical results 
show a large improvement of the NBS if outside options matter. Both number and size of 
stable coalitions under the NBS with outside options can be improved as compared to the 
results for the NBS without outside options. There are more than 190 stable coalitions. Stable 
coalitions comprise up to six members (e.g. {EUR, OHI, ROE, CHN, MES, BRA}, {EUR, 
ROE, HIA, CHN, MES, BRA}, {EUR, ROE, HIA, IND, MES, BRA}). This comparison 
confirms the advantage of the optimal sharing rule in reducing players’ free-rider incentives 
(cf. Weikard and Dellink 2014).  
Since outside options are independent of the bargaining weights, any set of bargaining 
weights will lead to the same set of stable coalitions. Hence there is no need to report results 
for different sets of bargaining weights in Table 4.4. The best-performing stable coalition is 
{EUR, CHN, IND, ROW}. Table 4.4 reports the comparison of the two best-performing 
stable coalitions that are formed under the NBS with and without outside options respectively. 
There are four members in each. In the case of bargaining with outside options several large 
GHG emitters (EUR, CHN, IND) are engaged. The high abatement achieved not only 
generates large net gains for the coalition but also brings significant positive externalities for 
outsiders. However, due to large free-riding incentives, the best-performing coalition is still of 
limited size. This enhancement of the abatement efficiency also confirms the numerical 
results of the optimal sharing scheme obtained by Carraro et al. (2006) and Weikard and 
Dellink (2014). As shown in the last row of Table 4.4, we use an ‘indicator of success’ to 
represent the coalition’s efficiency in closing the welfare (or abatement) gap between All 
Singletons and Grand Coalition5. The stable coalition generated by the NBS with outside 
                                                             
5 The performance of Grand Coalition is reported in Table 4.A3 in Appendix. 
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options shows a significant improvement in decreasing the gap as compared to the coalition 
generated without outside options (i.e. 36% and 23%).     
Table 4.4 The comparison of two best-performing stable coalitions that are formed under the NBS with and without outside 
options 
Regions   The best-performing stable coalition under NBS with 
outside options: {EUR, CHN, IND, ROW} 
 The best-performing coalition without 
outside options: {USA, HIA, CHN, BRA} 
Annual abatement in 
2011 (% of BAU) 
NPV of Payoffs (bln$) over 100 
years 
Annual abatement in 
2011 (% of BAU) 
NPV of Payoffs 
(bln$) over 100 
years 
USA 6.16 7542.84 7.80 4127.30 
JPN 6.30 8954.01 6.31 7078.05 
EUR 15.33 7548.66 12.66 8699.96 
OHI 1.92 958.24 1.92 758.66 
ROE 7.93 750.84 7.93 594.17 
RUS 11.50 1741.76 11.50 1376.15 
HIA 0.97 960.85 9.35 736.23 
CHN 25.25 449.87 21.40 430.12 
IND 39.22 329.31 14.85 299.96 
MES 1.45 698.92 1.45 553.02 
BRA 0.60 505.80 8.15 441.76 
ROW 21.23 1447.48 3.80 1355.85 
Global 15.95 31888.57 11.79 26451.22 
Indicator of 
success 
(%) 
                               29.38                                             36.00                                 15.90                           23.00 
Note: Numbers in bold indicate the performances of signatories in a stable coalition.                                
Indicator of success (%): (NPV of global payoffs in a coalition – NPV of global payoffs in All Singletons) / (NPV of global 
payoffs in Grand coalition – NPV of global payoffs in All Singletons) *100. A similar definition applies to abatement. 
4.5 Discussions and conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the formation and performance of international climate agreements 
in a cartel game when the distribution of coalitional gains is based on the NBS. We consider 
different plausible sets of bargaining weights. Our analysis identifies and discusses some key 
factors driving heterogeneous negotiators’ bargaining power in international climate 
negotiations for distributing cooperative gains. These potential determinants provide insights 
into countries’ potential bargaining positions based on their different characteristics. 
Furthermore, we consider outside options in the Nash bargaining solution and discuss their 
role in improving the positive effect of the NBS on the formation and efficiency of ICAs. Our 
numerical analysis employs the STACO model to investigate the impact of the NBS with 
asymmetric bargaining power on the formation and efficiency of ICAs.  
Nash bargaining solutions for international climate agreements 
89 
 
Firstly, by applying the NBS without outside options to distribute coalitional gains, 
players’ incentives to participate and abate can be increased, although to a limited degree. The 
effects vary under different sets of bargaining weights. As numerical results in subsection 
4.4.2 show, only small coalitions can be stabilised when bargaining weights are determined 
according to abatement efforts, abatement costs and climate change damages. Our result is in 
line with the stability results of Weikard et al. (2006), where the coalitional surplus is shared 
among signatories based on different exogenous claims. In contrast, the size and performance 
of stable coalitions can be improved when bargaining weights are determined according to the 
discount factor or economic power.   
Secondly, the NBS with outside options is more conducive to ICAs as compared to the 
bargaining solution without considering outside options. As discussed in subsection 4.3.6, the 
bargaining outcome falls into the class of optimal sharing rules when outside options are 
considered. The numerical results in terms of stability and performances of international 
climate coalitions under the bargaining solution with outside options underline the advantage 
of such transfers. Our analysis provides a rationale for the use of optimal sharing rules: they 
result from a NBS with outside options (cf. Muthoo 1999).        
Thirdly, multiple equilibrium climate coalitions can emerge from the NBS. In particular 
under bargaining with outside options we find a large number of equilibrium coalitions. This 
finding is comparable to Carraro et al. (2006) and Nagashima et al. (2011), where multiple 
equilibrium coalitions can form when optimal sharing schemes are implemented.   
Moreover, it turns out that by applying the NBS to the distribution of coalitional gains, 
the success of international climate agreements depends on the set of bargaining weights that 
matters in climate negotiation. Our analysis suggests that some sets of bargaining weights 
generate more successful coalitions in terms of welfare and abatement than others. For 
example, among five sets of asymmetric bargaining weights, the one determined by 
negotiators’ economic power can facilitate a climate coalition that comprises two of the 
largest emitters (CHN and USA) jointly with two other regions.  
Our study has some immediate policy implications. Firstly, an ICA should be designed to 
attract large GHG emitters. Generally, regions with higher GDP produce more emissions, like 
USA, China or India. Thus when regions with more economic power (higher GDP) can 
benefit more from an agreement, they will have stronger incentives to join and, hence, more 
successful ICAs can be formed. It might be controversial that economic power shapes 
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negotiations and determines outcomes. However, it should be noticed that economically 
powerful regions with a high GDP may include regions with a relatively low GDP per capita, 
such as China or India when compared to USA. Secondly, in the negotiation process multiple 
determinants of bargaining power will play a role. This is because one country’s incentives to 
cooperate on GHG mitigation are impacted in a complex way by factors that are related to 
abatement options, climate change vulnerability and economic power. The bargaining power 
of each negotiator is likely to be driven by multiple determinants.   
One direction to extend our analysis is to study negotiators’ strategic behaviour when 
bargaining power becomes an endogenous variable 6.  This requires an extended dynamic 
game setting where pre-negotiations determine the negotiation protocol (Wangler et al. 2013) 
and thereby bargaining powers are relevant at the later stages of the game.  
4.6 Appendix 
Table 4.A1.  Regional aggregation in the STACO3 
STACO3 Names 
USA United States 
JPN Japan 
EUR EU27 & EFTA 
OHI Other High Income 
ROE Rest of Europe 
RUS Russia 
HIA High Income Asia 
CHN China 
IND India 
MES Middle East 
BRA Brazil 
ROW Rest of the World 
 
                                                             
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment. 
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Table 4.A2.   Discount rate, GDP and abatement benefit share of twelve regions in STACO 3.0 
Regions Discount rates GDP in the year 
2011(Billion $) 
Regional shares of benefits 
(ߠ௜) 
USA 0.0517 12807.0 0.2263 
JPN 0.0359 4831.4 0.1725 
EUR 0.0388 13708.0 0.2491 
OHI 0.0636 1672.5 0.0345 
ROE 0.0612 615.2 0.0271 
RUS 0.0397 729.4 0.0403 
HIA 0.0474 1973.4 0.0300 
CHN 0.1117 3160.0 0.0620 
IND 0.1444 803.2 0.0500 
MES 0.0470 827.7 0.0249 
BRA 0.0442 1266.0 0.0153 
ROW 0.0530 3158.6 0.0680 
Global -------- 45552.4   ∑ ߠ௜ = 1
 
 
Table 4.A3.     All Singletons and Grand Coalition 
Regions 
 
All Singletons  Grand Coalition 
  Annual 
abatement in 
2011 
(% of BAU 
emissions) 
Net present value 
(NPV) of payoffs 
(Billion $) over 100 
years 
 Annual abatement 
in 2011 (% of BAU 
emissions) 
Net present value (NPV) 
of payoffs (Billion $) over 
100 years 
USA 6.16 3507.55 25.87 12795.98 
JPN 6.30 4309.52 23.88 18569.78 
EUR 12.66 5173.23 32.13 21508.83 
OHI 1.92 463.33 37.08 1429.88 
ROE 7.93 362.42 50.64 911.18 
RUS 11.50 836.58 50.13 2292.19 
HIA 0.97 464.00 29.85 609.19 
CHN 6.77 283.53 39.64 -1353.45 
IND 14.85 182.14 58.38 21.21 
MES 1.45 337.73 73.04 367.20 
BRA 0.60 244.52 20.23 393.91 
ROW 3.80                         816.73  40.94 1027.70 
Global 6.88                     16981.28 37.73  58573.6 
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Chapter 5 
Compliance and stability of international climate agreements 
with costly enforcement 
 
Compliance with abatement commitments is essential for the success of international climate 
agreements. Due to incentives for free-riding and limited observability of compliance levels, 
however, an enforcement mechanism including monitoring and potential punishment is 
required to force members to comply with their committed targets. In this paper we study a 
sequential cartel formation game, in which the coalition chooses an enforcement policy 
comprising an abatement target, monitoring expenditures and fines. Individual signatories 
respond by choosing their preferred abatement level which may or may not comply with the 
target. In equilibrium, signatories’ compliance levels are determined by individual welfare 
maximization under the agreed enforcement policy. Considering partial compliance, our 
analysis shows how the extent of compliance depends on abatement targets, monitoring 
expenditures (the intensity of monitoring) and the fine. Furthermore, we examine the impact 
of costly enforcement on the stability and performance of international climate agreements. 
We find that the compliance level of a coalition member can always be improved by 
increasing the monitoring expenditure. However, the effect of the target on compliance levels 
depends on the structure of the fine function. Because monitoring is costly, full compliance 
will usually not be enforced. We also find that a “broad” and “deep” climate coalition cannot 
be stable under a costly enforcement mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 This Chapter is based on a manuscript: Yu S., Finus, M., Weikard H.-P.(2016). Compliance and Stability of International 
climate agreements with costly enforcement. To be submitted.  
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5.1 Introduction  
Incentives to free-ride have been the main obstacle for a successful international cooperation 
on climate change mitigation. The Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015 seeks to 
establish broad participation to limit free-riding. However, the success of an international 
climate agreement (ICA) also depends on the implementation of abatement commitments by 
signatories. Even after signing a climate treaty, a signatory may have incentives to disregard 
its abatement obligations. To improve the success of an ICA, signatories need to be 
incentivised to comply with their commitments.  
The idea that contracts need enforcement is not new (e.g. Buchanan 1975). Barrett (2008) 
has argued that enforcement mechanisms are essential and imperative to ensure the 
effectiveness of ICAs. When reviewing and evaluating the enforcement mechanism adopted 
by the Kyoto Protocol, Finus (2008) finds positive effects but also proposes measures to 
improve enforcement. Based on Finus (2008), Hovi et al. (2012) formulate a pragmatic and 
credible compliance enforcement system for post-Kyoto climate agreements. Nevertheless, 
most theoretical and applied analyses of the formation of ICAs only consider free-riding 
incentives in the participation stage by implicitly assuming models that take compliance for 
granted (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994; Finus and Rundshagen 1998; Weikard et 
al. 2006; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus 2006; De Zeeuw 2008; Nagashima et al. 2009). An 
exception is McEvoy and Stranlund (2009) who study compliance in an ICA formation game 
that includes a costly monitoring system supported by coalition members. Their theoretical 
results show that under costly monitoring the set of stable ICAs is smaller but stable coalitions 
can reach higher levels of participation and abatement compared to costless enforcement 
where compliance is taken for granted. Based on the same game structure, McEvoy and 
Stranlund (2010) study the effect of costly enforcement on the efficiency of voluntary 
environmental agreements, they find that a voluntary environmental agreement can be more 
efficient in reaching emissions targets than an emissions tax under the condition that the 
agreement is enforced by a third party that is financially supported by the members of the 
agreement. Their results also imply that free-riding incentives can be reduced if signatories 
bear enforcement costs. The analyses of McEvoy and Stranlund (2009, 2010) provide insights 
into the design of enforcement mechanisms in ICAs where an effective enforcement should be 
undertaken by an independent third party and funded by all signatories.  
International climate agreements with costly enforcement 
95 
 
However, the analysis of McEvoy and Stranlund (2009, 2010) is simplified as it is based 
on the assumption that members of an agreement provide sufficient funds to secure full 
compliance by all members. Abatement decisions are restricted to whether or not to control 
emissions, resulting in either full compliance or full defection with no control of emissions at 
all. In other words, their assumption does not consider partial enforcement that may result 
from signatories’ choice of enforcement expenditures. Signatories of ICAs are motivated by 
cooperative gains to support the enforcement, however they will not contribute an amount that 
is beyond their benefits from compliance. If their contribution to enforcement is not sufficient 
for full compliance, partial noncompliance may result. A social optimum can be reached by 
full compliance of signatories in ICAs. When enforcement is costly, however, the optimal 
enforcement could induce partial compliance (Arguedas 2008). Stranlund (2007) examines 
the optimal compliance level in an emissions trading programme. He concludes that under an 
increasing marginal penalty, some degrees of violation can be cost-effective. In a model 
where firms can choose cleaner technologies in exchange for reductions of the fines due to 
non-compliance with environmental standards, Arguedas (2005) finds that the optimal 
environmental policy could result in a certain degree of non-compliance.   
In this paper, we examine an enforcement mechanism similar to the one introduced by 
McEvoy and Stranlund (2009, 2010) but we consider partial compliance, implying that the 
optimal abatement level of signatories could lie between the non-cooperative Nash level and 
the target. With partial compliance, abatement targets might influence the efficiency of ICAs 
through affecting signatories’ compliance levels, and also the degree of sanction on 
noncompliance. This implies that abatement targets of ICAs should be set optimally in a 
cooperative way. We relax the assumption of full compliance with the targets of an ICA and 
determine the optimal enforcement mechanism with respect to the optimal abatement target 
and monitoring expenditures for an ICA. Furthermore, we analyse how an optimally designed 
enforcement mechanism affects incentives for participation and compliance in a coalition 
formation game. 
According to the theory of optimal law enforcement (Becker 1968; Polinsky and Shavell 
2000), rules are enforced if the expected fine is (weakly) larger than the compliance cost of a 
potential offender. The expected fine for non-compliance is the probability of detection times 
the fine. While the sanction is costless in terms of social welfare (if it can be seen as a 
monetary transfer), detection requires costly monitoring. Therefore, the fine imposed on 
defectors should be set as high as possible to keep monitoring costs low. The punishment 
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considered in our model is a fine that is dependent on the degree of non-compliance 
represented by the difference between actual abatement and the negotiated abatement target. 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that fines collected are paid out to all signatories in a 
lump-sum way, such that the repayment will not exert influence on signatories’ strategic 
choices of compliance levels. In the model of this paper, the optimal compliance level of 
signatories is determined endogenously and strategically based on abatement targets, 
monitoring expenditure and fines imposed on defectors. The optimal level of non-compliance 
can be explained by the trade-off between gains from increased coalitional abatement due to 
improved compliance levels and the cost savings from reducing expenditures for monitoring. 
Stranlund (2007) and Arguedas (2008) study the effect of the shape of the penalty 
function on the choice of compliance level. In this paper we study the role of the penalty 
function for the formation of ICAs and for compliance. In particular, we derive the 
equilibrium conditions for the case when the fine is linear or convex in the degree of the 
violation. The monitoring probability incentivises compliance and participation. Hence, we 
also explore the impact of the monitoring technology by considering monitoring probability 
as a linear or concave function of monitoring expenditure.    
The model in this paper is formulated as a four-stage coalition formation game. At the 
first stage, countries make their membership choices. At the second stage, coalition members 
jointly and simultaneously fix their mitigation targets and the monitoring expenditure that 
determines the inspection probability. At the third stage, countries choose their abatement 
levels independently. Singletons just choose a best response while signatories must take the 
expected punishment into account, in case they would not comply. At the final stage, 
signatories’ abatement levels are randomly monitored and fines are due if non-compliance is 
detected. In the next section we provide details of the game structure and we determine 
analytically the abatement targets, the optimal monitoring expenditure, individual abatement 
levels and fines for a given set of signatories. 
We find that the compliance level of a coalition member can be improved by increasing 
the monitoring expenditure. Because monitoring is costly, full compliance will usually not be 
enforced. If the fine function is linear in the compliance level, it is optimal to set the target at 
the coalitional optimum. If the fine function is convex, stronger incentives can be set with a 
higher target. Therefore the target is set at the upper bound which is, in the context of our 
model, the Business-as-usual (BAU) emissions level. As shown by our theoretical analysis, 
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under the optimal enforcement policy, in equilibrium signatories’ abatement level is lower 
than or equal to the coalitional best level that is obtained from Samuelson’s rule. Hence, the 
optimal enforcement policy induces partial compliance and depends on fine functions and 
monitoring technologies. Our numerical results show that with a quadratic fine and a linear 
monitoring probability functions, signatories’ can be incentivised to choose the coalitional 
best abatement level. Otherwise, with constant marginal fine, equilibrium abatement choices 
will be lower than the coalitional best level. Monitoring technology plays a role for 
incentivising signatories’ compliance level. As our numerical results indicate, signatories’ 
compliance level is lower when the monitoring probability is concave in monitoring 
expenditures, compared to the case of a linear monitoring probability function.       
Fine functions, the enforcement parameters representing the productivity of monitoring 
expenditure and the severity of the punishment respectively affect the stability of an ICA. The 
intuition is that stricter enforcement implies higher levels of compliance. This increases costs 
of compliance due to increased abatement efforts and, in turn, reduces incentives to join an 
ICA. The converse is also true. Weak enforcement might stabilise a grand coalition. As shown 
by our numerical results, in the case of quadratic fine and linear monitoring probability 
functions stable coalitions have the fewest members, while slightly larger coalitions can be 
stabilised if the fine function is linear or the monitoring probability function is concave.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we present the model and 
analyse the equilibrium conditions for each stage of the model. In Section 5.3, under the 
assumption of symmetric players, we firstly derive the equilibrium for three specified models. 
Based on the analytical solutions for three models, we illustrate the results on welfare and 
stability employing a numerical example. We conclude in Section 5.4.  
5.2 A general ICA formation model with costly enforcement 
The formation of an ICA with costly enforcement is modelled as a four-stage cartel game. Let 
ܰ = {1,2, … , ݊} denote the set of ݊ players. Each player ݅ ∈ ܰ is faced with a membership 
choice at stage 1. Signatories, those who sign up to the agreement, form a coalition ܵ ⊆ ܰ. At 
stage 2, all signatories ݅ ∈ ܵ cooperatively set the abatement targets, denoted by ݍത௜, for each 
member in order to maximise joint welfare. Simultaneously, the overall monitoring 
expenditures denoted by ݉ = ∑ ݉௜௜∈ௌ  is chosen jointly and optimally by all members through 
balancing the expenditures of monitoring with benefits from increased compliance. We 
assume in our model that the aggregated monitoring expenditures ݉  are shared equally 
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among coalition members, i.e. ݉௜ =
ଵ
௦
݉, hence we focus on how to determine the optimal 
aggregated level of monitoring expenditure ݉. At stage 3, with given abatement targets and 
the monitoring expenditure, coalition members and singletons choose abatement levels ݍ௜ by 
maximising their individual welfare. The equilibrium solution determines the level of 
compliance. At the final stage, each signatory’s abatement is randomly monitored with a 
probability ܲ ∈ [0,1] depending on the monitoring expenditure ݉ and the size of the coalition 
ݏ = |ܵ|. Thus the inspection probability can be represented as a function of the monitoring 
“intensity” 
௠
௦
 such that ܲ = ܲ(௠
௦
) with ܲ(0) = 0,  డ௉
డ௠
> 0 and డ௉
డ௦
< 0. If emission reduction 
by any signatory is found to be less than its abatement commitment, a fine will be imposed.      
We apply sub-game perfect equilibrium to solve the game, such that equilibria are 
obtained by backward induction.   
Stage 4: Starting with the analysis of the final stage, notice that at this stage the set of 
signatories ܵ, the monitoring expenditure ݉, and the signatories abatement ݍ௜ and abatement 
targets ݍത௜ are given. All signatories are monitored by an enforcement agency with probability 
ܲ(
௠
௦
). A fine, denoted by ܨ௜, is imposed on the defector if non-compliance is detected. The 
fine is increasing in the level of defection, i.e. the shortfall of a country’s abatement compared 
to its target. Let ݀௜ ≡ ݉ܽݔ (0, ݍത௜ − ݍ௜)  denote the level of defection. The max operator 
ensures that overcompliance does not count as “negative defection”. We also introduce a 
parameter ݂ > 0 which reflects the severity of punishment. Here we assume that the fine 
imposed would reflect the severity of the offence; it could, for example, reflect the (global) 
damage from emissions. Note that, as Stranlund (2007) points out, different forms of penalty 
influence the choice of abatement in the way that the abatement depends on the punishment 
policy parameter f or abatement target ݍത௜ or both. In our model we treat ݂ as an exogenous 
parameter that is set in pre-negotiations. Then a general way to write the fine is ܨ௜(݀௜; ݂) =
ܨ௜(ݍത௜, ݍ௜; ݂). Fines are assumed to be weakly convex in the level of defection; there is no 
discount on punishment for more severe defections. Given the choices in previous stages, 
signatories’ expected fine is  ܨ෠௜ = ܲ(
೘
ೞ
) ∙ ܨ௜(ݍത௜, ݍ௜; ݂).  
Stage 3: At stage 3, countries choose their abatement levels strategically. Any player’s 
abatement cannot exceed the Business-as-usual (BAU) emissions level denoted by ݁̅௜, such 
that ݍ௜ ∈ [0, ݁̅௜]. Let ܤ௜ and ܥ௜ denote respectively abatement benefit and cost functions where 
the magnitude of abatement benefits depends on the global abatement denoted by ݍ = ∑ ݍ௜௜∈ே . 
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We can write ܤ௜ = ܤ௜(ݍ)  with ܤ௜ᇱ(ݍ) > 0  and ܤ௜ᇱᇱ(ݍ) ≤ 0 . The cost is associated with 
individual abatement ܥ௜(ݍ௜)  with ܥᇱ௜(ݍ௜) > 0  and ܥᇱᇱ௜(ݍ௜) > 0 . At this stage, singleton 
players choose their abatement level to maximise their own payoffs by taking all others’ 
abatement as given. Under such an abatement denoted by ݍ௜ேௌ , in equilibrium each non-
signatory’s marginal abatement benefits are equal to its marginal costs:  
ܤ௜
ᇱ(ݍ) = ܥ௜
ᇱ൫ݍ௜
ேௌ൯, ݅ ∈ ܰ\ܵ.                                                                                                                (5.1) 
Each signatory decides on its abatement level to maximize its own expected payoff given 
the coalition’s monitoring expenditure ݉ and abatement targets ݍത௜  decided at stage 2. The 
problem of signatory ݅ ∈ ܵ at this stage can be written as:  
max
௤೔ 
ߨ௜(ࢗ) = ܤ௜(ݍ) − ܥ௜(ݍ௜) − ݉௜ − ܲ(
௠
௦
)ܨ௜(ݍത௜, ݍ௜).                                                                (5.2) 
where ࢗ = (ݍଵ, … , ݍ௡), denotes the abatement vector. Notice that an abatement target that is 
smaller than the Nash abatement level (in the absence of a coalition) denoted by ݍ௜ே would not 
be effective. Hence, even before we analyse the second stage we can assume targets ݍത௜ ≥ ݍ௜ே. 
The enforcement mechanism cannot incentivise abatement levels beyond ݍത௜, hence, we can 
rule out overcompliance such that signatories’ abatement ݍ௜ ∈ [0, ݍത௜]. Note that we assume 
that fines, if collected, are distributed as a lump sum to all signatories. This assumption 
implies that the redistributed fine will not influence signatories’ strategic choice of abatement. 
Taking the derivative of problem (5.2) with respect to ݍ௜ , the first order condition for an 
interior solution is obtained as:  
ܤ௜
ᇱ(ݍ∗) − ܥ௜
ᇱ(ݍ௜
∗) − ܲ(೘
ೞ
)
డி೔(௤ത೔,௤೔)
డ௤೔
ቚ
௤೔ୀ௤೔
∗
= 0 ⇔ ܤ௜ᇱ(ݍ∗) − ܥ௜ᇱ(ݍ௜∗) = ܲ(
೘
ೞ
)
డி೔(௤ത೔,௤೔)
డ௤೔
ቚ
௤೔ୀ௤೔
∗
.  (5.3)  
Eq. (5.3) shows how signatories’ abatement choice is influenced by the enforcement 
mechanism. Note that డி೔(௤ത೔,௤೔)
డ௤೔
ቚ
௤೔ୀ௤೔
∗
≤ 0, thus the equilibrium abatement of a signatory ݅ ∈ ܵ 
is not less than the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium level, where ܤ௜ᇱ(ݍ∗) = ܥ௜ᇱ(ݍ௜∗). For an 
interior solution, according to the equilibrium condition (5.3), a signatory chooses the optimal 
level of abatement by equalising marginal net gains of abatement with the marginal expected 
fine. Notice that, if the marginal expected fine is zero, no signatory will comply with the 
target and the non-cooperative abatement level will result. It is also interesting to note that 
Samuelson’s rule which determines the coalitional best level of abatement can be satisfied if 
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−ܲ(೘
ೞ
)
డி೔(௤ത೔,௤೔)
డ௤೔
ቚ
௤೔ୀ௤೔
∗
= ∑ ܤ௝
ᇱ
௝∈ௌ\{௜} . The intuition is as follows: if the marginal expected fine 
makes up for the externality of each signatory’s abatement, then the coalitional optimum will 
be achieved.  
Since Eq. (5.3) is a condition for an interior solution ݍ௜∗ ≤ ݍത௜, it is also possible that  
ܤ௜
ᇱ(ݍത௜) − ܥ௜
ᇱ(ݍത௜) > ܲ ቀ
௠
௦
ቁ
߲ܨ௜(ݍത௜, ݍ௜)
߲ݍ௜
ቤ
௤೔ୀ௤ത೔
.                                                                                   (5.4) 
In this case we have a corner solution, where ݍ௜∗ = ݍത௜ and full compliance is achieved. This 
happens when the punishment for a small deviation from the target is sufficiently severe.   
From Eq. (5.3) we can see that the higher the monitoring probability ܲ, the higher is the 
abatement ݍ௜∗  (and the compliance level). This indicates an implicit relationship between 
equilibrium abatement of signatories and monitoring probability, that is:   
߲ݍ௜
∗
߲ܲ
> 0, ݅ ∈ ܵ.                                                                                                                                      (5.5) 
We can now write the optimal abatement as the reduced form  ݍ௜∗ = ݍ௜∗(ݍത௜, ܲ(
೘
ೞ
) ). Since the 
detection probability ܲ is a function of ݉ with డ௉
డ௠
> 0, we can write: 
ݍ௜
∗ ቀݍത௜, ܲ(
௠
௦
) ቁ = ݍ௜
∗(ݍത௜, ݉ , ݏ), ݓ݅ݐℎ 
߲ݍ௜
∗
߲݉
> 0, ݅ ∈ ܵ.                                                                   (5.6) 
Hence, by raising the monitoring expenditure ݉ , the inspection probability ܲ  and the 
equilibrium abatement ݍ௜∗  increase. However, the relationship between ݍ௜∗  and ݍത௜  is not 
straightforward, as it depends on the form of the fine function and will be discussed in the 
next section. 
Stage 2: Now we move to the second stage. At this stage coalition members jointly 
determine abatement targets ݍത௜ and monitoring payment ݉. Because monitoring is costly and 
increasing the target is costless, it is always better to increase the target and to lower 
monitoring efforts while maintaining the expected fine. Unless there is an upper bound of the 
target, we cannot obtain a solution. However it is reasonable to assume that the target is 
bounded by the BAU emissions ݁̅௜, i.e. ݍത௜ ≤ ݁̅௜. Note that coalitional payoffs are decreasing in 
monitoring expenditures. Since we assume fines collected from defectors will be paid back to 
International climate agreements with costly enforcement 
101 
 
signatories, the collected fines are welfare neutral from the perspective of the coalition. The 
coalition solves the following problem:       
݉ܽݔ
௠,௤ത೔
 ෍ ߨ௝(ࢗ
∗)
௝∈ௌ
= ෍ ܤ௝(ݍ
∗)  − ෍ ܥ௜ ቀݍ௝
∗(ݍത௜, ݉)ቁ
௝∈ௌ
− ݉ 
௝∈ௌ
.                                                       (5.7) 
s.t.  
ݍത௜ ≤ ݁̅௜. 
The Lagrangian function for the problem (5.7) is ܮ(݉; ݍത௜; ߛ௜) = ∑ ߨ௝(ࢗ∗)௝∈ௌ + ߛ௜(݁̅௜ −  ݍത௜), 
where ߛ௜  is the Lagrangian multiplier for the target. By taking the partial derivatives with 
respect to ݉, ݍത௜ and ߛ௜, we obtain the following first order conditions: 
߲ܮ
߲݉
= ෍
߲ܤ௝
߲ݍ∗
௝∈ௌ
෍
߲ݍ௝
∗
߲݉
௝∈ௌ
− ෍(
߲ܥ௝
߲ݍ௝
∗
௝∈ௌ
߲ݍ௝
∗
߲݉
) − 1 = 0,                                                                       (5.7ܽ) 
߲ܮ
߲ݍത௜
= (෍
߲ܤ௝
߲ݍ∗
௝∈ௌ
)
߲ݍ௜
∗
߲ݍത௜
−
߲ܥ௜
߲ݍ௜
∗
߲ݍ௜
∗
߲ݍത௜
− ߛ௜ = 0,                                                                                   (5.7ܾ) 
߲ܮ
߲ߛ௜
= ݁̅௜ −  ݍത௜ ≥ 0,                                                                                                                            (5.7ܿ) 
ߛ௜(݁̅௜ −  ݍത௜) = 0, ߛ௜ ≥ 0.                                                                                                          (5.7݀) 
It is clear from (5.7d) that if the constraint is non-binding, then ߛ௜ = 0 and Samuelson’s rule 
applies according to (5.7b). However, we prove in the Appendix that the optimal target is 
always chosen as a corner solution, i.e. ݍത௜∗ = ݁̅௜. Then the first order conditions (5.7a-d) can 
be reduced to the following:   
∑
డ஻ೕ
డ௤∗௝∈ௌ
൬∑
డ௤ೕ
∗
డ௠௝∈ௌ
൰ − ∑ (
డ஼ೕ
డ௤ೕ
∗௝∈ௌ
డ௤ೕ
∗
డ௠
) − 1 = 0.                                                                               (5.8)         
(∑
డ஻ೕ
డ௤∗௝∈ௌ
−
డ஼೔
డ௤೔
∗)
డ௤೔
∗
డ௤ത೔
= ߛ௜ ≥ 0.                                                                                                          (5.9)                   
In Eq. (5.8) the term 
డ௤ೕ
∗
డ௠
 gives the marginal incentive to abate. Since we assume that 
overcompliance does not pay, additional monitoring will not increase abatement beyond the 
target level. Eq. (5.8) indicates that in equilibrium, the coalitional marginal net gains of the 
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increased abatement due an increase in monitoring efforts is equal to the marginal costs of 
monitoring which are unity by assumption. 
Eq. (5.9) leads to interesting insights. First, if ߛ௜ > 0, then ∑
డ஻ೕ
డ௤∗௝∈ௌ
−
డ஼೔
డ௤೔
∗ and  
డ௤೔
∗
డ௤ത೔
 must 
both be positive. This is true because it is never optimal for a coalition to induce abatement 
higher than the coalitional best level and we can rule out that ∑
డ஻ೕ
డ௤∗௝∈ௌ
−
డ஼೔
డ௤೔
∗ < 0. Hence, ߛ௜ >
0 implies that the level of abatement that is optimal to enforce falls short of the coalitional 
best (Samuelson) level of abatement. Furthermore, from Eq. (5.9) the coalitional best 
abatement can be induced by the optimal target if ∑
డ஻ೕ
డ௤∗௝∈ௌ
−
డ஼೔
డ௤೔
∗ = 0. The shadow value ߛ௜ 
indicates the marginal gain if the constraint on the target could be relaxed. Second, note that, 
from Eq. (5.9) it is also possible that increasing the target is not effective for inducing higher 
abatement. In that case డ௤೔
∗
డ௤ത೔
= 0. This is the case when the fine function is linear.   
From above analysis of Eq. (5.9), it can be concluded that, if the fine function is convex 
and therefore  డ௤೔
∗
డ௤ത೔
> 0,  and under the binding target ݍത௜∗ = ݁̅௜, signatories are incentivised to 
choose an abatement level that is equal to or lower than the coalitional first best level obtained 
from the Samuelson’s rule, i.e. ∑
డ஻ೕ
డ௤∗௝∈ௌ
≥
డ஼೔
డ௤೔
∗. Particularly, the target is set optimally so that 
signatories could be induced to choose the coalitional best abatement level. As argued before 
this will be achieved if   
−ܲ൫೘
ೞ
൯
డி೔(௤ത೔,௤೔)
డ௤೔
ቚ
௤೔ୀ௤೔
∗
= ∑ ܤ௝
ᇱ
௝∈ௌ\{௜} .                                                                                             (5.10)   
We can also see from (5.10), that the target cannot play a role in incentivising signatories’ 
abatement when the marginal fine is constant. Some implications can be gained from 
equilibrium condition (5.9). Firstly, under the optimal enforcement mechanism, the target and 
monitoring are used as two instruments to increase signatories’ compliance level. Since 
setting higher target is costless while increasing the monitoring probability is not, it is always 
better to choose the maximum target level. Secondly, setting higher targets can increase the 
abatement, but it is not optimal for a coalition to abate more than the level obtained from the 
Samuelson condition. Under the Samuelson condition each coalition member makes the 
abatement choice that internalises the externality imposed on all other signatories.  
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Stage 1: At the initial stage all countries make decisions on the membership by evaluating 
their payoffs of being a signatory or a singleton. Countries evaluate payoffs depending on the 
anticipated strategic decisions on the optimal enforcement policy and the abatement. We 
assume the sub-game perfect equilibrium in our model is unique under the optimal 
enforcement policy. Therefore, for each coalition structure we introduce a valuation function 
௜ܸ(ܵ) to represent each player’s payoff under a coalition ܵ. By applying the solution concept 
of cartel stability (d'Aspremont et al., 1983) to represent the Nash equilibrium at this stage, a 
stable coalition is defined as:      
(a) internal stability: ௜ܸ(ܵ) ≥ ௜ܸ(ܵ\{݅}),                ∀݅ ∈ ܵ                                                          (5.11) 
(b) external stability: ௜ܸ(ܵ) ≥ ௜ܸ(ܵ ∪ {݅}).            ∀݅ ∈ ܰ\ܵ                                                    (5.12)            
5.3 Models with specified functional forms 
However, outcomes and policy implications can be different under different functional forms. 
For example, the form of fine function ܨ can affect the choice of monitoring expenditures, 
abatement choices and therefore also signatories’ incentives to participate in an ICA. 
Furthermore, the monitoring technology affects the expected penalty and thus compliance 
levels. To explore the impact of design features (i.e. the penalty structure and monitoring 
technology) of enforcement mechanisms in ICAs, this section provides equilibrium conditions 
obtained from Section 5.2 for models with specified functions. We present three specified 
models that differ in the form of fine (penalty) and monitoring probability functions. For 
simplicity, we assume symmetric players with same abatement cost and benefit functions in 
all specified models. To illustrate more explicitly the impact of the costly enforcement on 
welfare and stability under these three model specifications, a numerical example is provided 
in the final part of this section. 
Under all three model specifications, the benefit and cost functions remain the same. We 
employ a linear abatement benefit function. In this case non-signatories have dominant 
abatement strategies which coincide with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. This allows 
us in the following subsections to focus our analysis on signatories’ choices.   
5.3.1 A basic model with a linear fine and a linear monitoring probability functions 
Our analysis starts with a basic model, where the monitoring probability and the fine are 
linear. Functions are specified as follows. We assume linear abatement benefits ܤ௜(ݍ) = ܾݍ 
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with ܾ > 0; marginally increasing abatement cost ܥ௜(ݍ௜) =
ଵ
ଶ
ܽݍ௜
ଶ  with ܽ > 0; and a linear 
monitoring probability ܲ(೘
ೞ
) = ߙ೘
ೞ
 with 0 ≤ ܲ ≤ 1 . In this function ߙ  is a parameter 
representing the monitoring productivity and satisfying ߙ > 0. We assume that all signatories 
can be monitored with the probability one if the monitoring expenditure is large enough, 
namely if ݉ ≥ ೞ
ഀ
. The fine imposed on a defector is linear in the degree of non-compliance 
ܨ௜ = ݂ ∙ (ݍത௜ − ݍ௜ ) where ݂ > 0 is a parameter. Moreover, observe that if ݍ௜ = 0 and for given 
ݍത௜, the maximum possible expected fine is ߙ
௠
௦
݂ݍത௜.  
According to the equilibrium condition of signatories’ abatement choice (5.3) at stage 3, 
the optimal individual abatement ݍ௜∗ of a coalition member ݅ ∈ ܵ is 
ݍ௜
∗ =
ܾ
ܽ
+
ߙ݂݉
ܽݏ
.                                                                                                                                  (5.13) 
It is obvious from Eq. (5.13) that for a given coalition ܵ the choice of optimal abatement ݍ௜∗ 
for signatories ݅ ∈ ܵ only depends on monitoring expenditures ݉ and exogenous parameters. 
Clearly, the abatement of each signatory is higher than the non-cooperative Nash level ௕
௔
 as 
long as the monitoring expenditure is positive. According to Eq. (5.13), for interior solutions 
ݍ௜
∗ < ݍത௜, the target ݍത௜ cannot affect signatories’ abatement choice due to the constant rate of 
the marginal fine ቚడி೔(௤ത೔,௤೔)
డ௤೔
ቚ = ݂. However, this conclusion does hold for a corner solution 
ݍ௜
∗ = ݍത௜, where signatories’ optimal abatement ݍ௜
∗ can be advanced by setting higher target ݍത௜. 
As shown by the analysis of the stage 2 game in Section 5.2, a linear fine function implies 
that the target does not play a role in inducing higher abatement levels that are interior 
solutions ݍ௜∗ < ݍത௜ . However, for a corner solution ݍ௜∗ = ݍത௜ , signatories’ abatement can be 
advanced by increasing the target ݍത௜. In such case optimal abatement can be implemented by 
setting the target equal to the coalitional best level, i.e. ݍത௜∗ =
௦௕
௔
7. 
The optimal monitoring expenditures ݉∗ can be determined by applying  డ௤೔
∗
డ௠
=
ఈ௙
௔௦
 (which 
is obtained from Eq. (5.13)), to the equilibrium condition (5.8). The following result can be 
derived based on specified functions in this basic model: 
                                                             
7 This value is obtained by applying the specified functions in this basic model to the Samuelson condition డ஼೔
డ௤೔
∗ = ∑
డ஻ೕ
డ௤∗௝∈ௌ
.  
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ݍ௜
∗ =
ݏܾ
ܽ
−
1
ߙ݂
.                                                                                                                                    (5.14) 
Since the term ݉ cancels out, Eq. (5.14) gives signatories’ optimal abatement level that is 
resulted from the optimal monitoring costs. As shown by Eq. (5.14), for given parameters (i.e. 
ߙ, ݂, ܽ and ܾ), the coalitional abatement increases with coalition size ݏ. This reflect the well-
known result that incentives to become a free-rider are increasing in the coalition size. 
Moreover, according to Eq. (5.14), the coalition best abatement level ௦௕
௔
 cannot be achieved by 
an interior solution ݍ௜∗  considering 
ଵ
ఈ௙
> 0 . This result can be interpreted as the optimal 
monitoring costs is not sufficient to induce signatories to choose the coalitional best 
abatement. As a consequence partial compliance results. Optimal monitoring costs ݉∗, are 
obtained by equalizing Eq. (5.14) with Eq. (5.13) and rearranging the equation: 
݉∗ =
ݏ(ݏ − 1)ܾ
ߙ݂
−
ܽݏ
ߙଶ݂ଶ
.                                                                                                                (5.15) 
From Eq. (5.15) we see that the individual monitoring contribution ݉௜∗ =
(௦ିଵ)௕
ఈ௙
−
௔
ఈమ௙మ
 
increases in the size of a coalition. This, jointly with (5.14) shows that for each individual 
signatory, compliance costs increase with the size of the coalition. Hence, incentives to 
participate and to comply become smaller when the coalition is getting larger.  
Based on the above analysis on optimal solutions for signatories’ and singletons’ 
abatement, monitoring expenditure, the equilibrium payoff of each signatory under the 
coalition ܵ can be obtained as: 
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ) =
(݊ − ݏ)ܾଶ
ܽ
+
ݏଶܾଶ
2ܽ
−
(ݏ − 1)ܾ
ߙ݂
+
ܽ
2ߙଶ݂ଶ
 , ݅ ∈ ܵ.                                                       (5.16) 
The singleton’s equilibrium payoff is solved as: 
௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ) =
(ݏଶ − ݏ + ݊)ܾଶ
ܽ
−
ܾଶ
2ܽ
−
ݏܾ
ߙ݂
 , ݅ ∈ ܰ\ܵ.                                                                      (5.17) 
By applying the solution concept of internal and external stability, the formation of ICAs in 
the first stage can be analysed. We use a stability function (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993) to 
identify the size of the stable coalition. Generally the stability function is defined as Λ(ݏ) =
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ) − ௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ − 1). The size of the stable coalition is the largest integer ݏ satisfying Λ(ݏ) ≥
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0 and  డஃ(௦)
డ௦
< 0. Based on the welfare equations (5.16) and (5.17), the stability function can 
be specified as: 
Λ(ݏ) =
(4ݏ − ݏଶ − 3)ܾଶ
2ܽ
+
ܽ
2ߙଶ݂ଶ
.                                                                                              (5.18) 
Thus the derivative of Λ(ݏ) can be obtained as: 
߲Λ(ݏ)
߲ݏ
=
(2 − ݏ)ܾଶ
ܽ
.                                                                                                                         (5.19)  
Eq. (5.19) shows that the stability function is falling for ݏ > 2. This implies that minimum 
value of the size of the internally and externally stable coalition is 2. From (5.18) we conclude 
that the coalition size is decreasing in ߙ and ݂. The grand coalition (i.e. ݏ = ݊) even can be 
stabilised if the term ߙ݂ is low enough. The intuition behind this conclusion is that ߙ and ݂ 
are parameters representing the monitoring productivity and the severity of punishment 
respectively, higher value of ߙ  and ݂  implies a defector faces higher probability of being 
monitored and having a heavier fine punishment. This increases the effectiveness of an 
agreement and therefore the cost of defection. Accordingly, a potential participating country 
will have less incentives to join an ICA in order to avoid strict enforcement policies. 
Conversely, if enforcement is weak, the grand coalition is stable but abatement is close to the 
non-cooperative Nash levels. Our conclusion on the impact of the costly enforcement on the 
membership of an ICA is in line with McEvoy and Stranlund (2009) who also highlight the 
adverse impact of the costly enforcement.    
Taken together, the result of the linear fine model shows that signatories can be induced 
to increase their compliance levels by increasing monitoring expenditures. Due to the constant 
marginal fine the target is an ineffective enforcement instrument for interior solutions for 
signatory’s equilibrium abatement, while it can only advance each signatory’s abatement level 
at corner solutions. In equilibrium the monitoring expenditure chosen by the coalition can 
induce the signatories to choose abatement levels that are lower than the coalitional best 
levels determined by Samuelson’s rule. Consequently, only partial compliance can be 
sustained by the optimal enforcement policy. As to the impact of the costly enforcement on 
the membership choice, the size of the stable ICA with costly enforcement is ambiguous and 
dependent on the value of enforcement parameters. This implies that the grand coalition might 
exist if the enforcement parameters are properly taken at a value low enough.  We resort to a 
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numerical example in Section 5.3.4 to illustrate welfare effects of the costly enforcement 
mechanism with linear fine and monitoring probability functions.    
5.3.2 The model with a quadratic fine function  
The structure of the fine is one of the key factors to the endogenous choice of enforcement 
policies. Stranlund (2007) and Arguedas (2005) conclude that the choice of the optimal 
compliance level depends on the shape of penalty. In the previous section with the linear fine 
function, due to the constant expected marginal fines, signatories’ choices of compliance 
levels are independent of the abatement target but only depends on the monitoring 
expenditures. To investigate the effect of different fine functions on the choice of enforcement 
policy, we extend the linear fine function to the quadratic form in this section.  
By applying ܨ௜ =
ଵ
ଶ
݂(ݍത௜ − ݍ௜)
ଶ and other specified functions that remain the same as in 
the basic model, the equilibrium condition (5.3) for signatories’ abatement can be rewritten as: 
ݍ௜
∗ =
ܾݏ + ߙ݂݉ݍത௜
ܽݏ + ߙ݂݉
.                                                                                                                            (5.20) 
Clearly, Eq. (5.20) shows signatories’ abatement can be increased by setting a higher target ݍത௜. 
As to the effect of monitoring efforts, because  డ௤೔
∗
డ௠
=
௦ఈ௙(௔௤ത೔ି௕)
(௔௦ାఈ௠௙)మ
> 0 according to Eq. (5.20) 
and the assumption ݍത௜ ≥ ݍ௜ே =  
௕
௔
 signatories’ abatement level will increase with larger 
monitoring efforts. It is worth noting that the increasing rate of signatories’ abatement driven 
by monitoring efforts is diminishing due to  డ
మ௤೔
∗
డ௠మ
= −
ଶ௦(௦ିଵ)௕
ఈ௙௠య
< 0. It can be concluded from 
Eq. (5.20) that under the marginally increasing fine, signatories’ compliance levels can be 
advanced by either setting higher targets or spending more on monitoring. As shown in the 
analysis in Section 5.2, the optimal target is set at its upper bound ݍത௜∗ = ݁̅௜. Because players 
are symmetric in our specification, we remove the subscript of ݁̅௜  and then ݍത௜∗ = ݁̅ . By 
replacing ݍത௜  in Eq. (5.20) with ݁̅ , the optimal abatement level of each signatory can be 
rewritten as ݍ௜∗ =
௕௦ାఈ௠௙௘̅
௔௦ାఈ௠௙
.   
According to Eq. (5.9), under the optimal target ݍത௜∗ = ݁̅, signatories are incentivised to 
choose an abatement that is lower than or equal to the coalitional best level. Hence, 
signatories’ optimal abatement under the quadratic fine structure can be represented as the 
following:  
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ݍ௜
∗ =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ ݏܾ
ܽ
                         ݂݅ 
ܾݏ + ߙ݂݉݁̅
ܽݏ + ߙ݂݉
≥
ݏܾ
ܽ
ܾݏ + ߙ݂݉݁̅
ܽݏ + ߙ݂݉
         ݂݅ 
ܾݏ + ߙ݂݉݁̅
ܽݏ + ߙ݂݉
<
ݏܾ
ܽ
 .                                                                         (5.21) 
Note that for both values of ݍ௜∗, signatories only partially comply with the target ݍത௜∗ = ݁̅.  
Now we come to the choice of monitoring expenditures, which are derived differently 
depending on ݍ௜∗ as shown in Eq. (5.21). When the coalitional best abatement is induced ݍ௜∗ =
௦௕
௔
, the monitoring costs that are sufficient to complement the maximum target for 
implementation of the coalitional best abatement level can be directly identified by solving for 
݉ in Eq. (5.10). Otherwise under a target that has a positive shadow value, monitoring costs 
that are coupled with the target to induce higher abatement level can be obtained according to 
Eq. (5.8) that is the equilibrium condition for choosing the optimal monitoring costs. Hence, 
by applying specified functions specification to Eqs. (5.8) and (5.10), the optimal monitoring 
costs ݉∗can be solved as:           
݉∗
=
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
ݏ(ݏ − 1)ܾܽ
ߙ݂(ܽ݁̅ − ݏܾ)
                                                                                                       ݂݅  ݍ௜
∗ =
ݏܾ
ܽ
ݏ ቆට
ߙ݂(ܽ݁̅ − ܾ)(ܾܽݏଶ + ߙ݉∗݂ݏܾ − ܾܽݏ − ߙ݉∗݂ܽ݁̅)
ܽݏ + ߙ݉∗݂ − ܽቇ
ߙ݂
݂݅ݍ௜
∗ =
ܾݏ + ߙ݉∗݂݁̅
ܽݏ + ߙ݉∗݂
 . (5.22) 
It can be seen from Eq. (5.22) that larger monitoring expenditures will be required for a low 
monitoring technology ߙ  under the coalitional best abatement level. However the optimal 
monitoring expenditures under the abatement ݍ௜∗ <
௦௕
௔
 cannot be derived explicitly, and we 
resort to a numerical example in Section 5.3.4.   
As shown by the above analysis, for the case of ݉∗ = ௦(௦ିଵ)௔௕
ఈ௙(௔௘̅ି௦௕)
 and ݍ௜∗ =
௦௕
௔
, we can 
derive the stability function as the following. The payoff of each signatory is obtained as:   
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ) =
ݏଶܾଶ
2ܽ
−
ݏܾଶ
ܽ
+
ܾ݊ଶ
ܽ
−
(ݏ − 1)ܾܽ
ߙ݂(ܽ݁̅ − ݏܾ)
 , ݅ ∈ ܵ.                                                                (5.23) 
The singleton’s optimal payoff is solved as: 
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௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ) =
ݏଶܾଶ
ܽ
−
ݏܾଶ
ܽ
+
(2݊ − 1)ܾଶ
2ܽ
 , ݅ ∈ ܰ\ܵ.                                                                        (5.24) 
Based on these welfare function, the stability function is: 
Λ(ݏ) = ௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ) − ௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ − 1) =
(−ݏଶ + 4ݏ − 3)ܾଶ
2ܽ
−
(ݏ − 1)ܾܽ
ߙ݂(ܽ݁̅ − ݏܾ)
.                                   (5.25) 
The size ݏ satisfying conditions Λ(ݏ) ≥ 0 and డஃ(௦)
డ௦
< 0 cannot be solved explicitly, hence we 
have to resort to a numerical example in Section 5.3.4 to show the stability effect.  
As compared to the result of the basic model, due to increased severity of punishment, 
signatories can be incentivised to change their compliance levels by both of monitoring costs 
and the fine through changing of the target. Under the optimal target chosen at the upper 
bounder, signatories only partially comply with the target by choosing the abatement that is 
lower than or equal to the coalitional best level. The effect of the enforcement with marginally 
increasing fine function on the stability and welfare of an ICA will be checked by resorting to 
a numerical example in Section 5.3.4.  
5.3.3 The model with a concave function of monitoring probability  
Under the linear monitoring probability function, the monitoring probability for each 
signatory is increasing constantly with the monitoring expenditure. According to the law of 
diminishing returns, however, the marginal productivity of the monitoring expenditure 
referring to the marginal monitoring probability, could be decreasing with monitoring 
expenditures. In this section, we investigate the enforcement policy with a concave form of 
probability function while keeping other functions unchanged as compared to the basic model. 
Considering the maximum monitoring probability and the diminishing returns of the 
monitoring expenditure ௠
௦
, the function of monitoring probability is specified as ܲ ቀ௠
௦
ቁ = 1 −
ଵ
ଵାఈ
࢓
࢙
. By applying specified functions to the equilibrium condition (5.3) at stage 3, the 
strategy for the optimal abatement choice of each signatory is derived as:   
ݍ௜
∗ =
ܾ
ܽ
+
ߙ݂݉
ܽ(ߙ݉ + ݏ)
.                                                                                                                      (5.26) 
Because the fine function is linear in this case, as shown in Eq. (5.26) signatories’ abatement 
level can only be incentivised by the monitoring expenditure. Furthermore, according to Eq. 
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(5.26) it can be shown that signatories’ abatement is increasing at a decreasing rate, i.e. డ௤೔
∗
డ௠
=
ఈ௙௦
௔(ఈ௠ା௦)మ
> 0, డ
మ௤೔
∗
డ௠మ
= −
ଶఈమ௙௦
௔(ఈ௠ା௦)య
< 0. It is also obvious to see from Eq. (5.26) that signatories’ 
optimal abatement level is higher than the Nash level ௕
௔
 given the term ఈ௠௙
௔(ఈ௠ା௦)
> 0 under 
positive monitoring expenditures, but all signatories will become non-compliant and their 
abatement will equal to the Nash level when there is no monitoring expenditure ݉ = 0. By 
equalizing the coalitional best abatement level ௦௕
௔
 with ݍ௜∗  shown in Eq. (5.26) and then 
solving for ݉, we can see that the coalition will reach the fist-best if ݉ = ௦(௦ିଵ)௕
ఈ(௙ା௕ି௦௕)
, which 
can serve as an upper bound for the monitoring expenditure, i.e. ݉ ≤ ௦(௦ିଵ)௕
ఈ(௙ା௕ି௦௕)
. This is 
because it is not coalitional optimal to spend more on monitoring if the coalitional best 
abatement is taken by signatories, as shown by the equilibrium condition (5.9). But note that, 
this upper bound level that can induce the coalitional best abatement is not the optimal level 
of the monitoring expenditure in a coalition.  
Following the target setting under the model with linear fine function in Section 5.3.1, the 
optimal target is set as ݍത௜∗ =
௦௕
௔
. Applying specified functions to Eq. (5.8) that is the condition 
for the optimal monitoring expenditure, and subtracting ݉ yield the following result:  
݉∗ =
ݏ
ߙ
ඨܾߙ݂(ݏ − 1) −
݉∗ߙଶ݂ଶ
ߙ݉∗ + ݏ
ܽ
−
ݏ
ߙ
 .                                                                                      (5.27) 
Eq. (5.27) is a cubic function of ݉∗ , implying an explicit analytical solution for optimal 
monitoring expenditure ݉∗cannot be obtained. We resort to an numerical example in Section 
5.3.4 to show the optimal monitoring expenditure, and also results on the compliance level 
and the stability.   
5.3.4 A numerical illustration 
Implicit solutions for the optimal monitoring cost ݉∗  in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 cannot 
enable us to look into the effect of the optimal enforcement mechanism in an ICA. In this 
section we use a numerical example to show the optimal monitoring cost choice and the 
impact of which on signatories’ compliance levels (abatement levels), the coalition stability 
and payoffs. We set the following parameter values throughout this numerical example: the 
number of players ݊ = 10, the BAU emissions ݁̅ = 110, the abatement cost parameter ܽ = 1, 
International climate agreements with costly enforcement 
111 
 
the marginal abatement benefit ܾ = 10, the parameter representing the severity of the penalty 
in the fine function ݂ = 100 , the parameter representing monitoring technology in the 
monitoring probability function ߙ = 0.01 . Numerical results are shown in the following 
tables.  
Let us firstly look into the result on the compliance level under each model specification. 
As shown in row 7 of Table 5.1, under the enforcement mechanism with linear fine function, 
signatories’ optimal abatement levels ݍ௜
∗ under different coalition sizes are below but close to 
the coalitional best level (i.e. ௦௕
௔
). Under fines that are marginally increasing in defection 
levels, the results of signatories’ optimal abatement in Table 5.2a show that the coalitional 
best abatement level ݍ௜∗ =
௦௕
௔
 can be induced by the optimal enforcement policy composing 
both of  the optimal target and monitoring expenditures. For the case ݍ௜∗ =
௕௦ାఈ௠௙௘̅
௔௦ାఈ௠௙
<
௦௕
௔
, each 
signatory’s abatement level is slightly lower than the first-best level. However, the differences 
in  the optimal abatement levels and monitoring expenditures between these two cases are 
becoming larger when the coalition is expanding, i.e. after ݏ = 7. The changes in these two 
cases can be attributed to the functional form of the analytical solutions (i.e. Eqs. (5.21) and 
(5.22) representing ݉∗ and ݍ௜∗), and also because of the particular numerical values given in 
this example. As shown in row 7 of Table 5.2a and 5.2b, in general the optimal monitoring 
expenditures under the case ݍ௜∗ =
௦௕
௔
 are also slightly higher than the case ݍ௜∗ <
௦௕
௔
. This is 
because as analysed in Section 5.3.2, under quadratic fine function monitoring costs are 
chosen at a value which can work together with the optimal target to incentivise signatories to 
choose the coalitional best abatement level. For the case where the optimal abatement level is 
lower than the coalitional best level, the monitoring costs are also lower. When the 
monitoring technology parameter is low, as shown in Table 5.3 where the marginal 
monitoring probability is decreasing and the marginal fine is constant, in equilibrium the 
marginal abatement level that is induced by one more unit of monitoring expenditure is the 
lowest as compared to the other two models with constant marginal monitoring probability. 
Because of the low efficiency of the enforcement with concave monitoring probability, 
monitoring costs are more than half of signatories’ payoffs when the coalition size is larger 
than eight. The optimal targets under these three model specifications are all set at the BAU 
emissions level, hence signatories are partially complying with the target under these three 
cases. As shown by the numerical results, the compliance level and payoffs under the 
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quadratic fine and constant marginal monitoring probability are the highest while the ones 
under the linear fine and the concave monitoring probability functions are the lowest.    
For the results on coalition stability under three model specifications, it can be seen from 
Tables 5.1-5.3 (where the number 1 represents stability and 0 represents instability) that the 
optimal enforcement mechanism enhances coalition’s stability as compared to the case 
without enforcement, but the extent of the stability enhancement is quite limited. Specifically, 
as shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.3 the coalition with three members can be stabilised as the 
largest stable coalition among the three model specifications if the fine function is linear or 
the monitoring probability is concave in monitoring costs. However, only the coalition with 
two members is stable when the monitoring function is linear and the fine function is 
quadratic. The result of the stability is reasonable by comparing signatories’ abatement and 
payoffs under three model specifications. It can be seen from Tables 5.1 to 5.3 that signatories’ 
abatement levels and the resulting payoffs are lowest under the model with concave 
monitoring probability function compared to the results in other two specified models, where 
achievements in abatement and payoffs under the model with quadratic fine function are the 
largest and signatories in the model with both linear fine and monitoring probability functions 
abate and gain less than that. As higher abatement level implies stronger free-riding incentives 
and vice versa, the stable coalition under the quadratic fine is the smallest but achieves the 
most.     
The comparison of monitoring costs between the three model specifications shows that 
lower monitoring costs are required under the quadratic fine function compared to the one in 
other two models with linear fine form. This result confirms our analysis that under the 
enforcement mechanism with quadratic fine function, both of monitoring costs and target can 
be used as effective enforcement instruments. Hence, monitoring costs can be saved by setting 
higher target that results in heavier punishment. This counts for higher payoffs under the 
quadratic fine function as compared to the ones achieved under the linear fine function. By 
comparing the monitoring costs and the incentivised signatories’ abatement level (see row 6 
and 7 in Tables 5.1-5.3), it can be seen that in contrast to the linear monitoring probability 
function, the marginal abatement under the concave monitoring probability function is the 
lowest. This is due to the marginal monitoring probability being decreasing in monitoring 
expenditures. 
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Table 5.1. Payoffs and Stability for the basic model with a linear fine and a linear monitoring probability functions 
  ݏ = 2  ݏ = 3  ݏ = 4  ݏ = 5  ݏ = 6  ݏ = 7  ݏ = 8  ݏ = 9  ݏ = 10 
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ) 990.50 1130.50 1370.50 1710.50 2150.50 2690.50 3330.50 4070.50 4910.50 
௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ − 1) 940.00 1130.00 1520.00 2110.00 2900.00 3890.00 5080.00 6470.00 8060.00 
௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ) 1130.00 1520.00 2110.00 2900.00 3890.00 5080.00 6470.00 8060.00 --- 
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ + 1) 1130.50 1370.50 1710.50 2150.50 2690.50 3330.50 4070.50 4910.50 --- 
݉∗ 18.00 57.00 116.00 195.00 294.00 413.00 552.00 711.00 890.00 
ݍ௜
∗ 19.00 29.00 39.00 49.00 59.00 69.00 79.00 89.00 99.00 
Internal 
stability 
       1        1        0        0        0        0        0        0        0 
External 
stability 
       0        1        1        1        1        1        1        1        --- 
 
Table 5.2a. Payoffs and Stability for the model with a quadratic fine function: for the case ݍ௜
∗ =
௦௕
௔
  
  s = 2  s = 3  s = 4  s = 5  s = 6  s = 7  s = 8  s = 9  s = 10 
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ) 999.89 1149.75 1399.57 1749.33 2199.00 2748.50 3397.67 4146.00 4991.00 
௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ − 1) 950.00 1150.00 1550.00 2150.00 2950.00 3950.00 5150.00 6550.00 8150.00 
௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ) 1150.00 1550.00 2150.00 2950.00 3950.00 5150.00 6550.00 8150.00 --- 
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ + 1) 1149.75 1399.57 1749.33 2199.00 2748.50 3397.67 4146.00 4991.00 --- 
݉∗ 0.22 0.75 1.71 3.33 6.00 10.50 18.67 36.00 90.00 
ݍ௜
∗ 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00 
Internal 
stability 
       1        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0 
External 
stability 
       1        1        1        1        1        1        1        1        --- 
 
Table 5.2b. Payoffs and Stability for the model with a quadratic fine function: for the case ݍ௜
∗ <
௦௕
௔
  
        ݏ = 2        ݏ = 3      ݏ = 4     ݏ = 5     ݏ = 6     ݏ = 7     ݏ = 8     ݏ = 9   ݏ = 10 
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ) 999.89 1149.750 1399.57 1749.33 2199.00 2748.50 3397.67 4146.03 4991.42 
௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ − 1) 949.90 1149.753 1549.53 2149.18 2948.61 3947.60 5145.64 6541.18 8128.04 
௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ) 1149.753 1549.53 2149.18 2948.61 3947.60 5145.64 6541.18 8128.04 --- 
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ + 1) 1149.750 1399.57 1749.33 2199.00 2748.50 3397.67 4146.03 4991.42 --- 
݉∗ 0.22 0.75 1.71 3.33 5.99 10.47 18.57 35.46 82.17 
ݍ௜
∗ 19.99 29.98 39.98 49.97 59.96 69.94 79.89 89.76 99.15 
Internal 
stability 
          1           0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0 
External 
stability 
          1           1        1        1        1        1        1        1        --- 
 
Table 5.3. Payoffs and Stability for the model with a linear fine and a concave monitoring probability functions  
     ݏ = 2     ݏ = 3     ݏ = 4     ݏ = 5     ݏ = 6     ݏ = 7     ݏ = 8     ݏ = 9   ݏ = 10 
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ) 989.63 1126.18 1359.11 1686.88 2106.96 2615.28 3205.26 3867.02 4587.72 
௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ − 1) 940.19 1125.96 1504.84 2072.69 2822.23 3740.33 4803.54 5972.49 7191.77 
௜ܸ
ேௌ(ݏ) 1125.96 1504.84 2072.69 2822.23 3740.33 4803.54 5972.49 7191.77 --- 
௜ܸ
ௌ(ݏ + 1) 1126.18 1359.11 1686.88 2106.96 2615.28 3205.26 3867.02 4587.72 --- 
݉∗ 19.29 68.07 156.08 299.29 521.61 857.31 1394.44 2036.67 2930.03 
ݍ௜
∗ 18.80 28.49 38.07 47.44 56.51 65.05 72.78 79.35 84.55 
Internal 
stability 
       1        1        0        0        0        0        0        0        0 
External 
stability 
       0        1        1        1        1        1        1        1        --- 
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5.4 Conclusion      
Considering the free-riding incentives in the process of compliance with abatement 
commitments, individual signatory’s strategic compliance level is conditional on the design of 
enforcement mechanism. As a result, signatories’ payoffs and participation incentives in an 
ICA can also be changed. In this paper we use a combination of analytical and numerical 
analyses to explore the design of the optimal enforcement mechanism in self-enforcing ICAs 
and also to illustrate the effect of the optimally designed enforcement on signatories’ 
compliance levels and the stability of ICAs.  
A coalition decides on the optimal enforcement policy with respect to the choices of 
monitoring expenditure and the abatement target  by maximising joint welfare. Under such an 
optimal enforcement mechanism, the coalitional first best described by Samuelson rule can be 
achieved when the fine imposed on defectors are marginally increasing in defection levels and 
meanwhile the marginal monitoring probability is constant in monitoring expenditure. 
Otherwise, a second-best in which individual signatory’s abatement level is lower than the 
coalitional best level is achieved. Because monitoring is costly, full compliance under the 
optimal enforcement will usually not be enforced. 
In our model set up with a quadratic fine function even the coalitional best abatement 
level is partial compliance. The target is set strategically to overly strict levels because setting 
a high target implies higher marginal fines and the target is a costless instrument to incentivise 
abatement. In this case full compliance should not be the objective of the enforcement policy 
design.  
The stability of ICAs is improved by the optimal enforcement mechanism but to a very 
limited degree. Under a linear fine function, the stability of a coalition depends on 
enforcement parameters. Our analytical results show that defection costs become high if the 
parameters representing the severity of the punishment policy and the monitoring efficiency 
are taking high values. Large defection costs have an adverse effect on incentives to join a 
coalition and such that only the smaller coalition can be stabilised, the vice versa. This is in 
line with the result of McEvoy and Stranlund (2009), who argue that high values of 
enforcement parameters decrease the enforcement cost, such that only lower participation 
level is needed to increase coalition’s abatement level. A narrow but deep coalition can be 
formed when the fine is increasing in the degree of the defection. Under the quadratic fine 
function the high abatement level and high resulting payoffs also cause high free-riding 
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incentives. A slightly larger coalition can be sustained under the concave monitoring 
probability because the low abatement improvement, as compared to the enforcement with 
quadratic fine function.  
In conclusion, our study shows that an optimal designed enforcement mechanism can 
increase the mitigation effectiveness of ICAs through inducing higher compliance levels, 
especially if the penalty for defectors is marginally increasing with the defection degree. 
Because free-riding incentives increase with the coalitional abatement level, broad and deep 
coalitions cannot be stabilised under a costly enforcement mechanism. However, this stability 
result could be different if the players are asymmetric in marginal abatement costs and 
benefits. This is one direction to extend our research. For asymmetric players, the optimal 
enforcement mechanism could result in the mixture of full and partial compliance in a 
coalition, thus signatories’ incentives to join an ICA varies among signatories. 
5.5 Appendix 
Supposing the constraint on target setting is non-binding, then the shadow value of the 
constraint is ߛ௜ = 0. Hence, Eq. (5.7b) can be rewritten as   
෍
߲ܤ௝
߲ݍ∗
௝∈ௌ
=
߲ܥ௜
߲ݍ௜
∗ .                                                                                                                                 (5. ܣ1) 
which is Samuelson’s rule. By replacing ∑
డ஻ೕ
డ௤∗௝∈ௌ
 in Eq. (5.7a) by డ஼೔
డ௤೔
∗, the following equation 
is obtained: 
 డ஼೔
డ௤೔
∗ ∑
డ௤ೕ
∗
డ௠௝∈ௌ
= ∑ (
డ஼ೕ
డ௤ೕ
∗௝∈ௌ
డ௤ೕ
∗
డ௠
) + 1.                                                                                                (5. ܣ2) 
Clearly, Eq. (5.A2) cannot hold in general implying ߛ௜ > 0.  
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Chapter 6 
Discussion and conclusions 
Global cooperation among sovereign countries is an efficient way to mitigate greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, however, it is difficult to realise due to the public good property of GHG 
emissions mitigation. This thesis investigates the formation and effectiveness of international 
climate agreements (ICAs) by exploring the effects of carbon trade, asymmetric bargaining 
powers and enforcement involving costly monitoring and punishment on improving the 
stability and effectiveness of ICAs. I use both game theory and numerical modelling to 
analyse these mechanisms. The analysis and results of this thesis provide insights into the 
design of current and future ICAs  for improving the stability and effectiveness. 
6.1 Answers to research questions  
 What is the impact of a carbon market on regional incentives to join an ICA for GHG 
emissions mitigation when the carbon market is established independently of this 
agreement?  
Carbon trade within a coalition for GHG emissions mitigation can improve incentives to join 
(Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus 2006). To investigate the impact of an independent carbon 
market that is open to all on participation incentives and performances of a climate coalition 
for GHG emissions mitigation, a four-stage coalition formation game is formulated in Chapter 
2. In this four-stage game, the equilibrium coalition structure implies the simultaneous 
stability of the climate coalition and the carbon market. Being different from a single climate 
mitigation coalition, the presence of a carbon market enlarges the space of players’ strategic 
choices and therefore changes incentives to join the mitigation coalition.  
I firstly analyse the game theoretically by backward induction. Due to the complexity of a 
two-coalition structure, the analysis is based on different memberships of players. At stage 4, 
the singleton non-traders who are outside of both the carbon market and the mitigation 
coalition, choose their optimal abatement levels by equating their marginal benefits with their 
marginal costs of mitigation. For carbon traders who are members of the carbon market, it is 
optimal to take the abatement level that equates marginal mitigation costs with the permit 
price. For the mitigation coalition members who choose to be outside of the carbon market, 
they choose the optimal abatement level based on Samuelson’s rule. Stage 3 only involves the 
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behaviours of the carbon traders, i.e. their optimal allowance choices. I apply the endogenous 
allowance choice scheme developed by Helm (2003) to the strategic allowance choice at this 
stage, such that the solution for choosing the optimal allowance level can be derived. The 
stability check of the carbon market and the ICA at stage 1 and 2 cannot be realised through 
the theoretical analysis without specified functional forms. To gain insights into the stability 
and performance of this four-stage coalition formation game, I employ a modified version of 
STACO model where 12 world regions are aggregated into 7 regions and the related 
parameters are also recalibrated.  
Results from the numerical analysis show that impacts of an independent carbon market 
on the mitigation coalition are complex. Firstly, with respect to the levels of stability and 
performance, this carbon market exerts a negative impact on the mitigation coalition. With the 
presence of the carbon market, the number of coalitions that can be formed decreases. At the 
same time, the best-performing mitigation coalition under the two-coalition structure 
generates lower global payoffs and abatement than the best-performing one in the absence of 
a carbon market. Secondly, for a given stable coalition, the presence of a carbon market can 
help to improve global abatement and payoffs. Global abatement increases with the presence 
of the carbon market, which involves more regions to abate. The improvement in global 
payoffs is driven by the positive externality of increased global abatement. Thirdly, with a 
carbon market, some instable coalitions under the one-coalition structure become stable. This 
conclusion especially applies to the internally stable but externally instable coalitions, which 
become fully stable coalitions with the presence of the carbon market. The intuition behind 
this is that the independent carbon market provides an additional opportunity for some non-
signatory countries to increase mitigation efforts through carbon trade. This induces a Pareto 
improvement on abatement levels and profitability compared to the one-coalition structure. 
Although this independent carbon market is open to both the mitigation coalition and its 
outsiders, the numerical analysis shows that in equilibrium members of the mitigation 
coalition are not willing to join the carbon market. As shown by the theoretical analysis, the 
mitigation coalition is more likely to be a permit buyer if the coalition joins the carbon market. 
Hence, the mitigation coalition receives negative transfers from buying emission permits. For 
the mitigation coalition, the free-riding benefits surpass the gain from joining carbon trade. 
In conclusion, even with this dual-agreement system, the structure of coalition formation 
is still a partial participation with free-riding outsiders. More alternative strategic options 
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offered by carbon trade destabilise the most efficient mitigation coalitions that are stable in 
the system with a single mitigation agreement. However, it could be beneficial to some 
mitigation coalitions by expanding the single coalition structure to improve the efficiency of 
some stable, but suboptimal ICAs. 
 How does an individual allowance choice constraint impact the stability and effectiveness 
of a carbon trade agreement? 
Without constraints on allowance choices, a carbon market would not be very effective (Helm 
2003). Moreover, participation incentives that stem from unlimited allowance choices could 
also dampen the stability of a carbon market with open membership. Therefore, imposing a 
constraint on allowance choices might not only mitigate the hot-air effect but can also help to 
stabilise a carbon market by avoiding excessive participation of potential sellers. In Chapter 3 
I study the impact of a constraint on individual allowance choices on the stability and 
performance of a carbon market with open membership. The carbon market is formulated as a 
coalition focusing on carbon trade, and the analysis is based on a standard two-stage coalition 
formation model. At stage one all players make decisions on signing or not signing a carbon 
trade agreement, which obliges all signatories to accept a constraint on the allowance choice. 
The constraint imposed on individual carbon traders is modelled as a fraction of each trader’s 
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. In the second stage, carbon traders simultaneously 
choose emission allowances subject to exogenous constraints, and trade and decide their after-
trade abatement assuming the abatement of all non-traders is given. Thus, the outsiders 
choose their abatement by taking others’ abatement levels as given. 
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibria of this two-stage game are derived by backward 
induction. The results from theoretical analysis show that the constraint imposed on allowance 
choices is not binding when the constraint is lax. Under non-binding constraints, allowance 
choices and the carbon price in the constrained carbon market where the shadow value of 
carbon is zero, are identical to the carbon market without constraints. By increasing the 
strictness of the constraint, the constraint becomes binding and the carbon price / shadow 
price of carbon increases. Under binding constraints, carbon traders choose the optimal 
allowances that are equal to this imposed ‘cap’. Because of the positive shadow value of 
carbon allowances when constraints are binding, the gains of all carbon traders decrease with 
the tightening of the constraint on allowance choices. As a result, there is no participation 
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incentive and thus no carbon market will emerge when the constraint is too strict. This 
indicates that the condition for the internal stability is violated. 
To illustrate the consequences of imposing constraints on individual allowance choices 
more explicitly, a numerical analysis based on this two-stage game is also implemented by 
employing the STACO model. As a base scenario, a numerical analysis for an unconstrained 
carbon market is performed. The numerical results for the base scenario show that the hot-air 
effect takes place and the stability of a carbon market with open membership is dampened if 
the allowances can be chosen arbitrarily. By imposing a constraint on individual allowance 
choices, the numerical analysis shows that the hot-air effect can be alleviated and even 
eliminated by increasing the strictness of the constraint on allowance choices. At the same 
time, this constraint also has a positive effect on the stability of the carbon market in the sense 
that multiple equilibrium carbon markets can be formed under different constraints. This 
result confirms the theoretical analysis with respect to that no stable carbon market can be 
found when the constraint is set too strict. As to the impact on mitigation effectiveness of the 
carbon market, global abatement and welfare are enhanced due to the limited allowance 
choices. However, the improvement of the global abatement and welfare reaches the highest 
levels when the constraint is set at a moderate level. 
With a sensitivity analysis, the impact of the baseline setting on the stability and 
effectiveness of constrained carbon markets is also analysed numerically. Instead of the BAU 
baseline for the constraint on individual allowance choices, the non-cooperative Nash 
emissions levels become the new baseline for the constraint. Numerical results indicate that 
larger and more effective carbon markets can be formed under the Nash baseline for the 
constraint as compared to the BAU baseline. The improved stability and effectiveness of 
stable carbon markets with Nash baseline are related to the binding allowance choices of all 
carbon traders, which are found in all carbon markets from our numerical results. In particular, 
a carbon market with full participation can be sustained when the upper bound of individual 
allowance choices is the Nash-emissions level. The intuition is that each region can only 
improve but never lose upon its Nash payoff by joining the carbon market. 
In conclusion, under a carbon market with open membership, the stability and the 
membership of an international carbon market can be increased by imposing a constraint on 
allowance choices. When tightening the constraint ‘broad but shallow’ agreements are 
replaced by ‘narrow but deep’ ones.  Imposing constraints on allowance choices can improve 
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the stability and enlarge the scale of an international carbon market to a limited degree, but 
cannot overcome the free-riding incentives. 
 What is the impact of using the Nash bargaining solution for distributing coalitional gains 
under different sets of bargaining weights on the stability and effectiveness of 
international climate agreements? 
 
Chapter 4 examines how the formation of ICAs and their mitigation efficiency are impacted 
by the use of the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), which is affected by negotiators’ unequal 
bargaining power. In a Nash bargaining game with heterogeneous players, bargaining powers 
are unequal and may be driven by different characteristics of negotiators. Potential reasons 
that could result in differences of negotiators’ bargaining power in international climate 
negotiations are firstly discussed and reviewed in Chapter 4. Based on the discussion of these 
potential factors, five different determinants that may change negotiators’ bargaining power 
are identified and then are used for the quantification of negotiators’ bargaining weights. 
These five determinants are: (i) discount factor; (ii) abatement efforts; (iii) abatement costs; 
(iv) climate change damages; (v) economic power (in terms of GDP). Furthermore, the 
outside options of players, which also can impact the bargaining solution, are introduced. It is 
argued that the Nash bargaining solution with outside options (see Muthoo 1999) falls in the 
class of optimal sharing rules described by Carraro et al. (2006) and Weikard (2009). 
To compare and examine the impact of the NBS with different sets of unequal bargaining 
weights on incentives to cooperate, international climate negotiations are modelled as a two-
stage cartel formation game. In this model, gains from climate mitigation cooperation are 
distributed among signatories by applying the NBS with different sets of bargaining weights. 
Based on the two-stage game, a numerical analysis is implemented in Chapter 4. The 
numerical results show that multiple equilibrium climate coalitions can emerge from the NBS. 
The number and size of stable coalitions vary with different sets of bargaining weights. 
Moreover, it turns out that the success of international climate agreements depends on the set 
of bargaining weights in climate negotiations. Some sets of bargaining weights generate more 
successful coalitions in terms of welfare and abatement than others. For example, among five 
sets of asymmetric bargaining weights, the one determined by negotiators’ economic power 
can facilitate a climate coalition that comprises two of the largest emitters (CHN and USA) 
jointly with two other regions.  
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Numerical results in Chapter 4 also show that the NBS with outside options is more 
conducive to ICAs as compared to the bargaining solution without considering outside 
options. The analysis on the NBS with outside options provides a rationale for the use of 
optimal sharing rules: they result from a NBS with outside options. 
It can be concluded from the study of Chapter 4 that negotiators’ bargaining power in 
international climate negotiations can be interpreted as and quantified with different sets of 
bargaining weights. Accordingly, Nash bargaining solutions in terms of the results of 
coalitional gains allocation among members are differentiated by applying different sets of 
bargaining weights. By using the NBS as a transfer scheme, the participation incentives and 
performances of ICAs can be improved as compared to agreements that do not redistribute 
gains from cooperation, but its capacity to overcome free-riding incentives is limited. 
However, if Nash bargaining accounts for outside options of players, larger stable coalitions 
and higher global abatement levels can be achieved.   
 How can an optimal enforcement mechanism for an ICA be designed, and what is the 
impact of an optimally designed enforcement mechanism on participation and compliance? 
The success of an international climate agreement is not only relying on the participation but 
also on the implementation of abatement commitments by signatories. To improve the 
implementation of abatement commitments, an enforcement mechanism is required to 
incentivise signatories to comply with their commitments. Chapter 5 investigates the optimal 
enforcement policy with respect to the optimal abatement target and monitoring investment 
for an ICA. Furthermore, I analyse how an optimally designed enforcement mechanism 
changes incentives to participate and comply in a coalition formation game. The model in 
Chapter 5 is based on the enforcement mechanism introduced by McEvoy and Stranlund 
(2009, 2010) but is extended by considering partial compliance. In this model with partial 
compliance, the optimal compliance level of signatories is determined endogenously and 
strategically based on the monitoring expenditure and abatement targets. The model in this 
paper is formulated as a four-stage coalition formation game. At the first stage, countries 
make their membership choices. At the second stage, coalition members jointly and 
simultaneously fix the abatement target and monitoring expenditures that determine the 
probability of monitoring. At the third stage, countries choose their abatement levels 
independently. Singletons just choose a best response while signatories must take the 
expected punishment into account, in case they would not comply. At the final stage, 
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signatories’ abatement levels are randomly monitored and fines have to be paid if non-
compliance is detected. 
The four-stage game is solved analytically by backward induction. The analysis gives the 
following findings on the optimal enforcement design and signatories’ compliance levels. 
Firstly, a signatory chooses the optimal abatement level by equalising marginal net gains of 
abatement with the marginal expected fine. This implies that Samuelson’s rule which 
determines the coalitional best level of abatement can be satisfied if the marginal expected 
fine makes up for the externality of each signatory’s abatement. Secondly, signatories to an 
ICA decide cooperatively on the enforcement mechanism with respect to the abatement target 
and monitoring expenditures. In equilibrium, monitoring expenditures are decided so that 
coalitional marginal net gains of the increased abatement due to one unit increase in 
monitoring costs is equal to the marginal monitoring costs. With a constraint to the target 
setting, the target is optimally chosen at the upper bound value of the constraint that is the 
BAU emissions level. Note that, this equilibrium condition for the optimal target setting only 
applies to the case where the target can play a role in inducing higher abatement levels, for 
example when the marginal fine is increasing in defection levels. Under such an optimal 
target, signatories are incentivised to choose an abatement level that is either equal to or 
smaller than the coalitional best one obtained from Samuelson’s rule. This result has two 
implications: firstly, under the optimal enforcement mechanism, the target and the monitoring 
are used as two instruments to increase signatories’ compliance level. However, setting a 
higher target is costless while increasing the monitoring probability is not. Therefore, it is 
always better to choose the maximal target level when implementing Samuelson’s rule. But 
note that the target is not an effective enforcement instrument when the marginal fine is a 
constant value. Secondly, setting higher targets can increase the abatement, but it is not 
optimal for a coalition to abate more than the Samuelson level. This is true since under the 
Samuelson condition, each coalition member makes the abatement choice by internalising the 
external effects on all other signatories. 
To explore the impact of the design feature (i.e. the penalty structure and monitoring 
technology) of enforcement mechanism in ICAs, I apply the analytical solutions to three cases 
with specific functions. Several results can be obtained from the analysis of the three specified 
models. Firstly, the optimal enforcement policy induces partial compliance, but the level of 
which varies under different functional forms of fine and monitoring probability. Under the 
enforcement with quadratic fine and linear monitoring probability functions, signatories’ 
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compliance level can be induced to the most since both the target and monitoring costs are 
effective in incentivising signatories to take the coalitional best abatement level. Under the 
enforcement mechanism with linear fine and linear monitoring probability functions, 
signatories’ compliance level can be incentivised only by monitoring efforts but not by the 
target due to the constant marginal fine. Hence, due to costly monitoring, signatories’ optimal 
abatement level induced by the optimal monitoring costs that are chosen by the coalition is 
lower than the coalitional best level. Monitoring technology improvement can have a positive 
effect on incentivising signatories’ compliance level. As shown in our numerical results, 
signatories’ compliance level is the lowest when the marginal monitoring probability is 
decreasing in monitoring costs, as compared to the results from the constant marginal 
monitoring probability. 
Secondly, due to different compliance levels, the payoffs and participation incentives in 
an ICA are also different under different functional forms of the fine and monitoring 
probability. In the case of a linear fine function, the enforcement parameters representing the 
productivity of monitoring expenditure and the severity of the punishment respectively affect 
the stability of an ICA. The intuition is that higher values of enforcement parameters imply 
higher defection costs and thereby reduces the incentives to join an ICA. This result also 
implies that the grand coalition can be stabilised if enforcement parameters have low values 
under the enforcement mechanism with linear fine functions. Due to the implicit analytical 
solutions, the stability results under the quadratic fine and the concave monitoring probability 
functions cannot be drawn explicitly. By using a numerical example, our results illustrate that 
the stable coalition under the enforcement mechanism with the quadratic fine and linear 
monitoring probability functions contains the fewest members, while a slightly larger 
coalition can be stabilised if the fine function is linear or the monitoring probability function 
is concave. The reason is that the abatement and payoffs under a quadratic fine function can 
achieve the highest levels, which also generates the strongest free-riding incentives. However, 
the enforcement mechanism with concave monitoring probability has the lowest effectiveness 
in incentivising signatories’ abatement levels. Hence, free-riding incentives are low under the 
enforcement with linear fine or concave monitoring probability. This stability results implies 
that under the optimal enforcement policy, an ICA can either be formed as a narrow and deep 
one or as a broad but shallow one. 
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6.2 General discussion and conclusions  
6.2.1 Modelling conclusions 
Game-theoretical modelling is a useful and essential instrument to study the problem of 
international cooperation on climate change mitigation. Game theory can facilitate the 
analysis of countries’ strategic interactions and derivation of optimal strategies. In the context 
of climate change cooperation, non-cooperative game theory typically models the formation 
of ICAs as a two-stage game: the first stage is the membership choice, and the second stage 
involves the optimal abatement choice. To study the impact of a carbon market that is open to 
all on the stability and effectiveness of a climate mitigation coalition in Chapter 2, I extend 
the typical two-stage game to a more complex four-stage game. In this four-stage game, there 
are two coalitions: a carbon market and a climate coalition for GHG emissions mitigation. 
These coalitions are formed sequentially at stages 1 and 2. At stage 3, market participants 
make their decisions on allowances choice and in the final stage all players choose abatement 
levels. Through this four-stage coalition formation model, I find that the carbon market has an 
adverse effect on countries’ incentives to participate in the mitigation coalition. This is 
explained by the alternative strategic options offered by the carbon market, which enlarge 
each player’s strategy choice space. As a result, players who intend to join the mitigation 
coalition for collective gains can also be attracted by carbon trade for low marginal mitigation 
costs, or opt to be a free-rider because of the increased abatement level resulting from carbon 
trade. As a consequence, the size of the mitigation coalition is reduced compared to the case 
without the presence of the carbon market. Furthermore, modelling the carbon market as a 
one that is open to all enables us to analyse the mitigation coalition’s incentive to join carbon 
trade. The results in Chapter 2 show that the carbon market is not attractive for the mitigation 
coalition, which prefers to be a market outsider due to the free-riding incentives from the 
increased mitigation level. 
The carbon market studied in Chapter 2 is unconstrained, which results in hot-air and 
excessive participation incentives that may result in instability of the carbon market. Hence, I 
impose an exogenous constraint on individual carbon trader’ allowance choices and study the 
effect of this constraint on the stability of the carbon market in Chapter 3. I employ a standard 
two-stage coalition formation game, where all players simultaneously make decisions on their 
market participations at stage 1, and signatories make their allowance choices and then trade 
at stage 2. The results in Chapter 3 shows that both of the stability and the membership of an 
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international carbon market can be increased by imposing a constraint on allowance choices. 
Moreover, when tightening the constraint ‘broad but shallow’ agreements are replaced by 
‘narrow but deep’ ones. 
To compare and examine the impact of the Nash bargaining solutions (NBS) with 
different sets of unequal bargaining weights on incentives to cooperate on climate change 
mitigation, I formulate a standard two-stage cartel formation game in Chapter 4. All players 
make their membership choices at stage one and abatement targets are set cooperatively by 
signatories at stage two. In this game, signatories’ individual payoffs are determined by 
applying the NBS with a given set of bargaining weights, which are based on signatories’ 
asymmetric bargaining power. The conclusion in Chapter 4 is that applying the NBS without 
outside options to distribute coalitional gains, players’ incentives to participate and abate can 
be increased but to a limited degree. However, by considering outside options, the stability of 
an ICA can be improved to a further degree. The reason is that the bargaining outcome falls 
into the class of optimal sharing rules when outside options are considered. Hence, the study 
in Chapter 4 provides a rationale for the use of optimal sharing rules: the optimal sharing rules 
result from a NBS with outside options.  
By formulating a four-stage coalition formation model in Chapter 5, I investigate impacts 
of an optimally designed enforcement mechanism on signatories’ compliance levels and the 
stability of an ICA. I conclude that the optimal enforcement induces partial compliance. 
However, compliance levels are different under different functional forms of fine and 
monitoring probability. Under an enforcement mechanism with fines for defectors are 
increasing in defection levels and the marginal monitoring probability is constant, both of 
monitoring costs and the abatement target are effective in incentivising higher compliance 
levels. As a result, the coalition’s first-best abatement level can be induced. However, when 
both of the marginal fine and monitoring probability are constant, only monitoring costs are 
the effective enforcement instrument and thus signatories’ compliance levels are lower than 
the one under quadratic fine function. Monitoring probability matters for the compliance level. 
A concave monitoring probability function is less effective in inducing higher abatement. A 
lower compliance level results when the marginal monitoring probability is decreasing in 
monitoring costs. In terms of the stability effect, the stability of ICAs can be improved by the 
optimal enforcement mechanism but with very limited degrees. 
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6.2.2 Policy conclusions 
Being adopted on 12 December 2015 and entering into force on 4 November 2016, the Paris 
agreement has been a highly expected institutional instrument governing global GHG 
emissions mitigation. However, there are still challenges facing the Paris agreement, for 
example, instability arising from member countries’ dropping out due to economic and 
political reasons, low mitigation effectiveness or poor implementation of ambitious targets. 
By focusing on these common challenges that can be faced by all ICAs, this thesis studies the 
institutional dimension of the global climate change problem and aims to increase the degree 
of success of ICAs by employing economic and institutional instruments. Results of this 
thesis can be interpreted and lead to the following policy implications.  
First, establishing a carbon market independently of an ICA is ineffective to increase 
cooperation but can increase global abatement level by involving more countries to abate. In 
reality an example of such a carbon market can be referred to the CDM, under which 
uncommitted developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol can indirectly reduce GHG 
emissions by allowing the committed countries to implement emission-reduction projects in 
their lands. The results in Chapter 2 show that a carbon market that is established outside of 
an ICA cannot facilitate the enlargement of an ICA. The intuition is that each country’s 
strategy choices are increased due to the presence of a carbon market as compared to a single 
ICA, therefore countries seek cheaper abatement options not only by joining an ICA but also 
by joining a carbon market. However, the global abatement level is increased by the presence 
of the carbon market because outsiders of the ICA can become signatories and do more 
abatement than the non-cooperative Nash level by joining carbon trading. For policy makers, 
this could be a solution to increase the mitigation effectiveness of partial climate coalitions 
given that a global climate agreement is difficult to reach.  
Second, imposing a constraint with the baseline of non-cooperative Nash emissions level 
on individual countries’ allowance choices can help to increase participation in and mitigation 
effectiveness of an international carbon market. This policy implication can be interpreted in 
two ways. One refers to the importance of designing constraints on carbon trader countries’ 
emission allowance choices in an international carbon market. This constraint can increase the 
mitigation effectiveness of a carbon market by limiting the amount of the emission allowances, 
but can also increase the stability of a carbon market by regulating excessive participation 
incentives. As shown by the analysis of Chapter 3, without a constraint on allowance choices 
Chapter 6 
128 
 
it is difficult for a carbon market with open membership to satisfy external stability, because it 
is easily destabilized by market entrants who seek for revenues from carbon sale. The lower a 
region’s marginal damages of GHG emissions, the more allowances will be chosen. Excessive 
allowance choices result in an inefficient carbon market. By imposing constraints on 
allowance choices, the hot-air effect can be eliminated. Moreover, the stability of a carbon 
market can be enhanced in a way that the incentives of obtaining revenues from carbon sale 
can be controlled through limiting the allowance choices. Hence, the policy with respect to 
imposing a constraint on individual allowance choices can be considered for a coalition of 
international carbon trade.   
The second interpretation concerns the choice of a baseline for the constraint on 
allowance choices. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (IPCC 2007) defines baseline 
as “the reference for measurable quantities from which an alternative outcome can be 
measured, e.g. a non-intervention scenario is used as a reference in the analysis of 
intervention scenarios.” Accordingly, the baseline levels used in the current climate change 
negotiations, for example the 1990 year’s GHG emissions level or the pre-industrial level, can 
be taken as the BAU emissions level that is projected without policy intervention. However, 
by reducing damages from and the vulnerability to climate change, currently most countries in 
the world make domestic policies by taking the impact of climate change into account. 
Especially after the Copenhagen Conference, developing countries also announced their 
mitigation actions. This kind of policies, which are made based on individual welfare 
maximisation and aim to internalise the negative effects of climate change on their own, 
results in the so-called non-cooperative Nash equilibrium emissions. Hence, the baseline in 
current international climate negotiations should be revised by taking the Nash emissions 
level. One of the findings in Chapter 3 suggests that altering the constraint baseline from the 
BAU level to the non-cooperative Nash emissions level could ease negotiations. Under the 
Nash baseline, not only the global welfare and mitigation effectiveness of a carbon market are 
improved but also the grand carbon market might be formed. This is because as compared to 
the non-cooperative scenario, each region can only improve upon its Nash payoffs by joining 
the carbon market. 
Third, in international climate negotiations countries’ bargaining power could be 
determined by various factors. This provides a reference for policy makers with respect to the 
elaboration on coalitional surplus sharing rules that can improve the mitigation effectiveness 
of ICAs. For example, analysis of the bargaining power of key GHG emitters could be used to 
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induce the participation of key emitters. In the model of Chapter 4, the distribution of gains is 
the outcome of a bargaining process with unequal bargaining power and, thus, sharing 
weights of collective gains are determined by bargaining power. The numerical results in 
Chapter 4 suggest that different sets of bargaining weights quantified from determinants of 
bargaining power affect the formation and effectiveness of ICAs to different degrees. For 
example, the bargaining weights determined by negotiators’ economic power can facilitate the 
best-performing climate coalition, which includes the world largest GHG emitters, the USA 
and China. The numerical results from Chapter 4 also show that in the negotiation process 
multiple determinants of bargaining power play a role. The intuition is that one country’s 
incentives to cooperate on GHG mitigation are impacted in a complex way by factors that are 
related to abatement options, climate change vulnerability and economic power. Hence, the 
sharing weights can also be derived from the combination of multiple determinants of 
bargaining power. 
Lastly, an enforcement mechanism with fines for non-compliance should be designed and 
adopted to increase compliance of signatories of ICAs. In the Paris agreement, countries’ 
abatement targets, which is set by themselves and called the “nationally determined 
contributions” (NDCs), are not binding. Hence, it is necessary to reduce the risk of 
noncompliance by establishing an enforcement mechanism consisting of monitoring and 
punishment of defectors. As shown by results in Chapter 5, signatories’ compliance levels can 
be improved by an optimal enforcement mechanism. Especially when fines imposed are 
marginally increasing in the defection level, the coalitional best abatement level can be 
induced. This is because signatories can be incentivised to increase their compliance levels by 
both higher monitoring costs and higher targets under the enforcement mechanism with 
quadratic fine function. Due to the lack of supranational agency in international climate 
agreements, member countries’ compliance with mitigation targets is hardly to be monitored 
and then be enforced. However, assuring compliance with abatement commitments is crucial 
for the effectiveness of ICAs. Therefore, designing an optimal enforcement mechanism and 
successfully implementing it are urgent issues facing the Paris or post-Paris international 
climate agreements. The study in Chapter 5 can be considered as a reference for that.              
6.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The numerical analysis is implemented in Chapter 2 to 4 by employing a numerical (STACO) 
model. Therefore, results and conclusions from these three chapters are restrictive with regard 
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to the specific model features. As to the game setting, STACO is based on the concept of 
cartel formation game. Hence, the game theoretical analyses in Chapter 2 to 4 all focus on the 
structure of one international climate coalition, which excludes the case of multiple coalitions. 
Moreover, the stage games in Chapter 2 to 4 are all static and do not take the uncertainty into 
account. All players make their decisions on membership and abatement level in the pre-
period and then decisions last for all future periods. This static game setting ignores the 
impact of the current decisions on the ones in the future, hence it is reasonably for decision 
makers to change the strategies for coalition participation and abatement magnitude over time. 
Climate change projections are highly uncertain, which requires to use the probabilistic 
methods to estimate and tackle the climate change problem (Weitzman 2009; Millner et al. 
2013). Therefore, for future research, it would be interesting to study the formation of ICAs 
and the optimal mitigation problem by employing a stochastic-dynamic control model. As an 
example, Kolstad (2007) introduces uncertainty and learning in environmental costs and 
benefits to a standard formation model of international environmental agreements (IEAS). He 
finds that systematic uncertainty designed in his model has a negative effect on the size of an 
IEA. The effect of learning is ambiguous.  
In Chapter 3, the constraint on allowance choices is modelled as an exogenous parameter 
that is common for all heterogeneous carbon traders. Due to different marginal abatement 
costs and benefits, it would be more realistic to set conditional constraints for different carbon 
traders. The exogenous setting of the constraint makes the analysis more tractable, however 
the optimal constraint level under which a stable climate coalition can achieve the highest 
mitigation levels as compared to the ones under other constraint levels, cannot be determined 
theoretically for general conditions. Thus it would be valuable to extend the model to include 
a pre-negotiation stage where all players first determine their own constraint - possibly 
conditional on regional characteristics - and only after that the membership and allowance 
choices would follow. This analyse could provide an endogenous solution for the individual 
constraint level.   
Chapter 4 argues that bargaining power of heterogeneous countries depends on some 
external characteristics of the country itself. However, if negotiating countries anticipate that 
their decisions (e.g. mitigation decisions) have an influence on future bargaining power, 
interesting strategic interactions may arise. One direction to extend our analysis is to study 
negotiators’ strategic behaviour when bargaining power becomes an endogenous variable. 
This requires an extended dynamic game setting where pre-negotiations determine the 
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negotiation protocol (Wangler et al. 2013) and thereby bargaining powers are relevant at the 
later stages of the game. 
Chapter 5 studies the design of the optimal enforcement mechanism and its impact on the 
compliance level and stability of ICAs. Results show that because free-riding incentives 
increase with the coalitional abatement level, broad and deep coalitions cannot be stabilised 
under the optimal enforcement mechanism. However, this stability result is derived based on a 
model with symmetric players. The impact on stability of ICAs could be different if the 
players are characterised by asymmetric marginal abatement costs and benefits. This is one 
direction to extend our research. For asymmetric players, the optimal enforcement mechanism 
could result in the mixture of full and partial compliance in a coalition, thus signatories’ 
incentives to join are different. 
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Summary 
Relying on individual countries’ efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is 
insufficient for keeping the rising global average temperature below a level detrimental to 
humans. Instead, the threat of climate change requires global cooperative efforts to reach 
significant reductions in GHG emissions. Yet, it is difficult to reach a consensus on sharing 
the burden of climate change mitigation among nation states because of the free-riding 
incentives resulting from the public good property of climate change mitigation. In the 
absence of a supranational agency that takes the role of an enforcer of commitments, the 
compliance with mitigation commitments is also an obstacle to mitigation cooperation even 
after an international climate agreement (ICA) has been signed and ratified. To enable 
effective GHG emissions mitigation, the design of institutional and economic instruments that 
can facilitate the formation of ICAs is needed. The aim of this thesis is therefore to study the 
stability and effectiveness of ICAs by considering the impacts of carbon trade, countries’ 
uneven bargaining powers and enforcement mechanisms. Game theoretical modelling is a 
useful and appropriate tool to study the incentive mechanisms applied to agents with different 
preferences, and is often used to study the formation and stability of ICAs. Hence, game 
theory applies throughout this thesis. To relate the analytical solutions to the real problems in 
ICAs formation and thus to provide policy insights, numerical models and analyses are also 
employed and presented in this thesis.  
While Chapter 1 sets the scene and formulates the research questions, Chapter 2 develops 
a four-stage coalition formation game in order to study the impact of a carbon market on 
regional incentives to join an ICA for GHG emissions mitigation when the carbon market is 
established independently of this agreement. This carbon market, which is assumed to be 
formed after the mitigation coalition, is open to the mitigation coalition and its outsiders. In 
particular, the initial emissions permit choice of each participant in the carbon market is based 
on an endogenous permit choice mechanism introduced by Helm (2003). The impact of this 
carbon market on incentives to join the mitigation coalition and the interlinkages between the 
two coalitions are studied. Results show that number and size of stable mitigation coalitions 
are smaller with than without a carbon market. The intuition is that in the presence of a carbon 
market, players are faced with more strategic choices implying that members of the stable 
mitigation coalitions have a potential incentive to deviate from a mitigation coalition and 
become a carbon trader instead. This can destabilise the mitigation coalition. Because the 
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carbon market offers an alternative or complementary policy instrument to facilitate 
mitigation, some non-signatories to the mitigation coalition would join a carbon market which 
helps to reduce global emissions. However, the mitigation coalition has no incentive to join a 
carbon market with non-signatories, since the benefits from free riding surpass the net gains 
from carbon trade. It is concluded that even with this dual-agreement system, free-riding 
incentives prevail and global cooperation does not emerge.    
Chapter 3 develops a model of an international carbon market where allowances are 
endogenously determined by each member of a carbon trade agreement, but with an 
exogenous constraint on the number of allowances per member. A global model is used to 
explore the incentives for regions to participate in such a carbon market and to examine its 
performance. Results show that the stability and effectiveness of an international carbon 
market can be improved by imposing constraints on individual allowance choices compared 
to a carbon market without such constraints. Constraints on allowance choices reduce “hot air” 
and increase global welfare and mitigation. Under a relatively lax constraint (12% below 
BAU emissions in the STACO calibration), a carbon market with the largest membership can 
be formed. When tightening the constraint the stable carbon markets become smaller but 
perform better in terms of global abatement and welfare. If the constraint is too tight, however, 
no stable carbon market can be formed. Moreover, numerical results also demonstrate that by 
tying individual allowance choice constraints to the Nash-emissions levels, international 
carbon markets are more successful in terms of global welfare and abatement, as it responds 
better to individual incentives to participate. Hence, a revision of the baseline could ease 
current climate negotiations, where BAU emissions are still dominant for defining and 
negotiating abatement targets or emission allowances.  
Chapter 4 studies the impact of using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) for distributing 
coalitional gains under different sets of bargaining weights on the stability and effectiveness 
of international climate agreements. International climate negotiations are modelled as a Nash 
bargaining game in which cooperative gains are distributed based on the NBS with 
asymmetric bargaining power. In climate negotiations, asymmetric countries’ bargaining 
powers are unequal and may be driven by different characteristics of the players. By 
discussing and reviewing potential reasons that could induce differences of negotiators’ 
bargaining power in international climate negotiations, five different factors that determine 
negotiators’ bargaining power are identified: i) discount factor; ii) abatement efforts; iii) 
abatement costs; iv) climate change damages; v) economic power. Numerical results illustrate 
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that the Nash bargaining solution can improve the participation incentives and performances 
of ICAs as compared to those that do not redistribute gains from cooperation, but its capacity 
to overcome free-riding incentives is limited. The success of international climate agreements 
depends on the set of bargaining weights that matters in climate negotiation. Among five sets 
of asymmetric bargaining weights, the one determined by negotiators’ economic power can 
facilitate a climate coalition that comprises two of the largest emitters (China and United 
States) jointly with two other regions (High Income Asia countries and Brazil). In climate 
policy making multiple determinants of bargaining power will play a role. This is because 
countries’ incentives to cooperate on GHG mitigation are impacted in a complex way by 
factors that are related to abatement options, climate change vulnerability and economic 
power. Hence, the bargaining power of each negotiator is likely to be driven by multiple 
determinants. Our model can be extended in a straightforward manner to account for different 
interlinked drivers of bargaining power if these can be determined.  
Chapter 5 studies the design of an optimal enforcement mechanism for a self-enforcing 
ICA and the impact of an optimally designed enforcement mechanism on participation and 
compliance. The model is formulated as a sequential cartel formation game, in which the 
coalition chooses an enforcement policy comprising an abatement target, monitoring 
expenditures and fines. Individual signatories respond by choosing their preferred abatement 
level which may or may not comply with the target. In equilibrium, signatories’ compliance 
levels are determined by individual welfare maximization under the agreed enforcement 
policy. Considering partial compliance, it is demonstrated that the extent of compliance 
depends on abatement targets, monitoring expenditures (the intensity of monitoring) and the 
fine. Results show that the compliance level of a coalition member can always be improved 
by increasing the monitoring expenditure. However, the effect of the target on compliance 
levels depends on the structure of the fine function. The coalitional best abatement level can 
be induced as a joint result of the monitoring expenditure and the target when the fine 
function is quadratic. Because monitoring is costly, full compliance will usually not be 
enforced. As to the stability, a “broad” and “deep” climate coalition cannot be formed with a 
costly enforcement mechanism.  
Four conclusions can be drawn from this thesis. First, establishing a carbon market 
outside of a mitigation coalition may not help to improve countries’ incentives to join the 
mitigation coalition, while the global mitigation level can be increased because the carbon 
market offers an alternative or complementary policy instrument to facilitate mitigation. 
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Second, imposing a constraint with moderate degrees of strictness on initial allowance choices 
can increase the mitigation effectiveness and participation level of an international carbon 
market. Moreover, changing the baseline of the constraint from the BAU emissions level to 
the non-cooperative Nash level can also be considered a way to improve the success of an 
international carbon market. Third, factors that could influence bargaining powers of 
negotiating countries can be brought up and determined at pre-stage of international climate 
negotiations. Hence, policy designers for negotiations of ICAs may consider to use the 
determinants of bargaining power that can enhance large emitters’ bargaining position to 
improve the mitigation effectiveness of ICAs. Fourth, due to the existence of free-riding 
incentives in the process of compliance with mitigation commitments, an optimally designed 
enforcement policy is needed for the successful implementation of ICAs.       
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